Dr. Hamad Kasasbeh

In his Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun did not interpret the decline of states as the result of sudden external shocks. Rather, he described it as a cumulative internal process that begins within the productive economy itself. This analytical framework remains highly relevant today, offering insight into how internal weaknesses gradually form and later transform into structural fragility that limits a state’s ability to withstand external pressures.

Ibn Khaldun argued that the earliest signs of decline emerge when the state loses balance between its role in regulation and support, and the financial and administrative burdens it imposes. The expansion of non-productive spending, combined with a slowdown in real economic activity, gradually undermines public confidence—especially when accompanied by weak resource management or the prioritization of narrow interests over the public good.

At this stage, external factors are not the direct cause of decline, but they become increasingly influential. States suffering from weak productivity and limited fiscal space often resort to short-term solutions, such as external financing or crisis management. As internal trust erodes, these states may gradually enter unequal external relationships, not solely due to external strength, but primarily because of internal vulnerability.

Ibn Khaldun warned of a phase in which the state shifts from facilitating economic activity to competing with it or overburdening it. Taxation moves from being a tool of financing to a tool of pressure, procedural constraints expand, and individual initiative declines. As investment weakens, the economy enters a cycle of exhaustion that becomes difficult to reverse without a fundamental change in how economic policy is managed.

A central pillar of Ibn Khaldun’s analysis is economic justice. Justice, in his view, is not merely a moral concept, but a practical condition for sustaining the productive economy. When injustice or the concentration of benefits prevails, incentives to work and invest decline, and the link between effort and reward weakens—clear signals of internal economic erosion.

This dynamic is closely linked to the concept of the rule of law, even if Ibn Khaldun did not use the term in its modern sense. Stable rules, equal application, and limits on authority form the foundation for protecting economic activity. When governance is driven by exceptions rather than rules, trust erodes and a silent withdrawal from the formal economy toward less productive activities begins.
Added to this is what can be described as the cost of uncertainty. An economy can adapt to strict rules if they are clear and stable, but it cannot adapt to constantly changing rules or selective enforcement. Such uncertainty disrupts planning, delays investment, and encourages firms and individuals to reduce risk rather than expand productive activity.

This pattern is not confined to a single case. It can be observed, to varying degrees, across several Arab economies today, where similar structural imbalances and a weakened productive base persist. In an increasingly competitive regional and global environment, the cost of delayed reform rises sharply, making early internal adjustment a prerequisite for stability rather than a deferred option.

In conclusion, Ibn Khaldun offers a timeless perspective on political economy. Challenges do not arise from external forces alone, nor from internal weaknesses alone, but from their interaction. When the productive economy is built on justice, the rule of law, stable rules, and sound management of resources and national interests, vulnerability to external pressure declines, policy choices expand, and early reform becomes far less costly than waiting for a moment of exposure.