By Amer Al Sabaileh

The Triple Agent ,a book written by Pulitzer Prize- winner Joby Warrick in July 2011, raised many new questions, especially as to who was behind the catastrophic mistake known as the Khost bombing.

I always wondered how the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) could fall into such a trap particularly as they were held up as one of the strongest intelligence agencies in fighting terrorism only a year before the Khost incident. I had the chance to read the book recently and was very interested to see the slant it gave on how the GID were not at all convinced of the actions taken and issued repeated warnings.

Who was to blame, the GID or the CIA? This is the pending question, debated even now, several months after.
The answer must be the CIA first and foremost.

Although many reviews have been written about the book, I would like to pick out a few salient points to illustrate my thoughts. The first being an excerpt that describes how Jordanian officer Ali Bin Zeid was called to cancel his trip to Afghanistan:
Then, just days before his planned departure, Bin Zeid was summoned unexpectedly to a meeting on Mukhabarat’s executive floor. He entered a conference room to find his immediate supervisor and several other senior officials waiting for him, all dark suits and ties.their faces as dour as buzzards’.
We’re sending someone else to Afghanistan to meet with Balawi, one of the officers said. The mission is simply too risky for someone from the royal family.(p.135)

Bin Ali protested and tried to convince his supervisors that it was his case. When this didn’t work he ignored their advice repeatedly saying:
“I’m going to Afghanistan,” “ even if I have to go with the Americans.”
Bin Zeid had already laid groundwork for this threat, and sure enough, a call was made from the CIA’s Amman station to the Mukhabarat headquarters, officially requesting bin Zeid’s presence at Khost. …. “We need Ali,” the CIA caller said.(pp.135-36)

It should be remembered that he was a young, ambitious officer who wanted to do his duty. He wanted to be part of an operation that would potentially make a big impact on fighting terrorism. Rather than criticizing his idealism, I would criticize the pressure of the CIA to involve him in their operation, despite the resistance of his own supervisors to the idea.

The interference of the CIA didn’t stop the Jordanian Mukhabarat from trying to block the whole operation. Warrick mentions several phone calls made by senior GID managers to the CIA official at the Amman office where they insisted “we have serious concerns”.

Having explained to the CIA station their concerns about the operation and Humam Balawi himself, the GID gave a clear warning:
“He could be leading you into an ambush”
Despite the logical and convincing reasoning of the Jordanian official, the CIA officer did not take this warning seriously. He considered it as the normal response from an atmosphere charged with rivalries and turf battles. In the CIA officer’s opinion the warning was given by officials who feared the success of bin Zeid who could soon be their boss.
Many are the mistakes that we can highlight: in Afghanistan several concerns never even reached Jennifer Mathews, CIA base chief for Forward Operations Base Chapman (Khost).

Many weeks later, counterintelligence officers who knew about the case told CIA investigators they had found Balawi’s behavior suspicious. Like the Mukhabarat officer in Amman, they worried that events in Pakistan were coming together too quickly, too easily.
None of these concerns, however, reached Mathews, who in late December won approval for her careful, well-written plan that revolved around a single objective: keeping Humam al-Balawi safe. (p.144)

Considering the evidence put forward by Warrick, undoubtedly the CIA is to blame for such a gaffe although, from an administrative point of view, the GID director should also take personal responsibility for the outcome for many reasons. Firstly for his absence and weakness and secondly for the failure to carry out his administrative duties effectively. The inability to provide a senior channel of communication for his staff to transfer crucial information to the right ears and above all his absence from the central stage.

From the American side two strong messages emerge which provide grounds for a rethink on policies or practices. The contradiction between the great American capacity for collecting data and the failure to reach any concrete, real conclusion. Secondly, the lack of professionalism the CIA station showed in dealing with the case from the beginning.
Nothing can be done now to remedy the awful consequences but it would be well to remember the proverb: “ No one is as deaf as the man who will not listen”.

Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh
http://amersabbaileh.blogspot.com