Nasser Bin Nasser

Jordan and Jordanian businesses have so far managed to weather yet another round of regional conflict. The availability of sufficient foreign currency reserves as well as strategic reserves of essential goods and crude oil can help the government cover several months of uninterrupted consumption. Banks have also implemented proactive measures to soften the blow, focusing on maintaining liquidity, supporting the private sector, and ensuring supply chain stability. Both authorities and businesses alike and are longing for a return to normal, a return to some kind of stability. This begs the question: when were things normal? Over the past sixteen years, every time conditions begin to improve, progress is stalled by a regional shock. The triggers vary: the Israeli government resorts to force to address political problems; a new nonstate actor emerges; a regime cracks down on its citizens; a refugee crisis unfolds; a government is overthrown; a food or energy crisis erupts; a pandemic hits; a genocide takes place; a regional war breaks out; supply chains are disrupted. The pattern is clear. Despite this, government and business leaders are repeatedly caught off guard. It is either wishful thinking or straight-out denial that things can return to normal. This may very well be the new normal, and the sooner government and business leaders accept and adapt to it, the better. Such a paradigm shift would fundamentally change how organizations make decisions, allocate resources, and survive uncertainty.

The first shift is one from reaction to preparedness. By identifying best, worst and most likely case scenarios as well as the identification of early warning indicators, decisions become robust across scenarios, not optimized for a single future. Likewise, leaders can become more comfortable acting before uncertainty emerges.

The second shift is faster and more effective crisis response. Organizations that plan for shocks don’t have to improvise and scramble under pressure. They can avoid decision paralysis in high-stress moments by simply executing pre-considered responses from predefined crisis playbooks.

The third shift is that shock-aware planning identifies vulnerabilities before they are exposed. By stress testing investments and policies, identification of single points of failure and hedging strategies, businesses and governments can develop more resilient revenue streams.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is the shift to enhanced agility. Pre-positioning for shifts can allow organizations to move from merely surviving shocks to exploiting them. For example, consider Jordan’s opportunity to exploit first-mover advantage in neighboring countries like Syria or reconfiguring trade or energy routes as a result of the US war on Iran.

It may be difficult to entirely shock proof Jordan from regional and global unrest, but continued reliance on past approaches – or the adoption of a “do-nothing” approach- are concerning patterns. Planning and adaptation are essential. A useful starting point is to diversify governance structures, such as boards and advisory councils, beyond the current focus on gender diversity. These bodies are dominated by traditional professional backgrounds, where risk is primarily treated as a compliance and reporting requirement rather than a strategic consideration.

There is a pressing need to adopt a more systematic and holistic approach to risk, encompassing geopolitical, geoeconomic, ESG and emerging technology ones, especially cyber and AI. Reliance on external consultants to assess risk can also miss a critical point: such approaches frequently depend on linear forecasts that are ill-suited to uncertain and complex environments and are limited in their ability to drive deeper, organization-wide shifts in risk culture. The objective is not to encourage organisations to take on more risk, but to become more deliberate and prepared in how risk is understood and managed - something that cannot be fully outsourced. Importantly, organizations must conduct the bulk of their planning during periods of relative calm. This reflects the broader paradox of risk: it is most acutely felt when it is least present and least recognised when it is most acute.

It may be time to stop lamenting the region Jordan finds itself in. In an era defined by uncertainty and complexity, resilience will not be determined by the absence of shocks, but by the ability to anticipate, absorb, and adapt to them.