Mohammad Abu-Rumman

Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen’s recent remarks, claiming that “there is no need to establish a Palestinian state because such a state already exists in Jordan, which hosts a Palestinian majority”, do not introduce any new or serious concern for decision-makers in Amman. Jordan–Israel relations have long surpassed the phase in which such traditional right-wing Zionist rhetoric could generate political alarm. Jordanian policymakers fully recognize that the Israeli right, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, now constitutes Israel’s dominant political center, and that any hope for the rise of a pragmatic or moderate Israeli camp willing to accept the idea of a Palestinian state has all but vanished in the foreseeable future.

Although Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza marked the decisive turning point in the political rupture between Jordan and Israel—burying, both symbolically and politically, what remained of regional peace ambitions built on the two-state solution, the crisis did not begin there. It stretches back decades, specifically to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, and reached new heights as Netanyahu and his circle consolidated control over political decision-making. According to the Jordanian reading, this domination later expanded into the security and military establishments as well, placing Israel almost entirely in the grip of the far right.

It is therefore hardly surprising that Jordan’s diplomatic rhetoric toward Israel has escalated to unprecedented levels, reaching what appears to be a point of no return. Repeated speeches by King Abdullah have signaled this shift clearly, but his recent interview with the BBC offered the most decisive moment: the King stated openly that he does not trust a single word Netanyahu says—a rare and consequential stance in both diplomatic and political terms. He further described Netanyahu’s government as “extremist,” a characterization that has become a permanent fixture in Jordan’s political lexicon. Jordan’s recent condemnation of Netanyahu’s visit to Syria, accompanied by several extremist ministers, reaffirmed that this posture is now a settled strategic approach, not a temporary reaction.

These firm Jordanian positions are not impulsive responses or isolated political objections. Jordan has long anchored its regional strategy in the two-state solution, peaceful diplomacy and political moderation. Yet it is increasingly evident that a new conviction has taken root: peaceful negotiations and diplomatic engagement are no longer effective tools in dealing with today’s Israel, and relying on rational political processes has become closer to wishful thinking than to realpolitik.

This conviction is reinforced by another, equally important one: that the absence of any genuine political horizon means the region is entering a prolonged period of tension and continuous threat. In Amman’s view, Netanyahu’s government and the broader Israeli far right constitute a direct threat to Jordan’s national security and even its internal political stability. The trajectory pursued by the Israeli right—annexing the West Bank and dismantling what remains of the Palestinian Authority—leads logically to scenarios of forced or “soft” displacement, the fragmentation of Palestinian cities into isolated cantons, and the pushing of Palestinians, particularly those holding Jordanian documents, toward Jordan.

Adding to this, Israel’s post–7 October policies, especially the shift in its military doctrine toward offensive operations and regional dominance, further intensify the threat. Israeli actions in Syria, and the instability they provoke, are a direct source of Jordanian concern regarding its northern borders, representing yet another dimension of strategic risk.

This raises the key question: could Jordan–Israel relations improve if Netanyahu fails to remain in power after the next elections? While a partial improvement may occur should one of the opposition leaders prevail, such a change would have limited impact in the medium and long term. The structural dynamics shaping Jordan–Israel relations—political and security alike—have reached a “zero-sum” stage, leaving little room for maneuver and making a return to trust or traditional cooperation highly unlikely in the near future.