Dr. Hamad Kasasbeh

The discussion of a new international system is no longer theoretical or postponed. It has become a reality shaping economic policies and strategic choices across the world. What is unfolding today is not a reform of the existing order, but the gradual formation of a new one, advancing at a pace that exceeds the ability of many countries to adapt. In this context, a country’s position is no longer determined solely by its resources, but by its capacity to act and to make timely decisions.

One of the most visible features of this phase is the relative decline of the unipolar system. The United States remains a central player in the global economy, but it is no longer able to manage the international system on its own. World Bank data indicate that the US share of global GDP has declined from around 30% at the beginning of the 2000s to approximately 24% in recent years. This shift reflects a structural change in global power balances and the rise of new economic actors shaping trade, investment, and technology.

Economically, globalization itself has changed course. The world is not moving toward isolation, but it is no longer open without conditions. Supply chains are being restructured, and trade is increasingly shaped by security considerations and political stability. World Trade Organization data show a slowdown in global trade growth compared to the period before the global financial crisis, alongside the growing influence of regional blocs in directing trade and investment flows.

In response to this relative decline in economic weight, US policy has increasingly relied on economic tools with clear political dimensions. This is evident in approaches toward Venezuela and its oil reserves, Iran and efforts to restrict its economic role, the extensive use of sanctions and pressure in the Middle East, and even discussions related to Greenland and its strategic and resource potential. This pattern reflects attempts to compensate for declining economic leverage through political pressure, a strategy that, in turn, contributes to eroding confidence in the global economic system.

At the monetary level, the debate is not about the collapse of the US dollar, but about a gradual decline in its centrality. According to International Monetary Fund data, the dollar’s share of global foreign exchange reserves fell from about 71% in 1999 to nearly 58% today. This trend does not signal a break with the existing system, but rather an effort by countries to diversify risk and reduce dependence on a single dominant currency in an increasingly uncertain global environment.

At the same time, technology has emerged as a decisive factor in the redistribution of economic power. Artificial intelligence is no longer a purely technical issue, but a driver of productivity and competitiveness. OECD reports indicate that global direct spending on AI applications has exceeded $150 billion annually. Yet many Arab economies remain largely outside innovation chains, relying more on importing technology than contributing to its development, which deepens their competitiveness gap.

The Arab world’s position becomes particularly clear in this context. The region accounts for more than 5% of the world’s population but contributes no more than 3% of global trade. Intra-Arab trade remains limited, at around 10–12% of total Arab trade, according to ESCWA and Arab Monetary Fund data. This structural weakness is compounded by ongoing political divisions within the region, including tensions among some Gulf Cooperation Council states, at a time when instability persists in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, and Iraq, creating a fragile regional environment that invites external intervention.

In conclusion, the international system is being reshaped now, and time has become a decisive factor. The greatest risk facing the Arab world may not lie in global instability itself, but in continuing to treat it as a temporary phase. In a rapidly changing world, it is not only mistakes that are penalized, but hesitation as well. The choice today is no longer between engagement and isolation, but between early action and delayed adaptation to rules being shaped without meaningful Arab influence.