Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran came to a halt without any written agreements or clear outlines for ending hostilities. While there were objective circumstances that forced both sides to stop the fighting—most notably the intervention of U.S. President Donald Trump—the manner in which the war ended clearly suggests that Israel has now added the Iranian front to its list of open arenas in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, where it reserves the right to strike whenever it deems necessary.

This is reflected in the statements made by Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, who outlined a permanent plan to counter Iranian threats. This means that Israel has no intention of abandoning its strategy of dominating Iranian airspace or conducting ground operations, especially after the exposure of the extent of Israeli intelligence penetration into Iran.

In practice, the war has ushered in a broader Iranian withdrawal from the areas surrounding Israel. Israel has managed to isolate the bordering fronts, dismantle the capabilities of affiliated groups, and contain the immediate threat posed by Iran. However, with the battlefield shifting into Iranian territory itself, it is fair to say that the corridor between Beirut and Tehran has effectively been severed. This also explains the immediate resumption of Israeli strikes against Hezbollah on the Lebanese front as soon as the fighting with Iran paused—a consistent Israeli approach throughout this conflict: reverting to other active fronts whenever one front is de-escalated.

Now that direct hostilities with Iran have stopped, Tehran faces an uncomfortable reality: internal confrontation. Israel’s apparent goal is to redirect Iran’s focus inward, pushing it to grapple with its domestic crises, thereby accelerating its strategic withdrawal. Iran, which long sought to transfer the crisis into Israel, now finds itself confronting a multifaceted internal battle that spans political, security, economic, and social fronts.

Politically, the crisis is becoming more evident with the absence of a clear strategy around the current impasse or return to the negotiating table. The scale of concessions Iran might need to make highlights a deep internal dilemma that may not be resolved without sweeping reforms to the structure of political representation. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s recent speech underscored the severity of this crisis. Directed only at one domestic faction “the hardliners”, it sought to boost morale and frame the outcome as a “victory,” yet it also revealed just how detached this faction has become from reality—evident in inflated claims such as the destruction of Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, among others.

Such statements triggered a harsh and humiliating response from President Trump, who reminded Khamenei that he was the one who prevented his assassination. Trump also reaffirmed that sanctions on Iran would remain in place, effectively shutting the door to any immediate diplomatic resolution and deepening the country’s internal crisis.

Even the European position—once supportive of reviving the nuclear deal or a similar framework—has become far more cautious. The stance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) toward Iran’s nuclear program could lay the groundwork for a more forceful international consensus, making Iran’s exit from the current crisis much more complicated and contingent on fundamental internal changes.

With no prospect for lifting sanctions or resuming negotiations, pressure on Iran’s regime is reaching unprecedented levels. Exiting a war of this magnitude—one that targeted the regime’s core institutions—requires broad internal consensus and a clear economic breakthrough, neither of which seems likely at this point. This raises the possibility of large-scale domestic unrest, potentially of a nature and scale that the regime has not previously faced and may struggle to contain.

It is now evident that the crisis has shifted firmly into Iranian territory. The war that erupted on Iranian soil is just one facet of this transformation. Yet the bigger challenge that remains is Iran’s ability to navigate its internal landscape and move toward viable international understandings that ease tensions. Failing that, the current crisis could quickly evolve into a complex political breakdown—one that the regime may find increasingly difficult to contain.