Dr. Hamad Kasasbeh

Sea routes are no longer the only weak point facing Arab economies. They now reveal a deeper problem: much of the region’s economic model still assumes that geography is stable and that global trade will continue under clear and predictable rules. Recent conflicts have shown that this assumption is no longer safe. Economies do not wait for wars to end before they feel the effects. From the first moments of a crisis, trade, investment, prices, and supply flows become part of pressure, deterrence, and shifts in political power, even for countries that are not directly involved in the fighting.

Long before ports close or ships stop moving, markets begin to price in new risks. Shipping and insurance costs rise, companies review their supply routes and investment plans, and key production materials arrive late. The effects then move quickly from the sea to factories, shops, and households. A country may face serious disruption without a single shot being fired within its borders. Distance from the battlefield is therefore no longer enough to protect an economy, because the impact of conflict now travels through trade, finance, energy, transport, and digital systems faster than it moves across traditional borders.

For this reason, debate about the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, or the Red Sea should not focus only on safe navigation or the flow of oil and gas. These routes are not the whole issue. They are a test of whether an economy can continue working when geography becomes part of a conflict. The main question is no longer only how to protect shipping lanes, but how to protect economic activity if those lanes are blocked, become much more expensive, lose insurance coverage, or fall under political and military pressures that no single state can control.

For many years, economic security in the Arab world was mainly understood as protecting natural resources, securing energy facilities, supporting exports, and building financial reserves to absorb market shocks. That view made sense when the main risks were linked to oil prices and continued energy exports. Today, however, the risk picture is wider. Strong financial reserves and large natural resources remain important, but they are no longer enough to keep an economy running. Disruption may come from transport, technology, payment systems, or broken supply chains rather than from a simple lack of money.

A state may have large financial reserves and still be unable to buy goods that cannot reach its markets, run factories that have lost essential parts, secure medicines when supply chains fail, or protect investment when transport and financial risks become too high. Money can cover part of the losses, but it cannot quickly replace ports, suppliers, transport routes, or digital systems. This is why the meaning of economic security has changed. In the twentieth century, it mostly meant protecting resources. Today, it means keeping the economy working and restoring normal activity quickly after disruption.

One of the most important features of modern geopolitical conflict is that competition has moved into the economy itself. Transport networks, supply chains, payment systems, sanctions, technology, data, insurance, and digital infrastructure are now tools of influence and pressure. Traditional wars aimed mainly to control land. Modern conflicts can weaken a state by limiting its ability to produce, trade, finance activity, or provide essential services. This creates a clear need for an Arab approach to economic security that connects economic policy more closely with national security and treats economic continuity as a core national interest.

Such an approach should not be a political slogan or a temporary emergency plan. It should be a practical long-term framework that moves policy from reacting after a crisis to preparing before one begins. It does not require full self-sufficiency, closing economies, or reducing trade with the world. It also should not replace dependence on one partner with dependence on another. Its main purpose is to make sure that no single supplier, market, transport route, or technology system can stop a large part of the economy, and that workable alternatives are ready before they are urgently needed.

Under this approach, stronger supply chains, more suppliers and markets, strategic reserves, food and medicine security, better transport links, and the protection of financial and digital systems all become parts of one system. Government readiness, fast coordination, and clear decision-making are equally important. The Arab world already has many of the building blocks: natural resources, a central geographic position, major ports, large markets, and strong financial capacity. The main challenge is not the lack of assets, but the failure to connect them through a shared plan that can keep economic activity moving during periods of pressure.

Building this approach does not require waiting for full Arab agreement or creating large new institutions. It can begin with practical cooperation among groups of countries on food and medicine reserves, connected ports and transport routes, early risk information, shared emergency plans, and regular tests of key sectors. The aim is no longer only to protect sea routes, but to protect the economy when those routes become part of a conflict. In the years ahead, the safest countries will not simply be those with the most resources, but those best able to keep their economies, institutions, and markets working under pressure. Economic continuity is now a practical measure of sovereignty.