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18 April 2024

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The more Iran loses abroad, the deeper its crisis at home

12-10-2026 10:56 AM


Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh
Iran’s failure to bring the United States back to any form of negotiation is pushing the confrontation into a new phase, one in which much of the pressure is likely to shift towards Iran’s domestic front. Tehran is facing a different reality as its ability to use some of the tools that once served as major instruments of regional pressure and escalation continues to diminish.

Iran’s escalation in the Strait of Hormuz can be understood in this context. Attempts to target or threaten maritime traffic appear, in part, to be an effort to challenge the American narrative that Washington has secured navigation through the strait and restored significant volumes of oil to international markets. As Hormuz loses some of its value as an Iranian instrument of pressure, Tehran risks losing one of its most important cards.

This is where the Bab al-Mandab Strait becomes increasingly significant. The Houthis’ actions over the past period have also aimed to maintain pressure on the global economy and international shipping routes, while keeping the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, under a constant level of threat. If efforts to limit the Houthis’ ability to threaten maritime traffic become more effective, Iran could lose a second major card in its regional strategy.

Against this backdrop, Tehran is likely to make greater use of the tools it still has, particularly to prevent the formation of a broader regional or international coalition against Iran and its regional allies. This could mean intensifying efforts to influence countries such as Pakistan and Turkey, and prevent them from adopting more active positions in support of Saudi Arabia or engaging more directly in efforts to contain Iranian influence.

At the same time, Iran may seek to activate its networks in different parts of the world, not necessarily to open new military fronts, but to create instability and pressure that make it harder for its adversaries to build a more cohesive regional and international front. If European countries, including France, begin playing a more active role in securing maritime routes, Iran’s room to manoeuvre will narrow further.

But the most important development may not be taking place abroad. It may be unfolding inside Iran itself.

Iran is facing mounting economic, political and social pressures, which could gradually become a central part of the confrontation. As the conflict continues and Tehran’s external leverage weakens, disagreements within the political establishment over how to manage the crisis and who should bear responsibility may become more pronounced. These pressures are emerging alongside continuing security challenges in different parts of the country, including Sistan and Baluchestan.

The equation is becoming increasingly clear, the more Iran loses its cards abroad, the deeper its crisis at home. As its ability to use Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraq as instruments of pressure or potential fronts diminishes, Tehran will have to deal more directly with the political, economic and security consequences of that decline within its own borders.

In this context, the confrontation could enter a new phase in which pressure on Iran’s domestic front increases alongside continued efforts to weaken its regional network. This includes the ongoing campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon, efforts to constrain the Houthis’ ability to threaten maritime traffic, and attempts to prevent Iraq from becoming another front in the conflict.

The central paradox is that losing its external leverage does not simply mean a decline in Iran’s regional influence. It also increases the domestic cost of the confrontation. The crisis is no longer defined solely by Tehran’s ability to threaten the region or mobilise its networks beyond its borders. It is increasingly about its ability to manage the economic, political and social consequences of that retreat.

The most sensitive phase of this confrontation may be the one in which Iran’s loss of external leverage gradually becomes a domestic crisis, making the preservation of internal cohesion as important as managing the confrontation with its adversaries.




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