Hasan Dajah

The ongoing conflict surrounding the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab has evolved beyond a limited military confrontation into a geopolitical crisis affecting the structure of the global economy, energy security, and international trade. Together, these two straits serve as the twin pillars of energy transit from the Arabian Gulf: Hormuz acts as a primary outlet for oil and gas exports, while Bab al-Mandab links these flows to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and European markets. Consequently, their simultaneous disruption would trap global trade in a "geopolitical pincer," constricting the flow of energy and goods between Asia and Europe.

The strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz stems from the fact that approximately one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade-along with over 110 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas (LNG), representing nearly one-fifth of the global trade in that commodity-is projected to pass through it in 2025. Furthermore, around 80% of the oil transiting the strait is destined for Asia, whereas the capacity of available alternative routes ranges only between 3.5 and 5.5 million barrels per day. Its importance extends beyond energy; over 30% of global urea trade, as well as significant quantities of ammonia and phosphates pass through the strait, directly linking its security to global food security.

As for the Bab al-Mandab Strait, it controls access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal and serves as the natural outlet for transporting Saudi oil-diverted via the East-West Pipeline-to Red Sea ports. Therefore, the expansion of the conflict to this area undermines the effectiveness of one of the most critical alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. Recent threats and attacks have prompted tankers to alter their routes and sail around the Cape of Good Hope-a longer, costlier journey-while Brent crude has surpassed the $100 mark, with some physical cargoes approaching $110 per barrel.

Economically, the crisis impacts consumers not merely through oil prices, but via a complex chain involving rising war-risk insurance premiums, tanker charter rates, fuel costs, extended delivery times, and storage and port fees. These costs filter through to the prices of electricity, transport, raw materials, fertilizers, food, and manufactured goods. Furthermore, this new wave of inflation compels central banks to maintain high interest rates, thereby slowing investment and growth while increasing debt-servicing costs—particularly for energy-importing developing nations. Electricity prices in the European Union and Japan surged by over 30 per cent year-on-year during the second quarter of 2026, driven by the liquefied natural gas (LNG) crisis.

However, rising oil prices do not guarantee gains for all producing nations. While countries capable of shipping exports via secure routes may reap additional revenue, producers reliant on the Strait of Hormuz could face production cuts due to full storage tanks and the inability to load tankers, alongside refinery shutdowns and escalating costs for insurance, maintenance, and military protection.

Some nations are particularly vulnerable due to the lack of alternative maritime routes for their massive LNG exports. Conversely, producers outside the region-such as the United States, Norway, and certain African states-may temporarily benefit from increased demand, though they remain exposed to the risks of a global economic slowdown and contracting consumption. Politically, the crisis is reshaping the distribution of influence in the energy market, compelling China, India, Japan, and South Korea to diversify suppliers, increase stockpiles, and link energy security to their diplomatic and naval presence.

It also provides major powers with a pretext to expand their military footprint in Arab waters, potentially transforming the protection of navigation into a tool for long-term influence. Meanwhile, non-oil Arab economies face a compounded burden, manifested in soaring import bills, a decline in activity across the Suez Canal, ports, and the tourism sector, and rising costs for food, transportation, and government subsidies.

Addressing this dilemma requires a phased strategy based on five interconnected tracks:

It must be emphasized that the Strait of Hormuz remained open to international navigation and faced no closure or major disruption until the outbreak of the US-Israeli war against Iran. Consequently, the navigation crisis is not an isolated event but a direct result of the military confrontation expanding to maritime corridors and energy facilities. The United States and Israel bear primary responsibility for halting the war and finding a political solution that reopens the Strait and ensures freedom of navigation. Based on this, the following approach is proposed:

Halting US-Israeli military operations against Iran as the key step toward reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and launching direct or indirect negotiations-sponsored by the United Nations and Gulf states-that include mutual guarantees against targeting ships, oil facilities, and ports.

Obliging the parties responsible for expanding the war to address its consequences, rather than merely demanding that regional states protect navigation or shoulder the costs of insurance and energy. Furthermore, the use of "protecting the straits" as a pretext to entrench a permanent foreign military presence or impose security arrangements that infringe upon the sovereignty of littoral states must be rejected.

Establishing a joint international system for maritime corridor security that is defensive in nature-encompassing early warning, surveillance, information sharing, rescue operations, and mine countermeasures-provided that it does not become a party to the war or a tool serving the agenda of any international power.

Precautionary measures to address the crisis include reviving the "Tapline" (Trans-Arabian Pipeline) route-extending through Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon to Europe-expanding networks that bypass the straits, and enhancing coastal storage and export capabilities. However, these proposals remain mere stopgaps that do not obviate the need to end the war and restore navigation to its normal course.

This entails coordinating the temporary release of oil reserves and establishing an international and regional fund to cover shipping risks and assist affected nations-with major contributions from the powers whose military operations caused the disruption to navigation and the surge in energy prices.

It also requires protecting communities from economic fallout through targeted financial support, securing stockpiles of fuel, wheat, and fertilizers, and accelerating investment in renewable energy and electrical grid interconnections-thereby reducing the future capacity of wars to hold the global economy hostage.

Consequently, the solution must not be reduced to military escorts for ships or the militarization of the strait; as such, measures address the symptom while ignoring the root cause. Reopening the Strait of Hormuz begins with halting the US-Israeli war on Iran, followed by establishing political and security arrangements that guarantee freedom of navigation and prevent the peoples of the region-and the world-from bearing the cost of a war they played no part in instigating.

Protecting the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab is not solely the concern of the littoral states; it is an international responsibility linked to global economic stability. Yet, a sustainable solution lies not in militarizing these straits, but in insulating them from conflicts, diversifying energy routes, and building a security and economic framework that prevents any party from weaponizing maritime geography to hold the world to ransom.

*Hasan Dajah is professor of Strategic Studies, Al-Hussein Bin Talal University