Dr. Hamad Kasasbeh

A recent analysis by an economic commentator portrayed the government’s fiscal performance during the first half of 2026 in strongly positive terms. Most of the figures it used are official and broadly verifiable, yet the corresponding figures were not given equal weight. The issue, therefore, is not primarily the data themselves, but the picture constructed from them. There is a clear difference between a number being correct and the conclusion built around it being complete. Without changing a single figure, a reassuring narrative can be created by highlighting what comforts, softening what concerns, and choosing for each indicator the angle that casts it in the best light. Selectivity does not require a false number; presenting half the truth skilfully can be enough.

Domestic revenues are a clear example. They reached about JD4.72 billion and represented 97.6% of total revenues and grants. At first glance, this appears to suggest that the government is financing itself largely from domestic resources. In reality, the figure mainly shows that grants were small relative to domestic revenues; it does not show that domestic revenues covered government spending. Expenditure reached about JD6.11 billion, meaning domestic revenues financed only about 77% of it, leaving a gap of roughly JD1.39 billion before grants. The 97.6% figure therefore measures the small size of grants relative to revenues, not the budget’s independence from borrowing. Confusing those two meanings is what creates a misleading impression.

The deficit itself should not be treated as a secondary figure inside an otherwise positive narrative. It reached about JD1.27 billion after grants and roughly JD1.39 billion before grants. This is not merely a “challenge” to be acknowledged in passing; it is the financing gap that determines the need for borrowing and directly affects the path of public debt. Revenue performance cannot therefore be assessed without giving the deficit equal weight. Strong collection does not amount to fiscal strength if a wide gap between revenues and expenditure remains.

The same applies to capital expenditure. It reached about JD561.5 million in the first half of the year, against an annual allocation of roughly JD1.6 billion, meaning execution by mid-year was around 35%. Current expenditure, meanwhile, stood at about JD5.55 billion out of total spending of roughly JD6.11 billion—more than 90% of expenditure during the period, compared with less than 10% for capital spending. This does not mean current expenditure is unnecessary or that the full-year outcome is already determined, but it does show how limited the budgetary space for investment remains. Capital spending, moreover, does not become an achievement merely because it is disbursed; the real test is what it produces in completed projects, infrastructure, productive capacity, investment and jobs.

Public debt changes the picture even more clearly. The often-cited balance of about JD37.69 billion and a ratio near 83.6% of GDP exclude holdings of the Social Security Investment Fund. When those holdings are included, total public debt rises to about JD49.68 billion, or roughly 110.2% of GDP. The debt balance excluding the Fund also increased by about JD1.13 billion, which means it was the ratio—not the nominal stock—that remained broadly stable. The split between roughly JD20.64 billion in external debt and JD17.06 billion in domestic debt matters for financing and risk management, but it does not by itself reduce the size of the government’s obligations or the cost of servicing them. Transparency therefore requires presenting the broader picture, not only the more comfortable ratio.

The picture becomes even clearer when interest costs are considered. The 2026 budget allocated about JD2.26 billion to public-debt interest, compared with roughly JD1.6 billion for capital expenditure. Interest allocations therefore exceed the entire capital budget by about JD660 million. This is not a marginal detail; it is one of the most consequential facts in Jordan’s public finances. When servicing past debt consumes more resources than are allocated to investment in the future, claims of a qualitative improvement in the fiscal position require substantial caution. A serious assessment cannot place a stable debt ratio at the centre of the story while giving the cost of servicing that debt a secondary role.

There is also a need to distinguish fiscal performance from monetary performance. Strong foreign reserves, movements in interest rates and growth in bank credit are important and positive indicators for the Jordanian economy, but a significant part of them falls under monetary policy and the tools of the Central Bank, not the budget and fiscal policy alone. Institutional fairness requires that achievements be attributed to their actual source. Combining monetary and fiscal indicators in one basket can make the government’s fiscal record appear brighter than public-finance data alone would suggest. Strong reserves and a stable banking system are valuable gains, but they do not erase the deficit, reduce debt-interest costs by themselves or mean that the budget has become more capable of financing its own expenditure.
The problem, then, is not the accuracy of the figures, but the architecture of the picture built from them. When reassuring indicators are explained in detail while those exposing the deficit, debt-service burden and limited room for investment are compressed, the data may remain correct while the conclusion becomes less complete than it should be. At that point, the issue is no longer optimism versus pessimism. The simpler question is whether the full picture was presented.

Anyone who undertakes to assess economic performance should not begin with a conclusion and then search for numbers that support it. The responsibility is to present what reassures and what concerns with equal discipline, and to place every figure in its proper context and against its natural counterpart. Official statistics do not need embellishment; they need faithful interpretation. Professionalism is not measured by how many correct figures are cited, but by how complete the picture built from them is. The government, for its part, has an interest in avoiding the adoption or repetition of readings that select the most comfortable figure. Official economic communication should explain reality, not manufacture an impression of it.

A more credible approach would be for the government to publish, regularly and in one place, revenues, expenditure, the deficit, public debt under its different definitions, interest costs, sources of deficit financing, and the execution and impact of capital projects. If improvement is real, it will require little explanation: it will appear in a narrowing deficit, a more sustainable debt path, lower interest pressure, and capital spending translating into completed projects, production and jobs. Ultimately, transparency is not a media detail; it is a condition for trust in economic policy. Public finances do not need someone to choose their most flattering angle; they need to be shown from every angle. Transparency does not mean merely that the published figures are correct; the picture built from them must also be faithful. When reassuring and troubling indicators are presented with equal weight, the government will not need anyone to polish its results; the results themselves will do the work.