By Gian Marco Liuni


The Syrian crisis which claimed the lives of more than 39000 people is having way more intense an effect than the untold human suffering. Even in neighbouring Amman the Friday protests are always inaugurated by a wish to the Syrian brothers.

Interviewed at a rally against the presence of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in the capital, a member of the Islamic Action Front strongly pushed for foreigners to arm the resistance. In condition of anonymity, he then commented on the upcoming meeting in Doha - “whatever project orchestrated from abroad that does not include the Generals on the ground is fated to fail. The international community should focus on implementing a no-fly zone and to supply weapons to the rebel army”.

But it is on 'who' such an opposition is that the international community stuck. Hillary Rodham Clinton, fed up with a Syrian National Council which fails to implement directives on the ground, requested a more a 'monolithic' interlocutor which is inclusive of the Syrian reality. The long series of attacks started in July, when the mukhabarat headquarters were bombed, forced the United States to reconsider their unconditional support. Being such attacks claimed by Jihadi groups such as Jubhat al-Nusra, who do not recognise any alternative to the Islamic State, the West asked for more control on Turkish and Gulf funds which might end up in Salafi hands.

The truth is that this 'reassessment' is useful to the opposition alike, or better, the oppositions. Self-proclaimed “the only voice of the Syrian people” the SNC realised its internecine struggle turned this group of expatriates to nothing more than a coalition of “fund-raisers”, with no effective implementation powers. In these 20 months personalities like Burhan Ghalioun and Abdulbaset Sieda offered themselves as intermediaries between the Gulf in particular and the Free Syrian Army. The problem is that the 'leader' himself of the FSA, Riad al-Asaad, admits he can only issue “general instructions” from Turkey: the local military councils retain veto power. The shown inefficiency and the subsequent reduction of diplomatic backing, forced the organisation to realise that it cannot remain a 'foreign' organism anymore in order to be credible.

This is why already the 11th of November the “National Coalition of the Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces” was born. The SNC's apparent attempt to defy the United States, was indeed a due formality for the media. Analysing the composition of this body, it is easy to understand that the Doha-line has prevailed: of the 60 seats, 22 are reserved to the 'intransigent' SNC; 14 for the Local Revolutionary Councils; 2 to the Kurdish National Council; 3 to the Turkmen community; 9 to non-specified relevant personalities within the opposition; 9 to further non-specified organisations.

The executive consists of a President, Ahmad Mouaz al-Khatib, assisted by three deputies, Riad Seif, and Suhair al-Atassi: the third position, reserved to a Kurd, remains vacant. On the basis of the 'Geneva agreement' of June, the NCSROF will form an interim government sided by a military council and a legislative committee: this will result in a transitional government charged with organising the elections, and revise the Constitution.

Considering the alternative to Bashar al-Assad presented in Doha, is it time to grant full trust to the opposition?

There are many positive steps forward. Finally some of the Local Councils are represented: "We will urge the international community to channel both humanitarian aid and military aid through this body. This will dry out or at least dwindle the informal funding”, commented the same al-Atassi to Al-Jazeera. After the Kurdish Sieda, the SNC elected the Christian George Sabra at its leadership, trying to shrug off accusations of being a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated body. Most importantly, the NCSROF tried to inaugurate the Lybian model: regroup the rebels under a unitary body, and prepare them to be the future interim government.

Nevertheless, the missed election of the third vice-president, and of as many as 18 seats, reduce its credibility. It gives the idea this effort was only to calm Washington down, by including some representatives from the ground. The same figure of Ahmed Mouaz al-Khatib brought everyone back to caution: elected for his inter-sectarian narrative, voices which depict him as a Sunni exclusivist and a staunch opponent of Israel, are multiplying daily. Although these have all to be confirmed yet, they reveal it is better to inquire before giving the full backing.

Within the new coalition, the SNC remains by far the 'favoured' entity (with as much as a third of the whole power for itself) due to its intransigence towards al-Assad, which brings it in total sympathy with Riyadh and Doha. The agreement, as retrieved from Carnegie, even places the requisite of 'non-negotiation' on top of the list:


The invitation extended by the State of Qatar in coordination with the Arab League bore fruit when the Syrian National Council and the other opposition groups attending this meeting agreed to form the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. Membership in the new body will be left open to all hues of the Syrian opposition. The Coalition’s Statutes shall make clear each side’s proportion of representation.

1.The sides agreed to bring down the regime and all its symbols and mainstays, to disband the regime’s security services and to call to account those responsible for crimes against Syrians.

2.The Coalition commits not to engage in any dialogue or negotiation with the regime.

3.The Coalition will have Statutes ready for signing once they are duly discussed and approved.

4.The Coalition will endorse the Joint Command of the Revolutionary Military Councils.

5.The Coalition will set up the Syrian National Legal Committee and issue the regulations governing its task in a special resolution.

6.The Coalition will set up technical and specialized committees required for its work. A special resolution will spell out the committees, their number and the modalities of their establishment and duties.

7.The Coalition will form an Interim Government after receiving international recognition.

8.The Coalition and Interim Government will be dissolved by a Coalition decision once the National General Assembly is held and the Transition Government formed.

9.This Agreement will not come into effect before its ratification by the sides’ relevant principals.

10.The Arab Ministerial Committee for Syria shall lodge this Agreement upon its signing with the Arab League Secretariat.


But this principle delays every possibility for a settlement in a short time. Syria is not Libya: 30% of the Syrians are more afraid of the alternative than of the regime itself. It is not Egypt either, as the opposition is fragmented in dozens of small parties, each one clinging to the insignificant difference vis-a-vis the others but which keeps them alive. For these reasons, its decision not to open to figures from the current regime might result in a backlash.

Tehran vainly attempted to organise a counter-conference in the same days as Doha's, inviting its 'selected' opposition. The “National Coordination Body for Democratic Change” includes too many figures from the current parliamentary opposition which undermines the legitimacy of such an option from the grassroots. The abuse from Iran and Syria of the term “terrorists”, used to topple even genuine requests for change, handed to the Gulf and the Turkish coalition the responsibility to find a solution to the crisis.

Charged with so many expectations it is wondered whether the 'new' opposition will survive to the internal divisions which crippled its predecessor. For sure the US and Europe are not willing to treat legitimacy as a 'given' anymore: this will be granted on the NCSROF capacity to symbiosis between 'head' and the 'arm' within Syria. Rami G. Khouri has better than anyone else synthesised the key points on which it has to work: coordinate military activities; a credible governance in the liberated areas; convince minorities that the new Syria is not going to resemble Iraq; manage the increasing influx of funds in an efficient manner and free of corruption. This is a monumental job which basically means the body will have to re-build a new State as the areas starting from the North are freed.

It is for this reason that al-Khatib, Seif and al-Atassi have undertaken a journey to Europe. The trio has to convince the West that the opposition 'has done its homework', and now it is time to grant full political, and financial backing. Earned the hesitant support of Westminster, the European Union adds itself to those which more or less recognised the coalition, together with the Arab League and the Gulf. The morale is so high that France is actively pushing to start to supply 'defensive weapons'.

The truth is that the international community has two concerns: Syria ending up being governed by a Mohamed Morsi, and the impossibility to disarm Al-Qaeda inspired groups once the State-Building phase is complete. Whereas for the first there are yet few hints which point in such a direction, the second in unfortunately a certainty. Syria has been doomed to destabilising attacks by the decision to shake its order already twenty months ago.

But this is exactly the reason why it is the moment to give trust. By creating a solid government it is still possible to defuse those groups for which the Islamic State is not the top priority. It is not a case that, as soon as Brussels granted recognition, brigades such as Liwaa al-Tawhid retracted a previous statement with which they opposed any collaboration with the NCSROF. The inclusion of many Local Councils is already an important step which deserves an opening towards the coalition.

In the meanwhile the NCSROF established its headquarters in Cairo, planning its showdown into Syria to be within the next two weeks. Nevertheless, the challenges of the National Coalition for the Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces go beyond the mere establishment of an alternative government. It remains to be seen whether the many fragments of the opposition will be included in the democratic channel, and if they will manage to dialog without compromising the post-Assad order.

But one thing at a time: in the Middle East, unfortunately, there is always time to make war.