Sameer Hamdan – Budapest

Could Dialogue with a Neighbor Matter More Than Alignment with Distant Powers?

This argument will not resonate with many, whether at the level of states or individuals, yet certain questions become necessary precisely because they are uncomfortable, what follows is not a defense of any actor, but an inquiry into what may ultimately serve the interests of all sides by making peace less costly than perpetual confrontation, this raises a question that is rarely addressed openly in the Middle East, if regional states are capable of building strategic partnerships with powers thousands of kilometers away, why does engagement with Iran, a permanent neighbor by force of geography, appear more difficult than alignment with distant actors.

This question neither ignores nor excuses Iranian policies, a significant part of the Arab–Iranian trust deficit stems from interventions that have left profound political and security consequences across several Arab states, any serious discussion of regional stability must begin with a number of fundamental principles, there can be no durable order without sovereignty, no meaningful partnership alongside the persistence of armed non-state actors, and no regional security architecture built upon interference in the domestic affairs of neighboring countries, yet for decades, the region has focused on managing the consequences of conflict rather than addressing its underlying causes, allowing hostility itself to become embedded in the foundations of the regional system.

The central challenge is not the existence of disagreement between Arabs and Iran, history offers numerous examples of neighboring powers that competed fiercely, clashed repeatedly, and ultimately developed mechanisms for coexistence, the Middle East remains one of the least successful regions in transforming rivalry into a regulated political order, as a result, disagreements evolve into crises, crises into confrontations, and confrontations into opportunities for external powers whose influence often grows in proportion to the region’s fragmentation.

Meanwhile, the international environment is changing in ways that make many traditional assumptions increasingly difficult to sustain, the Middle East no longer occupies the same position within American strategic priorities that it held during the decades following the Cold War, while the center of global economic gravity continues to shift toward Asia, China, India, and other rising powers are actively shaping the contours of a more multipolar international system, in such an environment, dependence on external security guarantees becomes more costly and less reliable, as great powers adjust their commitments according to changing interests, while geography remains constant.

The experience of recent decades has produced one conclusion that is difficult to dismiss, conflict has generated no decisive winners, Arab states have not succeeded in containing Iran through prolonged confrontation, and Iran has not succeeded in converting regional influence into lasting stability, instead, the region has accumulated political, economic, and security exhaustion, while other parts of the world have expanded economic integration and strengthened cross-border connectivity, the Middle East has continued to invest enormous resources in managing crises and reproducing them.

Paradoxically, a region endowed with one of the world’s most strategically important geographies continues to treat that geography as a burden rather than an advantage, Arabs and Iran share a strategic space that encompasses some of the most vital energy routes and commercial corridors on earth, any major disruption in the Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz has consequences that extend far beyond the region itself, affecting the global economy, the continuation of open-ended confrontation not only increases regional risks but also deepens dependence on outside actors that position themselves as indispensable providers of security.

The question, therefore, is not whether Arabs and Iran can agree on everything, an unrealistic expectation under any circumstances, the real question is whether they can agree on what prevents escalation, stability is not built upon the elimination of differences, but upon the institutionalization of mechanisms capable of managing them, what the region requires is neither an Arab axis against Iran nor an Iranian axis against the Arab world, but a renewed regional understanding founded upon respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and the protection of shared economic and strategic interests.

One reality remains impossible to escape, Arab states cannot change Iran’s place on the map, and Iran cannot choose different neighbors, the future of the Middle East will not be determined by the ability of one side to exclude the other, but by their collective capacity to create a framework in which cooperation produces greater returns than confrontation, the real danger is not Iran’s strength or Arab weakness, but the absence of a regional architecture capable of turning geography from a battlefield of rivalry into a foundation for shared interests and lasting stability.