By Maria Gloria - Since the uprisings Tunisia had been going through a “renegotiation” of what it should politically look like. Such processes are today addressed to what has been defined the implementation of “gender complementary” as stated in Art. 46 of the 2014 Constitution. The latter issue has publicly been welcomed as “broken tabu”, which in spite of the persisting diatribes between Islamists factions and secularists has today met a grade of freedom of speech within Tunisia society and its public spaces. Thus, the fact that does exist in Tunisia a place for social dissent on gender matters or whatever ostracized issues before 2011, is compulsory of the inclusive nature of new Tunisia, especially if the situation is compared to the case of Egypt, miles away from democratic state building processes and the establishing of al mujtama al madania ( civil society) today came to an end.
Economically, even though the management of domestic affairs -in terms of strikes and abolishment of state expenditures- has produced a slight financial improvements in rural areas ( an effect due also to the transnational policies in which, in some sense, Europe is playing its major role as Tunisia since ever represents the main partner for exportations and importations of goods ) the fulcrum of the debate on stability between Secularism and extremism has shifted from the political narrative to slums. Political parties, next to civil actors and UGTT, are theoretically called to take an incisive decision.
Indeed, the condition of slums in Tunisia have been degraded in the last months by social processes of radicalization mainly linked to the un-developed conditions of areas like Etthadamen.
The 2014 Constitutional text, by contrast to what stated in the Egyptian one, does not limit the Salafist-jihadi presence in politics or society by banning the principle of association on religious bases. Even though the Tunisian State is much more closer to the reformist nature advocated and claimed by the uprisings ( that no implicates the Tunisian has not forgotten the Jasmine and the Bouazizi’s syndrome in light of the many pragmatisms standing in its political agenda) the lack of reforms in slums today has gravely worsened so that they provide to the jihadi-branches that claimed legitimacy to benefit from state authority’s economic astaticism. This latter issue, rather than erroneously being politically contrasted , should rather be economically reconsidered in terms of development policies and decision making inclusive strategies. Strategic processes categorically ignored by Tunisian authorities.
If you want to drive people ( or citizens) to jihadism then closing off space for political expression is certainly one way to go about it. As experienced by Egypt during the 80’s and the 90’s in the area of Boulaq the condition of angered masses added to the Mubarak’s attempts of criminalizing of politics let Al Qaeda’s cells or affiliated groups to represent themselves as the alternative to the State by principles of dawaa and hisba , either far from Yusuf Al- Qaradawi’s post modern and more liberal doctrinal re-readings of the concept of citizenships ( al watanya) and participation.
The Salafist escalation in Tunisian areas symbolized, par antonomasia, by Ansar Al Sharia is first and foremost symptomatic of the economic & financial stagnancy gravely spread between graduates. I was reading time ago through Campanini’s book – a respected Italian Orientalist who approached to the reinterpretation of Political Islam in the aftermath of 2011. In his statement , the default has been caused by globalization which has swallowed the region in by principle of financial dependency , by not enabling the Middle Eastern North African Region to develop its economic net on the Arab League, which regional authorities and influence today is questionable.
I would not cynically accuse the IMF or the World Bank itself, more likely the dynamics and plan of providing policies in developing Countries, both subordinated to the state of corruption and interests before a mutual cooperation.
The political crisis in Tunisia is based on youth marginalization, those youth who were instrumental in the demise of the Ben Ali’s dictatorship, but who have not today been till met an integration process into political parties or taken an active role in social politics, in spite of the hard struggles to find a formal political role and develop a political culture different from corrupted and self-serving models which responds to their future aspirations and vision for the Country.
As consequence the context has put in place precise sociological dynamics so that for many young people today Jihadi Salafism offers an identity, a subculture, an inspirational opportunity to fight for something bigger than themselves, as governments are not producing any guarantees.
From this intricate background Ansar Al-Sharia keeps benefiting from also from its Libyan branch which with its call for charities campaigns in what is the Libyan ethnic identity clashes. That is symptomatic – from one side- of the risk of fueling anger against the secularist counterparts represented by Ettakatol or Nida Tunis incapable of matching social demand for changes by disenfranchised youth, after four years since Bouazizi’s syndrome spread out as exacerbation of public debt, stagnancy, privatization, corruption, geographical-economic disparities. None of these unequal economic approaches to politics have registered serious reforms , in spite of the conspicuous budget addressed to by Western governments.
No NGOs or stakeholder is rethinking local policies before state building and mainly peacekeeping actions specifically with regard to Etthadamen . The depiction of moderate Islamists has become very strong and dangerously addressed to influence the western audience, which today is even more culturally ,socially and politically no educated to the meaning of Political Islam. Even though Ghannouci is trying to shift his mindset after having been exiled, to reinterpret Political Islam (according to scholarly narrative) with a grade of anchoring to the “ British or French” ideological lessons on liberalism, after years spent on exile lived in contact with the highest expression of secularism, represented by the French exile; Tunisian audience maintains the skepticism on Shaykh Ghannouchi by providing its inability to break stereotyping barriers before the reset mindset of the leader. No doubts exiled leaders and representatives of the anti regime coalition carried on political activities in the French or UK branches during the 1990s, and that is addressed to the case of Egypt, Tunisia & Syria. However, if scholars in the West wondered if Tunisia could have represented a model for Egypt before its redundant Islamist ( apolitical) agenda, is explicative of that unquestionable slight change occurred in Ghannouchi’s social politics to deal with counterparts and oppositions forces. Symbolism of the Constitutional principles does differ between Egypt & Tunisia, but El-Nahda should be given credits for having put national interests before party’s ideology.
The shutting down of Islamist parties and NGOs in Egypt and the brutality of the ongoing repression in the county is miserably the farce on countering terrorism by accomplishing the Saudi authorities.
Parallel to this, the cracking down of terrorist groups in Tunisia is a farce and a fantastic orchestration for “Israel’s safety”, as is not limiting what is today defined “cyber- terrorism” or “networking jihadi platforms”. I would say that the conspiracy theory concerning the Arab uprisings (driven by US from its Israeli office- as Gilbert Achcar reported in his most brilliant radical analysis of the uprising “The People Want” and which words were expressed by Saleh ) finds a confirm in light of 1) the miserably slight economic reforms achieved ; 2) the completely schizophrenic way of processing counter-terrorism in spite of the many provisions and recommendations spread by International Crisis Group and aimed at implementing new pluralist policies ; 3) the friendship and dialogue standing between US and Muslim Brotherhood which has recently been listed as “terroristic organization” next to Hamas in Palestine ( which today has reached a strategic agreement with Fatah to get more political freedom of action after the limits imposed by cracking down) ; 4) the complete freedom addressed to jihadists on networking systems as proved by Facebook’s new generous ways of approaching to dawa .
What is the point of listing terrorist groups by keeping contacts with the creature that US itself created in the late 70’s beginning of 80’s pretending of calling for a de radicalization maneuvers?
Targeting Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia has today provided them with the privilege of clandestine status. This clandestine nature will in the next months and stages ambiguities, as whether attacks or bombings will take place the group is fully legitimated to deny any responsibilities. In addition, the strikes in the Capital next to the stable stagnancy or slight financial improvements are compulsory of the Salafist-jihadi manipulation of masses in slums in Etthandamen and Minhla.
Thus, the cracking down does not clash with the Constitutional principle of pluralist inclusivism, which means that the al Qaeda cell can legally operates through its divisions based on four senior leaderships.
Having stated that , many critics should be seriously moved to the US and EU policies in the region and their pragmatic and discrepant way of approaching regional counter- terrorism ,far from what stated by ICG.
When the Salafist-jihadi branches stood up in October 2013 for the dawaa campaign benefitting from the untruthfulness in political parties as actors of the transition, no local stakeholders has provided – and still is providing- a plan of public debt reduction , and if strikes will last for the next months, Islamists will be more legitimated in processing the mobilization of masses.
Even if Ennahda’s relationship with jihadi Salafist groups has been and it is problematic and confused ,it is not excluded from responsibilities in not struggling enough for a stabilization of the Country.
Etthadamen and Minhla micro projects
Etthadamen, as governatorate of Tunis made up of two suburban areas witnessed in 1996 presumed international projects for development addressed to the implementation of social participation of 100 women and 100 youth. The micro credit project was supposed to last 4 years and the outcomes should have been based on the tangible establishing of micro credit and income access or activities promoting the role of women in working places. Indeed, Etthadamen is today only one of the many slums from which in October 2013 Ansar Al- Sharia set up its dawaa campaign through micro social projects providing access to credit and economic resources, by effectively managing in the promotion, far from apparently corrupted ethos. Next to the economic and financial activities carried out in Tunisia the branch extended charities campaigns in Benghazi, by fully meeting the support of local peoples disenfranchised from State discourse. If from one side it would sound “socially inclined”, indeed Ansar activity is addressed to dismantle the spectrum of stability provided by the 2014 Constitution text by targeting the financial stagnancy which miserably shifted from 3.8% to 4%. The unemployment rate today, in spite of the many open gates is 30%, too high for fueling trust either in Ghannouchi , Marzouki or in the new presumed and sponsorized “civil society in its Constitutional proud ”. Even though some changes are actually occurred from a social perspective in terms of Constitutional gender equality and Constitutional voice assured to trade unions, where the role of UGTT has been crucial and still it is, as also here stated byindustrial ALL General Secretary Jyrki Raina:
The role of UGTT and member unions, including yourselves, has not only been of crucial importance in achieving this constitution you have been a shining example of how the trade movement can push for democracy and help change society.Jyrki Raina:
“ The breaking point which the Tunisian government is urgently called today to work on engulfs the processing of political economic reforms addressed to rethink the role of moderate Islamists by controlling trafficking, smugglings and cross border linkages “.
Furthermore, in the remapping of Al Qaeda’s structure, the cracking down of Ansar is useless to the destabilization of jihadism or salafism in the Maghreb if the decision will not be followed in the next months by actions addressed to the monitoring of the Algerian borders from which the organization economically depends on in terms of beautiful arms trafficking and narcotics.
de-radicalization in Tunisia by development policies in manatiq shabyya
As much of the literature on violence in Tunisia emphasizes the socio-economic dimensions of conflict, addressing such problems has been a central component of many of the practical recommendations. The international crisis group contends that prior to embarking on a security-based response to the transition, the Tunisia government and international actors should aim to provide and wide-ranging social, educational, and employment support services to the population. One of the possible de-radicalization strategies supported is based on the following model proposed by GSDRC in January 2014 and contrasting the standardized type of comprehensive de-radicalization
1.Bridging the border disparities – it would enable a more controlled power on gates from the western and eastern side which today are sanctuaries for extremist groups
2.Implement with UGTT the civil right of access to working market
3.Stark regional inequities
4.Fight against corruption
5.Reconsider the role addressed to youth in revolution – who have today been cut off of any roles in new established parties from both counterparts Islamists from Ennahda and secularist from Ettakatol or Nida Tunis
6.Ennahda should reconsiders its social politics and Islamist approach
To sum up, Tunisia should remember its revolution in this vortex of interests and ideological clashes. The recommendation is mainly addressed to the government –as democratically pointed out by the Crisis Group and Hinds in “Conflict Analysis in Tunisia”- which is today called to cooperate, following or emulating the Machiavelli’s political model ( to mean the call for inclusion of all counterparts) before the elections and encourage initiatives between less violent Islamic, Islamist and secular organizations to address social and economic problems resolution in nearby areas to the capital as first and stylized step towards the establishing of the civil society
This article has been previously published in Nawaat the Tunisian multi awarded blog which enabled the revolution in 2011. It has aroused many contestations between Tunisian readers first and foremost addressed to the re-reading of Rachid Ghannouchi’s Islamist liberalism. Most comments and critics proved to be locked in the inability to rethink the experience of the exile for former political representatives of opposition forces, which is not limited to the case of Shaikh Ghannouchi. With no doubt Rachid Ghannouchi’s ideology was during the 1990s strictly anchored to a certain grade of integralism and anti western attitude, and the exile even though did not stop his political activities certainly contributed to “moderate” the tactics in order to match one day with Country’s potential new order. Ghannouchi does belong to the “news Islamists” about which also Mandaville provided a categorization. However, the problem is that Tunisia in the Middle East is probably still a young community with regard to the construction of a political public and uncensored debate based on a deep political consciousness far for trolling and multilateral ways of approaching foreign narrative.
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