The funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is no longer merely a delayed commemorative ceremony that took nearly three months to take place. It has instead become a political signal marking Iran’s entry into a forced transitional phase. The question is no longer limited to who will succeed the Supreme Leader, but rather what kind of system will emerge after him.
This is particularly evident in the continued reliance on the notion of the “absent Supreme Leader.” The representative of the Hidden Imam has himself become absent from the scene, yet this absence does not negate the need to preserve his symbolic presence as a source of legitimacy that accompanies the political transition and prepares the ground for the next phase, from negotiations to political accommodations.
In parallel, President Trump appears to be betting on this phase as the beginning of Iran’s shift from confrontation to pragmatism. The decision to grant the regime a period to conduct the funeral, along with references to a more rational leadership in Tehran, reflects an approach aimed at pushing Iran to focus on its internal crises rather than its regional project.
From this perspective, the issue of frozen Iranian assets, mechanisms for supervising their use, and the gradual easing of sanctions become tools for reshaping the regime’s priorities, so that the economic equation turns into the foundation of political survival in the post-war phase.
Inside Iran, pragmatism also appears to define this transitional phase. The maintenance of the Supreme Leader in “political absence,” combined with limited messaging that balances revolutionary constants with signals of openness to negotiations, reflects an attempt to preserve legitimacy while redistributing power.
The absence of a clear succession mechanism and the limited public visibility suggest that Iran is gradually moving away from a rigid hierarchical religious system centered on the Supreme Leader toward a more horizontal security-political structure, where institutions share centers of decision-making, while the office of the Supreme Leader remains a symbolic umbrella that grants legitimacy to this transformation.
This shift adds a political and security dimension to Iran’s existing economic and social crises. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which for decades built its influence through a combination of domestic control and a regional network stretching from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen to the Red Sea and Sudan, is now facing an unprecedented test. Its spheres of influence are contracting, its proxies are under sustained pressure, and internal crises are forcing a reordering of priorities in which preserving the state’s structure and survival is becoming more urgent than continuing regional expansion.
However, the IRGC’s ability to maintain its domestic position remains tied to its capacity to preserve parts of its external leverage, which will be essential in any future negotiations. For this reason, Iraq appears to be the most critical arena in the coming phase, not only because of geography and shared borders, but also because of its ability to provide pressure tools that are difficult to replicate elsewhere, as Iranian influence declines in Lebanon and Syria.
Against this backdrop, Iran’s regional networks are likely to shift their methods more than their objectives. This would involve a form of apparent integration within state institutions, reducing the visibility of militia structures and uncontrolled weaponry, in a strategy resembling “bending in the face of the storm,” while retaining organizational depth and operational capacity.
The emerging equation is not about abandoning instruments of influence, but rather reshaping them into more flexible and complex forms that preserve leverage and maintain the ability to generate instability, when necessary, without openly claiming responsibility.
Ultimately, many actors aligned with the Iranian project appear to be betting on weathering the storm at the lowest possible cost, while assuming that Washington will settle for political and media victories that can be domestically marketed, rather than pursuing a structural transformation of the system.
From the Muslim Brotherhood, to the future of militias, to the question of irregular armed groups, a similar strategy is emerging. Gradual adaptation, tactical repositioning, and waiting for shifting conditions, in the hope that what appears today as temporary concessions will later become the foundation for restoring influence in a new regional cycle.
The funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is no longer merely a delayed commemorative ceremony that took nearly three months to take place. It has instead become a political signal marking Iran’s entry into a forced transitional phase. The question is no longer limited to who will succeed the Supreme Leader, but rather what kind of system will emerge after him.
This is particularly evident in the continued reliance on the notion of the “absent Supreme Leader.” The representative of the Hidden Imam has himself become absent from the scene, yet this absence does not negate the need to preserve his symbolic presence as a source of legitimacy that accompanies the political transition and prepares the ground for the next phase, from negotiations to political accommodations.
In parallel, President Trump appears to be betting on this phase as the beginning of Iran’s shift from confrontation to pragmatism. The decision to grant the regime a period to conduct the funeral, along with references to a more rational leadership in Tehran, reflects an approach aimed at pushing Iran to focus on its internal crises rather than its regional project.
From this perspective, the issue of frozen Iranian assets, mechanisms for supervising their use, and the gradual easing of sanctions become tools for reshaping the regime’s priorities, so that the economic equation turns into the foundation of political survival in the post-war phase.
Inside Iran, pragmatism also appears to define this transitional phase. The maintenance of the Supreme Leader in “political absence,” combined with limited messaging that balances revolutionary constants with signals of openness to negotiations, reflects an attempt to preserve legitimacy while redistributing power.
The absence of a clear succession mechanism and the limited public visibility suggest that Iran is gradually moving away from a rigid hierarchical religious system centered on the Supreme Leader toward a more horizontal security-political structure, where institutions share centers of decision-making, while the office of the Supreme Leader remains a symbolic umbrella that grants legitimacy to this transformation.
This shift adds a political and security dimension to Iran’s existing economic and social crises. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which for decades built its influence through a combination of domestic control and a regional network stretching from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen to the Red Sea and Sudan, is now facing an unprecedented test. Its spheres of influence are contracting, its proxies are under sustained pressure, and internal crises are forcing a reordering of priorities in which preserving the state’s structure and survival is becoming more urgent than continuing regional expansion.
However, the IRGC’s ability to maintain its domestic position remains tied to its capacity to preserve parts of its external leverage, which will be essential in any future negotiations. For this reason, Iraq appears to be the most critical arena in the coming phase, not only because of geography and shared borders, but also because of its ability to provide pressure tools that are difficult to replicate elsewhere, as Iranian influence declines in Lebanon and Syria.
Against this backdrop, Iran’s regional networks are likely to shift their methods more than their objectives. This would involve a form of apparent integration within state institutions, reducing the visibility of militia structures and uncontrolled weaponry, in a strategy resembling “bending in the face of the storm,” while retaining organizational depth and operational capacity.
The emerging equation is not about abandoning instruments of influence, but rather reshaping them into more flexible and complex forms that preserve leverage and maintain the ability to generate instability, when necessary, without openly claiming responsibility.
Ultimately, many actors aligned with the Iranian project appear to be betting on weathering the storm at the lowest possible cost, while assuming that Washington will settle for political and media victories that can be domestically marketed, rather than pursuing a structural transformation of the system.
From the Muslim Brotherhood, to the future of militias, to the question of irregular armed groups, a similar strategy is emerging. Gradual adaptation, tactical repositioning, and waiting for shifting conditions, in the hope that what appears today as temporary concessions will later become the foundation for restoring influence in a new regional cycle.
The funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is no longer merely a delayed commemorative ceremony that took nearly three months to take place. It has instead become a political signal marking Iran’s entry into a forced transitional phase. The question is no longer limited to who will succeed the Supreme Leader, but rather what kind of system will emerge after him.
This is particularly evident in the continued reliance on the notion of the “absent Supreme Leader.” The representative of the Hidden Imam has himself become absent from the scene, yet this absence does not negate the need to preserve his symbolic presence as a source of legitimacy that accompanies the political transition and prepares the ground for the next phase, from negotiations to political accommodations.
In parallel, President Trump appears to be betting on this phase as the beginning of Iran’s shift from confrontation to pragmatism. The decision to grant the regime a period to conduct the funeral, along with references to a more rational leadership in Tehran, reflects an approach aimed at pushing Iran to focus on its internal crises rather than its regional project.
From this perspective, the issue of frozen Iranian assets, mechanisms for supervising their use, and the gradual easing of sanctions become tools for reshaping the regime’s priorities, so that the economic equation turns into the foundation of political survival in the post-war phase.
Inside Iran, pragmatism also appears to define this transitional phase. The maintenance of the Supreme Leader in “political absence,” combined with limited messaging that balances revolutionary constants with signals of openness to negotiations, reflects an attempt to preserve legitimacy while redistributing power.
The absence of a clear succession mechanism and the limited public visibility suggest that Iran is gradually moving away from a rigid hierarchical religious system centered on the Supreme Leader toward a more horizontal security-political structure, where institutions share centers of decision-making, while the office of the Supreme Leader remains a symbolic umbrella that grants legitimacy to this transformation.
This shift adds a political and security dimension to Iran’s existing economic and social crises. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which for decades built its influence through a combination of domestic control and a regional network stretching from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen to the Red Sea and Sudan, is now facing an unprecedented test. Its spheres of influence are contracting, its proxies are under sustained pressure, and internal crises are forcing a reordering of priorities in which preserving the state’s structure and survival is becoming more urgent than continuing regional expansion.
However, the IRGC’s ability to maintain its domestic position remains tied to its capacity to preserve parts of its external leverage, which will be essential in any future negotiations. For this reason, Iraq appears to be the most critical arena in the coming phase, not only because of geography and shared borders, but also because of its ability to provide pressure tools that are difficult to replicate elsewhere, as Iranian influence declines in Lebanon and Syria.
Against this backdrop, Iran’s regional networks are likely to shift their methods more than their objectives. This would involve a form of apparent integration within state institutions, reducing the visibility of militia structures and uncontrolled weaponry, in a strategy resembling “bending in the face of the storm,” while retaining organizational depth and operational capacity.
The emerging equation is not about abandoning instruments of influence, but rather reshaping them into more flexible and complex forms that preserve leverage and maintain the ability to generate instability, when necessary, without openly claiming responsibility.
Ultimately, many actors aligned with the Iranian project appear to be betting on weathering the storm at the lowest possible cost, while assuming that Washington will settle for political and media victories that can be domestically marketed, rather than pursuing a structural transformation of the system.
From the Muslim Brotherhood, to the future of militias, to the question of irregular armed groups, a similar strategy is emerging. Gradual adaptation, tactical repositioning, and waiting for shifting conditions, in the hope that what appears today as temporary concessions will later become the foundation for restoring influence in a new regional cycle.
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