** Ideology against primary needs: the case of Jabhat Al-Nusra (The Nusra Front)
By Gian Marco Liuni *
Though used here in a rhetorical manner, this question poses anew since the Syrian conflict steers towards sectarianism and religious fundamentalism. In fact, properly due to the polarisation of the 'creed' decision-makers in the United States and Europe have been hesitant to intervene for the last 22 months, caught between the wish to possibly bandwagon on a Sunni victory, and the imperative to restrain from arming the rebels for fears of fundamentalist backlashes.
But the Syrians, it might appear, see it in a different way. As soon as in December the Obama administration branded the Salafi-Jihadi group Jabhat Al-Nusra a “terrorist organisation” the main opposition Syrian National Coalition outburst in disagreement, echoed by many Local Military Councils who regard the 'front' as indispensable to outweigh Assad's better equipped forces. The organisation's leader, allegedly Abu Mohammad Al-Golani, imprinted the group with a radical platform focused on Sunni exclusivism, strict interpretation of the Shari'a law, and violent rejection of men's self-govern.
What actually strikes the most is the popular reaction to the blacklisting. Thousands of Syrians gathered in Idlib, Aleppo and Damascus to their support for the radical Salafi group. Rallies pivoted on exalting the bravery of Al-Nusra's fighters and their heroic gestures to free the country off Assad, the “real terrorist in Syria” as most banners lamented. This all evidences the growing popularity the group enjoys at grassroots level, most appalling to Washington for it is convinced that the front is affiliated to the Iraqi Al-Qaeda.
The puzzle that is causing Western politicians many sleepless nights is how come a group whose main goal is to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Syria is gaining such a resonance, admiration, and even meeting popular legitimacy. The truth is that, led astray by the fear regarding Assad's chemical arsenal and the uncontrolled warlordism unravelling on the ground, analysts 'overestimated' the link between the Syrians' short-term need to find an 'efficient' liberator and the willingness to follow such radical agenda later at times of peace. Indeed what is happening is that Jabhat al-Nusra is building its popularity on the ability to address the civilians' primary needs while carrying out the most effective military operations against the regime. But this does not mean their ideological aim matches the kind of Syria most citizens wish to see out of this bloody conflict. Therefore it seems the popularity of the 'hardcore' narrative is just temporary. There are many points to understand how Al-Nusra's jihadism comes to be appealing and to cooperate with moderate Islamic thought, allegedly the mainstream political ideology among Syrian Sunni.
First of all, Jabhat Al-Nusra is one of the few forces to be almost entirely made up of Syrians, made exception for its strand in Damascus. The group concentrates on independence and quality, rather than quantity: it numbers barely 6000 units with no necessity to resort to foreign 'labour', unlike moderate Suqour Al-Sham and Al-Tawhid Brigade who aim to gather in wide coalitions of 40000 fighters. This enhances peoples' perception that Al-Nusra does not follow any foreign agenda and do fight solely for the Syrians, feeling that grows in importance as disillusionment about outside intervention mounts.
But commentators who depict the front as a 'magnet' for foreign mujahideen are not wrong either. In fact, contrary to the bottom, the leadership is increasingly attracting experienced 'trainers' from Iraq, Lebanon and Libya. This is evident from the shift in strategy Al-Nusra adopted. The May 2012 Damascus bombing was carried out through sophisticated remote devices, a tactic which Syrian security apparatuses taught jihadi groups who operated in Iraq: this strengthens the view proposed by the Institute for the Study of War that Al-Nusra's founding members were previously working for the Syrian government. But from the October bombing of Aleppo these attacks have been executed by suicide bombers whose jihadi cause was put well clear in video statements. This shift evidences not only further radicalisation, but the presence of foreign 'know-how' in designing such attacks. Nevertheless, since most field-fighters speak with Idlib or Aleppo's accent this helps Syrians to better accept the revolution, since it assumes the connotation of a domestic struggle independent of foreign interests.
Secondly, Al-Nusra's popularity has to do with both its military efficiency and the communitarian aspect of its 'protocol'. Especially in the more industrial areas of Aleppo the population is growing frustrated with the little advances of the revolution: the constant shortages of water, bread and the disruption of local businesses have in fact alienated upper and middle classes, who come now to see the uprising essentially as a rural-driven effort with little advantages for them. Even worse there is a general lack of trust about the Free Syrian Army, who failed to manage to run daily administration in liberated areas. People lament scarce security and the fighters' lack of discipline: this resulted in widespread looting and abuses, including corruption which led cities to be run on a mafia-like style.
With Jabhat Al-Nusra things are surprisingly different. Militarily, they avoid killing of civilians trying not to alienate the population, learning from the mistakes of Al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq. As documented in many videos they tend not to 'chase' Assad's forces as these are pushed out of an area: as soon as the army retreats, they suspend operations so not to destroy houses, markets and local businesses further, having understood that in doing so they would then be responsible for feeding the involved population. This is a crucial stance contributing to Al-Nusra's fame, at the expense of the less diligent FSA.
The highly communitarian ideology of Al-Nusra is the key to its popularity as it places the Sunni well-being at the core of its operate. Indeed alongside the military wing Al-Nusra has humanitarian-issues 'experts' who try to address water shortages and food. In a few villages bordering Turkey in the North there are reports highlighting how Shari'a is used to punish those bakers who increase bread prices, practice that would harm the community as a whole. Most importantly in virtue of this community-centred ideology Al-Nusra's fighters follow a self-imposed 'code of conduct' which does not tolerate any abuses on the population or any looting.
In brief, its success lies in its ability to efficiently take over the administration as areas are liberated from Assad's rule. Not only fighting then, but medical care and 'patrolling' services which enhance the people's perception of safety. In such desperation and disillusionment about a quick way out of the war, the Syrians have naturally become more result-oriented and have realised they have to organise themselves for a long-term disruption of the State. Having found those who can ease their daily suffering, some strands within the Syrian society forced themselves to accept as 'normal' even outrageous acts like the burning of Shi'a Mosques or the inflammatory sectarian narrative that Jabhat Al-Nusra propels.
Finally, there are economic considerations for the growth of Al-Nusra about which there are plenty of statements and documentation. Many fighters from ideologically affine groups, such as Ahrar Al-Sham, tend to switch to Al-Nusra for the simple reason that this is better equipped militarily, and crucially it assures protection and financial support to the whole family of those who join in. Ideology seems not to be the priority to explain why the organisation is becoming popular: most fighters come from a rural background who wave the flag of political Islamism and Jihadi-Salafism with little distinction on the content. Those who fight do it bearing in mind Syria as well as the cultural heritage it bears, which is Islamic. But fighting driven by religion does not mean necessarily promoting religious totalitarianism. The same fighters they themselves have a loose interpretation and knowledge of the ideology distinguishing an organisation from another, and join those who simply have better resources and assure protection. Hardcore jihadi believers form the leadership, but it is disconnected from the 'labourers': fighters on the ground usually do not even know their superiors outside of the cell they belong to.
Jabhat Al-Nusra is therefore the clearest example of how war 'myths' and humanitarian efficiency can win widespread sympathy despite ideological isolation, in desperate contexts. This popularity is paradoxically favoured by Al-Assad's willingness to cling onto power. In fact with no breakthrough in sight the current stalemate is pitting brigades one against the other to compete for resources, draining these mostly from the population: Jabhat Al-Nusra is tailoring a role as the less corrupted yet effective force against Al-Assad. With no viable political solution and with moderate Islamists incapable to find access to financial and military support, there is no doubt that Syrians will have to rely on Salafi-Jihadists and their foreign patrons to address their primary needs.
In the end, does the popularity of jihadists mean the Syrians want an Islamic Caliphate? There is no relevant evidence that would answer positively to this provocative question. Besides the above mentioned factors, there are historical reasons why such radical ideology cannot manage to spread from its North-West stronghold to the rest of the country. Interpreting the fragmentation of the Syrian society, in 1972 the Muslim Brotherhood split abruptly over ideological divisions for the Aleppo-Hama wing could not tolerate any dialogue with the Ba'ath secular regime, as the Damascus fringe was instead 'open' to. Beyond ideology, the many land reforms the Ba'ath inaugurated resulted in massive expropriation of land which completely alienated the vast Aleppine landownership. These two factors have radicalised the North-West, considered more socially and economically conservative than the rest of the country.
In fact during this week Jabhat Al-Nusra seized the Idlib's military airport of Taftanaz and much of the surrounding area. When questioned whether they will hand the huge portions of liberated land to the FSA, the Al-Nusra commander told AlJazeera that “these should be given back to the peasants and farmers who Assad originally stole from”, signal that right-wing populism can easily swipe away support from the FSA here. Nevertheless, despite being strong in these areas, the geographical and the urban-rural divide will determine where radical groups will face their limits as the war endures.
In conclusion, the support for Jabhat Al-Nusra uncovers a deep social fault-line between Syrians. Military considerations, difficulties in running normal administration, and the international 'skirmishes' regarding the supply of funds are all a super-structure exacerbating social, economic, and ideological differences already present among the Syrians. This ultimately benefited radical groups who have little problems with funding and do not have to wait for any outside orders before bringing home results.
But the favourable tide for these organisations is war, not peace time. When the crisis will be over and the State will start to run again, the old urban-rural and North-South divide will emerge further. Those Salafi ideologies which want to strictly Islamise the society, whether through participation to democracy or by violent means, are simply not appealing outside of their Northern conservative strongholds. In Hama and Homs the distrust for the Muslim Brotherhood is still as high as right after the massacres of thirty years ago, which leaves the population with no alternative to radicalism. But anywhere else moderate Islam has way more chances to emerge if finally capable to unite under a lowest common denominator, and to secure stable funding.
By that it is not meant that we can expect democracy out of this war, or to be more precise, a democracy in its Western conception. Most Sunni wish to see Islam rooted in the way State and society will be transformed by this conflict. But there is a whole ideological spectrum between an Egypt's democratically elected Islamism, and the Salafi conception that men have no right to govern themselves. And as long as the international community fails to draw a clear picture of who is fighting for what in Syria, all of its in-actions are shaping the tolerance and the perception Syrians will have of liberal-democracy in the future. A courtesy to Jabhat Al-Nusra.
* Gian Marco Liuni is an Italian political analyst and researcher with special focus on Middle Eastern affairs, particularly the developments in Syria. He contributed this article to Ammon News English.
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