Dr. Mahmoud Gudra Anakrih

For decades, Jordan has occupied a unique position in American Middle East strategy. Unlike many regional partnerships built primarily around transactional interests, the U.S.-Jordan relationship has rested on a deeper strategic logic: Jordan’s stability serves as a critical buffer against regional disorder, its military cooperation provides Washington with operational flexibility, and its diplomacy offers a channel of communication across some of the Middle East’s most difficult divides.

Yet every alliance has a price, and Jordan’s partnership with Washington is now confronting a fundamental question: whether the costs being imposed on the kingdom are being matched by the level of support required to sustain it.

The challenge facing Jordan is not a traditional security dilemma of choosing sides. It is the burden of geography. The kingdom has repeatedly found itself absorbing the consequences of conflicts it neither initiated nor controlled. Since the October 2023 Gaza war and the subsequent escalation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, Jordan has become increasingly exposed to regional military dynamics that directly affect its territory, airspace, economy, and domestic politics.

For Washington, Jordan has long been considered one of the most dependable partners in the region. But reliability has often encouraged strategic complacency. Because Jordan has consistently cooperated with American security objectives, policymakers have sometimes treated its stability as a permanent condition rather than a strategic asset requiring continuous investment.

That assumption is becoming increasingly risky.

A Partner Positioned on the Front Line
Jordan’s vulnerability is inseparable from its geography. Located between Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, the kingdom sits at the intersection of competing regional security dynamics. Its borders place it near several of the Middle East’s most active conflict zones, while its peace treaty with Israel has made it one of the few Arab states maintaining a formal security relationship with Jerusalem. The agreement also recognizes the Hashemite monarchy’s custodianship over Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, giving Jordan a diplomatic role that extends beyond its geographic size.

The same geography that makes Jordan strategically valuable also makes it vulnerable. Unlike states geographically removed from regional conflicts, Jordan cannot insulate itself from developments in neighboring countries or from military operations conducted by external powers.

The 2021 defense agreement between Amman and Washington illustrates this dilemma. The agreement expanded American access to Jordanian military facilities, including air bases, strengthening bilateral cooperation while also increasing Jordan’s exposure to potential retaliation against U.S. assets.

This exposure became more apparent as U.S. military activity expanded. American combat aircraft deployments at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base increased significantly before strikes against Iran, placing Jordanian territory at the center of regional military preparations. Jordan did not determine the trajectory of these confrontations, but it became part of their operational geography.

The Difference Between Presence and Partnership
Jordan’s security relationship with the United States differs from Washington’s military arrangements elsewhere in the Gulf. The American military presence in Jordan is not based on isolated sovereign-style installations but is integrated directly into Jordanian military infrastructure. Thousands of U.S. personnel operate alongside Jordanian forces, creating a high level of interoperability and cooperation.

Strategically, this integration is valuable. It allows the United States to maintain a flexible regional posture while strengthening Jordan’s defense capabilities.
However, integration also creates shared vulnerability. Any attack targeting American forces in Jordan risks affecting Jordanian military facilities and placing the kingdom itself on the front line of conflicts shaped by decisions made outside Amman.

The central issue is therefore not whether American military cooperation benefits Jordan. It does. The issue is whether the political and financial costs associated with that cooperation are being adequately addressed.

The Burden-Sharing Problem
The United States has invested heavily in Jordan over decades. Since 1951, Washington has provided substantial economic and security assistance, while current agreements continue to support critical sectors including water, energy, education, tourism, and economic development.

But the strategic environment has changed faster than the assistance framework.

Jordan’s current commitments were largely structured around peacetime assumptions, while the kingdom is increasingly operating under wartime pressures. Security risks have increased, economic uncertainty has grown, and domestic concerns about the consequences of hosting foreign forces have become more visible.

This imbalance creates a classic alliance dilemma: a smaller partner may remain committed to a strategic relationship while questioning whether the costs of that relationship are becoming unsustainable.

The economic impact is already emerging. Tourism revenues have declined, and domestic criticism has intensified. In July 2026, more than 300 Jordanian political, legal, and tribal figures publicly called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, arguing that the American presence had increased Jordan’s exposure to attacks.

Such criticism should not be dismissed as anti-American sentiment. It reflects a broader strategic calculation about national risk, sovereignty, and economic resilience.

Washington’s Strategic Miscalculation
The United States has historically understood Jordan’s importance, but it may have underestimated the cost of preserving Jordan’s stability under current conditions.
Jordan provides Washington with several strategic advantages: a reliable security partner, a platform for regional operations, a diplomatic bridge with Arab states, and a stabilizing force in a volatile neighborhood. These benefits extend far beyond the direct military relationship.

However, strategic partnerships cannot function indefinitely on goodwill alone. They require continuous adaptation to changing realities.

If Washington expects Jordan to remain a frontline partner during periods of regional confrontation, then American policy must move beyond traditional assistance models designed for stability rather than crisis. Supporting Jordan’s resilience should be viewed not as aid, but as a strategic investment.

Preserving the Alliance Before It Becomes a Liability
Jordan’s dilemma is not whether to maintain its relationship with the United States. The partnership remains central to its security and international position. The more important question is whether the alliance can evolve to reflect the new risks Jordan is being asked to absorb.

For Washington, the lesson is clear: reliable allies are not strategic assets that can be taken for granted. They require political attention, economic support, and recognition of the burdens they carry.

Jordan has repeatedly demonstrated its value as a regional anchor. It has provided stability in moments when instability could have spread beyond its borders. But stability is not automatic, and alliances are not sustained by expectations alone.

If the United States wants Jordan to remain one of the pillars of its Middle East strategy, it must recognize a simple reality: maintaining a strategic partner under pressure requires paying the true cost of partnership.