Dr. Emad Al-Hammadin

The proposed Sunni trilateral alliance—if it moves beyond political protocol—represents a new regional alignment capable of reshaping the map of alliances in the Middle East. The three states possess notable complementary capacities across economic, military, political, and demographic domains, as well as an ideological dimension, represented by Sunni Islam, the largest religious component in the Islamic world.

If intentions translate into concrete action, this alliance could extend its influence beyond the region and exert a broader global impact. The fundamental question, however, remains:

Is this alliance a strategic necessity reflecting a structural transformation in how these states address regional challenges? Or is it merely a limited political maneuver designed to secure short-term gains?

Transformation in the International System

Change in the Middle East, as American writer Thomas Friedman argues, has become inevitable—whether imposed by force, as President Trump believes, or pursued through the vision of “Greater Israel,” as articulated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. (Friedman, 2025).

The 2026 U.S. National Security Strategy, alongside the 2026 U.S. Department of Defence Strategy, indicates that American priorities in the Middle East are no longer what they once were. According to several American analysts, the current focus of the Trump administration has shifted toward the Americas and the Western Hemisphere (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2025).

Within this evolving context, states in the Middle East interpret these developments as evidence that the new American approach is less concerned with the specific vital interests of individual regional states and more focused on broader strategic contexts that serve overarching U.S. national interests.

For regional states that have historically relied on U.S. intervention to manage conflict dynamics, this shift generates strategic anxiety. As a result, many are reassessing their security strategies and exploring selective alliances that could enhance their sense of autonomy and collective security. However, the ceiling of such alliances remains constrained by a structural dilemma: fear of jeopardising relationships with major powers—particularly the United States.

In this regard, Middle East Monitor reported that the recent positive shift in relations between Ankara, Cairo, and Riyadh—particularly following President Erdoğan’s visits to Saudi Arabia (February 2, 2026) and Egypt (February 5, 2026), as well as King Abdullah II’s visit to Ankara (February 7, 2025)—represents a profound geopolitical transformation after years of tension among these states. The report suggested that Israel should carefully assess the implications of this development (MEM, 2026).

Moreover, the cooling of Egyptian–Israeli relations due to the Gaza war, alongside the rupture between President Erdoğan and the Israeli Prime Minister, creates a political environment conducive to deeper coordination among these regional powers. The Gaza war, in particular, has functioned as a strategic stress test, prompting several states in the region to reconsider their approaches to collective security and regional alignment.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey—two major Sunni powers with Islamic leadership credentials, deep Arab and Islamic strategic depth, shared historical linkages, significant economic weight, and advanced defense industries—possess the structural attributes that could potentially constrain efforts to reshape the Middle East solely in Israel’s favour.

However, a close reading of Israeli grand strategy suggests that Israel is not in a phase of retreat or strategic contraction. On the contrary, Israeli leadership appears to view the current moment as a “golden window” for achieving historic gains and expanding its sphere of influence—particularly in ways that enhance its financial, economic, and military autonomy from the United States.

Turkey and the Search for Strategic Depth
Turkey, which commands NATO’s second-largest army, has emerged as an active regional and international actor. Since President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power, Ankara has sought greater Islamic and Arab strategic depth, particularly after its unsuccessful bid to join the European Union.

Economically, Turkey views the Arab and Islamic spheres as essential markets for its advanced defence industries and civilian products. This orientation has been reinforced by shifts in consumer behaviour in parts of the Arab world, where boycotts of Western products following the Gaza war have redirected demand toward Turkish goods.

Within this context, Turkey has engaged in discussions with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan regarding deeper cooperation. Ankara perceives the potential transformation of this trilateral cooperation into a strong Islamic alliance as an opportunity to rebalance regional security asymmetries. President Erdoğan’s well-known statement—“If you are not at the table, you may be on the menu”—encapsulates this realist outlook.

Saudi Arabia and the Construction of Multiple Alliances
Saudi motivations for building substantial regional alliances stem from multiple strategic drivers. First, there is the perceived gradual American retrenchment from the Middle East. Second, there is concern regarding what Riyadh views as expansionist Israeli policies aimed at fragmenting major regional states. Third, there is a critical economic dimension: Saudi Arabia has embarked on large-scale economic transformation projects designed to diversify its economy and reduce long-term dependence on oil revenues. Any geopolitical imbalance or major disruption to the regional status quo could significantly affect the Kingdom’s ability to achieve the ambitions of Vision 2030.

The evolving Saudi–Pakistani partnership in the security domain exemplifies this search for a reliable regional partner. Both countries possess complementary strengths and vulnerabilities that make their cooperation mutually beneficial. They share a long history of security and political coordination, recently elevated through the signing of a joint defence agreement that moves the relationship into a deeper strategic dimension.

Regarding Saudi–Israeli relations, Israel’s persistent efforts to normalise ties with Riyadh stem from its recognition of Saudi Arabia’s strong influence in the Islamic world. The inability to secure normalisation has revived discussion within influential Israeli circles that Saudi Arabia is not necessarily a strategic partner and could, under certain conditions, emerge as a determined opponent of Israeli regional restructuring strategies.

Simultaneously, from the Saudi perspective, this dynamic reinforces the need to prepare for potential future friction with Israel. Strengthening alliances with Pakistan—and potentially Turkey—could position Riyadh more favourably in any future negotiations or confrontations with Israel, enhancing its leverage and strategic autonomy.

The Saudi–Pakistani Alliance: A Strategic Security Dimension
Pakistan benefits from Saudi Arabia’s economic support and financial resources. Riyadh also helps Islamabad balance its complex relationships with India and China, both of which maintain strong ties with the Kingdom.
This cooperation has taken practical form: approximately $2 billion in Saudi debt owed by Pakistan was reportedly converted into funding for the production of JF-17C Block III missiles—Chinese-designed systems that demonstrated operational reliability in recent Pakistan–India hostilities.

Opportunities for Integration and Strategic Convergence
The three states could significantly deepen cooperation in military coordination and defence manufacturing—an area in which Turkey has made substantial advances and Saudi Arabia is rapidly expanding.

There is also potential for elevated collaboration in counterterrorism and counter-extremism efforts at both regional and global levels. Furthermore, the alliance could coordinate responses to shared strategic issues affecting the Islamic world, including Palestine, Kashmir, terrorism, and broader regional crises.

Geostrategically, the three states occupy critical maritime positions. Coordinated naval capabilities could enhance control over supply routes, secure freedom of navigation in vital waterways, and contribute to global trade security

Alliance of Necessity or Tactical Maneuver?
Is this alliance a durable strategic shift, or a temporary tactical arrangement? What indicators point to sustainability, and what signals suggest fragility?

Historically, intra-Arab and Islamic alliances have rarely progressed beyond symbolic or protocol-based cooperation. Most states maintain primary strategic alignments with major global powers, limiting the emergence of independent regional blocs capable of altering the balance of power or challenging Israeli superiority.

Yet the Middle East is defined by constant transformation. The region’s geopolitical boundaries, including those established by the Sykes–Picot agreement, are no longer immutable.

Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether such an alliance, even if formalised, could operate independently of major-power influence. Turkish caution in formalising a binding pact may reflect this reality: a desire to assess the alliance’s limits, capabilities, and degree of autonomy before committing fully.

Dr. Emad Al-Hammadin, Centre for Strategic Studies - University of Jordan