By Gian Marco Liuni
The 19-month long uprising shaking Syria has reached a stalling point. The United States compelled Saudi Arabia and Qatar to formally 'halt' their funds to the Syrian opposition to avoid cells from splintering independent of the rebels. In the same token, Turkish PM Erdogan promoted the “Eid” truce as brokered by UN Special Envoy Brahimi, lowering the rhetoric of the previous weeks. Whereas the environment around the Syrian crisis has 'appeased', the death toll reached the dramatic figure of 200 lives daily, highlighting the failure of the Eid al-Adha truce. Not much is left to external powers at the moment, as long as a credible alternative does not emerge from within.
For those who lie in the fault-line of this Middle Eastern 'Cold War', waiting is more harmful than acting. Not that the Kingdom of Jordan has the military strength or the political capital to its 'muscles' like Turkey anyway, but the fragile Hashemite Kingdom comes under fire more than others, properly because of its vicinity to the conflict. Although separate entities, by sharing 400 kilometres of border, Syria projects many effects on Jordan: this blurs the clear division between foreign and domestic policy that King Abdullah II has to formulate.
The refugees 'issue': Jordan's strife between selflessness, and State interests
The refugees in Jordan topped 200,000 at the moment. Being there an estimated 80,000 'illegals', the government halted rents for those who bypassed checkpoints. Jordan's cautious approach is due to a rooted sense of distrust. The waves of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967 taught the country that a 'temporary' solution, might in fact turn out a permanent one. This adds challenges to a so stressed a country that resorted to the 'daylight saving time' to alleviate its difficulties.
Nevertheless Jordan opted for an 'open border' policy contrary, for instance, to neighbouring Iraq. But maintaining a decent standard of living is not an easy task, since the camps are built in the desert areas of the northeast. In an effort to avoid curfews and clashes, which would have political implications, the King tried his best to gather international backing on the matter. Last week only, King Abullah met King Mohammad VI of Morocco and EU Special Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton, whom reiterated their financial support after visiting the Zaatari camp.
Politically, it is vital for Jordan that the refugees’ file is handled as smoothly as possible. Zaatari officially hosts 35,000 refugees near Mafraq, where the Islamists are active. Since the Syrian crisis has long been included in the movement's narrative, they enjoy widespread support among the refugees. Curfews like the one broken out this Sunday are dangerous as the Islamists have easy hand in 'mixing' the imperative to raise refugees' standards with that of eliminating the root of their problems by intervening in Syria. Demographically, Jordan fears the refugees will swell the ranks of those who actively push for Amman's deeper involvement into Damascus.
These 'pockets' of consensus cannot be but appeased by Amman: adopting a policy similar to that of Iraq would only fall in Islamists’ favour. The King must pursue his effort to attract international awareness more proactively: he should court the Syrian National Council to divert some of their funds to Jordan, since the organisation is often heard in Istanbul, but never in Amman despite the latter's support. The mediation of Washington could avoid Jordan from becoming another launching pad for the Free Syrian Army (FSA), like Turkey. This argument is strengthened by the decision to deploy US forces on the Jordanian border, evidence there is no interest of having the Kingdom dragged into the conflict directly.
The Syrian-Jordanian border tails off dangerously
For the last months there has been a dramatic rise in illegal border crossings. This Monday, another Jordanian fell fighting with jihadists in Deraa: it is estimated that more than 250 Jordanian Jihadists managed to cross into Syria. This is a trend that is growing parallel to the mushrooming of funds to Syria, which from the Gulf manage to sideline the entry point in Turkey. The more the weapons pour in, the more Salafi leaders 'invest' to increase their weight for when the settlement comes. The impossibility to control the long border turns the North to a grey area managed by Salafi leaders like Mohammed Al-Tahawi: such work as a hub for Jordanians leaving, and Syrians looking for a safe zone. The benchmark serves also to bring in materials to be used in Jordan, as an alleged bombing plot thwarted by the GID evidences.
The killing of one Jordanian soldier who tried to resist Syrians from entering the country, did not spark any fear of Amman retaliating. Jordan cannot act like Turkey for many reasons. It has neither Ankara's 'directorate' system nor any international backing: Washington historically wants Jordan to be the country where the debris can be thrown once its neighbours are done with their renovations. Secondly, Amman is more sensitive to the Syrian crisis both for the demographics mentioned above, and for the King is not ideologically linked with the Syrian opposition, as Erdogan instead is. This corners the King to a de facto impossibility to reverse this course: as for Lebanon, as long as the external powers do not agree on a different 'assignment' for Jordan, the King cannot tailor a new Jordanian role by himself.
Damascus takes off Amman's mask of stability
Indeed King Abdullah's challenges are far tougher than its neighbours'. An Islamist victory in Syria would benefit the Jordanian one not because they want to bring down anyone at home after that: the King only worries about 'externalities', meaning that Jordanians who feel politically affine with Syrians will mobilise in Jordan for the same policies adopted by their neighbours. Besides, he will be forced to finally empower the Parliament.
Most important is the temporary 'deal' between the King and his citizens, since these latter are appeased by Amman siding with the Anti-Assad bloc. King Abdullah is forced to be against Assad and willing to bring down his regime, while knowing that this will strengthen Jordan’s Islamists. If he does not, not only he would lose precious allies in the West, but would risk to be labelled as joining the Iranian bloc. Thus, whereas for the Islamists it is a win-win situation, the King must negotiate an opening towards reforms, while not losing his traditional power-bases deriving from the influential tribes, who distrust the Brotherhood.
The aforementioned effects of the Syrian crisis are primarily acting in a subtle way: it is 'blurring' the perception of what is the legitimate fear of 'political persecution', and the abuse of this notion. In fact the Salafists can mobilise and obtain the release of detained by only 'naming and shaming', as much as an NGO would do. To be clear, statistically there is indeed a crackdown on protesters, as reinforced by the recent law on media regulation and recent wave of arrests. But some of the individuals were charged with assault on public officers: the King nonetheless intervened to secure their release, who even met urgently with the PM to consider their grievances. When the popular mobilisation can in any way influence the normal judicial course, it means the foundations of the Jordanian State are starting to be questioned.
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The Syrian crisis acted by shortening the distance that separates Jordan from the deadline to reforms. The King will have to work further on his bid to attract international backing on his operate, and stance as a 'peacemaker'. Even the Qatari Emir's visit to Gaza contributed to circle King Abdullah further, by empowering the alignment that opposes him inside Jordan's borders. Ironically, the only way out is represented by the same foreign patrons which for the last sixty years shaped Jordan's weaknesses as they are nowadays: the same that want Jordan to be the 'closet' of the Middle East, where all the others' skeletons can be hidden.
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