Raad Mahmoud Al-Tal

Over the past six months, the global economy has shown remarkable resilience in the face of war and a major energy shock. Despite disruptions to oil and gas supplies, the global economy has avoided recession, with growth expected to remain around 3% in 2026. Several factors have helped absorb the shock, including the use of oil and gas inventories, diversification of energy supplies, greater reliance on alternative sources, and continued investment, particularly in technology and artificial intelligence. Yet this resilience should not be mistaken for the end of the crisis. It reflects the ability of the global economy to absorb part of the shock while postponing some of its broader effects.

The International Monetary Fund expects global growth to reach around 3% in 2026, compared with an average of approximately 3.5% in 2024 and 2025. Growth is projected to improve to 3.4% in 2027. This slowdown reflects a combination of factors, including the war, higher energy costs, weaker global trade, tighter financial conditions, and elevated levels of public debt. The 3% growth rate therefore tells only part of the story. The global economy is still expanding, but at a slower pace and with significantly greater risks.

The energy shock is particularly important because its impact extends far beyond oil and gas markets. Higher energy prices raise transportation and production costs, increase electricity prices, and push up the cost of fertilizers and food. In June 2026, oil prices were around 30% higher than their pre-war levels. The use of inventories, higher production and refining outside the Gulf region, and measures to reduce demand have helped limit the initial impact.

However, inventories can only provide temporary relief. Every barrel withdrawn from storage today will eventually need to be replaced. This creates a potential second wave of pressure on energy markets. Many countries will need to rebuild their oil and gas stocks before winter, potentially generating additional demand even if there is no further escalation in the war. If this coincides with the normal seasonal increase in energy consumption, prices could come under renewed upward pressure.

The scale of available reserves provides some protection, but also illustrates their limits. OECD countries hold around 2 billion barrels of commercial and strategic oil stocks, while China’s inventories are estimated at approximately 1.3 billion barrels. Collectively, strategic and commercial stocks in oil-importing countries could theoretically cover around 40 to 45 days of global supply shortages under current disruption conditions. These reserves provide valuable time for adjustment, but they cannot permanently replace lost supplies.

At the same time, the global economy is benefiting from a powerful new source of investment: artificial intelligence and advanced technologies. Investment in these sectors is supporting economic activity and growth in several major economies. Yet this creates another challenge. The expansion of artificial intelligence and data centres is increasing demand for electricity and energy. Technology is therefore both a source of economic strength and a potential driver of higher energy demand.

Perhaps the greatest vulnerability is the level of global public debt, which is approaching 100% of global GDP. This is a historically high level and significantly limits governments’ fiscal room to respond to new shocks. Higher interest rates also increase debt-servicing costs, making additional borrowing more expensive. Governments could therefore find themselves under pressure to support households and businesses in response to higher energy prices while simultaneously facing rising financing costs.

This creates a difficult policy dilemma. Raising interest rates to contain inflation can weaken economic growth and increase the cost of servicing public debt. Increasing government spending, on the other hand, can protect households and productive sectors in the short term but may widen fiscal deficits and push debt even higher.

For Jordan, these global developments are particularly significant. As an energy-importing economy, Jordan is directly exposed to higher oil prices through the import bill, transportation and production costs, the current account, and domestic prices. Under a scenario of continued war-related disruptions for a limited period, the IMF estimated that Jordan’s growth could decline to 2.7%, compared with 3% before the war. Inflation could rise to around 2.3%, while the current account deficit could widen to 6.9% of GDP.

Jordan’s resilience will therefore depend not only on maintaining exchange-rate stability, but also on preserving adequate foreign reserves, managing public debt carefully, strengthening fiscal discipline, and expanding exports, tourism, and investment.

The broader lesson is clear. The global economy has not overcome the energy shock; it has so far managed to absorb it. But the longer the shock lasts, the greater the risk that temporary buffers will be exhausted. Higher energy prices, persistent inflation, rising financing costs, and elevated public debt could reinforce one another and create a much more difficult economic environment.

Global growth of 3% is therefore evidence of resilience, but it should not create a false sense of security. True economic resilience is not simply the ability to maintain growth during a crisis. It is the ability to preserve sufficient fiscal, monetary, and external buffers to withstand the next shock.

The real question is no longer whether the global economy has survived the first six months of the crisis. The more important question is whether it can maintain its resilience if the shock lasts much longer.