Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

Sanctions on Iran are no longer simply an instrument of economic pressure. Washington appears to be gradually moving from a policy of attrition toward an attempt to dry up the system that has allowed Tehran to circumvent sanctions and preserve its sources of financing for years. The confrontation is no longer limited to oil, banks and petrochemicals, but is expanding to front companies, shadow fleets, exchange networks, cryptocurrencies, individuals and entities that form part of Iran’s financial networks stretching from Turkey to Lebanon and beyond.

What makes the current phase different is that the United States appears to have a clearer intelligence map of these networks. The objective is therefore no longer simply to target sources of revenue, but the environment that allows Iran to continue operating despite sanctions, including the actors and companies that provide Tehran with room for maneuver. This means that American pressure may not stop at Iran’s borders, but could extend to those helping Tehran keep its trade and financial channels open.

In the past, Washington relied on pressure while keeping the door to diplomacy open. Today, after years of negotiations without decisive results, American patience appears to be wearing thin. Economic pressure has therefore become part of a broader strategy combining sanctions, diplomacy and military power. Military power is not necessarily an alternative to negotiations; it can be the instrument that gives diplomacy greater weight.

This is where the factor of time becomes critical. Iran, which has long relied on endurance and maneuvering, is entering this phase from a difficult economic position, after years of economic and social crises and a war that has added new burdens. If Washington succeeds in reducing Iran’s channels for evasion and increasing the cost of using them, sanctions could move from an instrument of pressure to a broader economic and social crisis capable of affecting the regime’s ability to manage the situation at home.

Yet this will not be an easy battle. Iran has spent decades building a complex system for dealing with sanctions, involving front companies, shadow fleets and financial and commercial networks, while its relationship with China continues to provide an important channel for economic movement. The issue, therefore, is not about closing every door to Tehran, but about reducing the number of available channels and raising the cost of using them to a level that makes sanctions evasion increasingly difficult.

What is particularly significant is that this pressure is now beginning to appear in Iran’s own political discourse. When President Masoud Pezeshkian calls for an end to the war and openly criticizes those obstructing an agreement, he is not speaking only to the outside world. He is also opening a debate inside Iran over who really controls the decision-making process and who bears responsibility for the continuation of the crisis.

Pezeshkian is trying to present himself as close to the ordinary Iranian who will pay the price of continued war and renewed sanctions. At the same time, he is sending a message that delaying an agreement could make the terms of negotiation even more difficult. He does not want Iran to appear to be surrendering under pressure, rather he is arguing that reaching an agreement now may be preferable to waiting until Tehran faces much harsher circumstances.

This is where sanctions and war become forces capable of reshaping Iran’s internal political balance. The longer the crisis continues, the higher the political cost of decision-making becomes, while more sensitive questions emerge about who is actually determining the country’s direction, particularly amid continuing uncertainty surrounding the centers of power within the regime.

Iran still has important cards to play, from its international relationships to its economic networks and its long experience in circumventing sanctions. The American military option also remains present, even when it is not used directly. The continued presence of American military power in the region gives both sanctions and diplomacy additional weight.

The coming battle, therefore, may not simply be a confrontation between Washington and Tehran. It may also become a battle over time inside Iran itself. The real question is no longer only whether the United States will impose more sanctions, but whether it can close enough of Iran’s evasion channels to turn sanctions from an instrument of pressure into a comprehensive crisis.

At that point, external pressure could become an entry point for an internal struggle over the decision itself. The question will be whether Tehran can endure until the equation changes, or whether American pressure will, this time, turn the factor of time against Iran.