Dr. Hamad Kasasbeh

The challenges facing the Jordanian economy were not created by one event, nor by a single decision or a specific phase. They developed gradually over many years, as regional crises, limited resources, and fiscal pressures interacted with delays in reforms that could have reduced the cost had they been implemented earlier. Therefore, discussing “lost opportunities” is not meant to assign blame in an emotional way. It is a calm reading of an economic path that could have been more capable of growth and job creation if some opportunities had been used at the right time.

Over the decades, Jordan has had important strengths: a geographic location at the heart of the region, an educated human capital base, relative political and institutional stability, broad international relations, and trade agreements with several markets. Yet these advantages have not been sufficiently transformed into a deep productive base, high-value exports, or broad and sustainable job opportunities. This is the central issue: the problem was not always the absence of potential, but the limited ability to turn this potential into an integrated national economic project.

One of the first opportunities that was not used as it should have been was treating fiscal and monetary stability as a final objective, rather than as a foundation for wider productive growth. Jordan was able, in different stages, to maintain a degree of stability despite external shocks. However, this stability was not reflected quickly or strongly enough in investment, employment, production, and real income levels. As a result, the economy continued to move within limited growth rates. These rates reflected resilience, but they were not enough to address unemployment or change the structure of the economy.

The delayed reform of the public sector was another opportunity that was gradually lost. The public budget expanded in current spending items that are difficult to reduce, while productive capital expenditure remained below what was needed. Over time, public finance became more focused on managing existing obligations, such as wages, debt service, and subsidies, and less able to direct resources toward development projects that raise productivity and create jobs. In many cases, the budget shifted from being a tool for building the future to being a tool for managing pressure.

In the labor market, Jordan could have started earlier to reconnect education with employment and production. The gap remained clear between education outputs and the needs of the economy, especially in technical education, digital skills, vocational training, and organized freelance work. As a result, unemployment, especially among young people and women, became a long-term structural challenge. An economy that does not connect education to skills, and skills to production, later pays a double cost: education that does not open doors to work, and unemployment that wastes the energy of society.

In investment, the problem was not only the absence of legislation, but also the absence of a clear and stable sectoral investment policy. Jordan witnessed several legal and institutional amendments, but investors need an integrated system, not legal texts alone. They need serviced land, competitive energy costs, suitable financing, fast procedures, clarity on priority sectors, and access to markets. For this reason, promising sectors such as food industries, smart agriculture, medical tourism, digital services, and logistics remained below their true potential.

Energy and water reform was also among the opportunities that could have been managed earlier and more comprehensively from an economic perspective. These two sectors are not only basic services. They are an important foundation for the competitiveness of industry, agriculture, and investment. Every rise in energy costs, every loss in water, and every delay in improving efficiency is reflected directly in production costs and in the economy’s ability to compete.

Jordan’s geographic location was another opportunity that was not used sufficiently. The country could have moved faster to become a regional center for transport, services, trade, education, health care, and reconstruction. But location alone does not create an economic advantage. Benefiting from it requires efficient logistics infrastructure, flexible customs procedures, a link between industry, trade, finance, and exports, and policies that make Jordan a point of production and services, not only a transit location.

Digital transformation was also an important opportunity that was delayed as a broad national project. Jordan has educated young people, promising technology companies, and a good reputation in professional services. However, for a long time, the digital economy remained a promising sector rather than a main driver of employment and exports. Digital work, exportable services, safe platforms for freelance work, and intensive technical training could have become an important path for reducing unemployment and raising household income.

The risk of lost opportunities is not only that they do not materialize. Over time, they also turn into additional costs. Every delay in labor market reform becomes higher unemployment. Every delay in improving the investment environment becomes weaker growth. Every delay in public administration reform becomes weaker implementation. Every delay in addressing the cost of energy and water becomes lower competitiveness. Reform later becomes more difficult because it does not start from zero. It starts from accumulated challenges that require time, resources, and public trust.

Still, the picture is not closed. Jordan still has an important opportunity to redirect its economy toward productivity, investment, employment, and exports. The Economic Modernization Vision can provide a useful framework if it moves from broad objectives to precise sectoral implementation, and if it connects fiscal, monetary, investment, education, and labor market policies. Success is not achieved by plans alone. It is achieved when the state turns plans into measurable projects, clear responsibilities, and defined timelines.

In conclusion, Jordan has not lost its opportunity, but it has lost an important part of its time. The time that was lost made reform more costly, deepened some structural imbalances, and reduced the ability of traditional policies to deliver quick results. The next phase therefore requires a calm but firm shift: from managing deficits to building growth, from expanding collection to expanding production, from treating the effects of unemployment to creating jobs, and from speaking about potential to turning it into real outcomes. Real reform is not measured by the intentions announced by governments. It is measured by the opportunities felt by citizens, the clarity seen by investors, and the economy’s stronger ability to rely on itself. If Jordan lost opportunities in the past, the most important opportunity today is not to allow that to happen again, because the cost of losing a second opportunity will be higher than the cost of reform itself.