Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

The latest round of US-Iranian talks, mediated by Oman, ended without any significant progress, while the American military buildup continues, sanctions are expanding to include new entities and individuals, and repeated calls for all Americans to leave Iran are rising. Meanwhile, Israel is preparing for an unprecedented military scenario, suggesting that these negotiations are implicitly a space to prepare for a wider confrontation. Iran, in turn, insists on attending talks from a position of strength, hinting at its ability to strike American and Israeli interests, directly contradicting Washington’s preparations.

The upcoming confrontation is not a repeat of the twelve-day conflict with Israel alone, but a scenario involving both the United States and Israel. As the gap in understanding widens, the likelihood of US force being applied grows under the new administration’s principle: preparing for war to impose peace, where the contours of power will determine the nature of any future agreement.

Observers of the current military buildup and the accompanying surplus of force understand that its objectives go far beyond traditional political pressure. Political leverage could be exercised with a few words from the President or a clear statement from Washington. But moving a military force of this scale, with costs potentially exceeding half a trillion dollars, oversimplifies what is happening.

What we are seeing is part of an inevitable path toward change in the core of Iran’s political process and its system structure—but not in the classical form many imagine. Trump, according to analyses of his personality, does not pursue open-ended wars or costly total collapse; he prefers limited, decisive operations that produce rapid change and pave the way for a second stage.

The Venezuela model illustrates this approach: mobilization, pressure, keeping the system formally intact, while enforcing fundamental changes in its behaviour and functions, and controlling its key resources. For Trump, this is the essence of victory. As for Iran, the timing is no coincidence: after more than two years of open-front crises, its regional proxies have receded and its ability to export crises into Israel has diminished. All while the turmoil has reverberated internally, with clear indicators such as symbolic assassinations, broad security breaches, and ongoing economic and social collapse, making discussion of forthcoming changes unavoidable.
The key question is not whether change will happen, but how it will be managed. Will Trump aim for a transitional phase that keeps part of the system as a partner, just as in Venezuela? The Iranian track seems focused on confining the crisis within the Revolutionary Guard, while creating internal system conflicts. Media confusion and contradictory messaging serve as tools to push the crisis into the heart of Iran’s political structure.

Military buildup does not necessarily mean open war; the more realistic scenario is that it serves as cover for an internal intelligence operation, achieving change at minimal cost under military protection. Israel plays a central role in this scenario, with US-Israeli intelligence coordination directly overseeing Iran’s internal landscape, increasing the likelihood that any change will not occur without Israeli involvement.

These factors make surprise a key component in any operation, not just conventional warfare. As the Venezuelan model illustrates, US military mobilization in October continued for weeks amid calculated surprises, including a call between Trump and Maduro. The Iranian scenario may unfold similarly over time, with surprises ready to be triggered, especially if intelligence operations are activated.

The nature of the US buildup and its timing reinforce the notion that this is not only about Iran, but an attempt to reshape the region. Iraq and Yemen are unlikely to be removed from these transformations. Practically, the “seven fronts” war has been dismantled front by front, leaving Iran as the main axis of change.

In short, Iran may be at a pivotal stage: neither open war nor conventional political pressure, but a restructuring of the Iranian system and the broader region under a single banner: using force and preparing for war to impose peace.