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When America Stops Taking Off, Blaming a Single Device Is Not Enough

16-11-2026 08:21 AM


Captain Osama Shakman
I received calls from friends asking me what had happened to aviation in the United States. How can flights stop in a country with such capabilities? And has anything similar happened before? Behind the questions lay an understandable astonishment, but it also reveals a perception that grants advanced countries an immunity they do not possess. Progress does not prevent failure; rather, it raises the level of responsibility for preventing it and makes leniency towards earlier warnings less justifiable.

After more than forty years in aviation, I know that the safety of a flight begins far from the passenger's seat, and that an aircraft that appears independent in the sky depends continuously on the ground. Behind every take-off lie information that must be trusted, communications that must remain stable, and people who make their decisions within limited time. So, when I followed the halt to aircraft take-offs in the United States on 13 November 2026, my question was what had allowed the fault to widen until a decision of this size became necessary.

The Federal Aviation Administration announced that communications problems had affected a number of air traffic control centres, and so it decided to suspend aircraft take-offs across the United States. It is necessary to be precise in the description here. Not all aircraft stopped flying at one moment, and not all airports were closed; rather, the flights that had not yet taken off remained on the ground, while controllers continued to direct the aircraft already in the air and to secure their landing.

I support the decision to suspend take-offs in the interest of safety. When the reliability of the information on which air traffic management relies declines, stopping becomes a duty. But the soundness of the decision does not exempt the institution from accountability for the circumstances that made it necessary. We have a right to appreciate its competence in managing the crisis and to hold it strictly to account for its preparedness to prevent it. Merely praising the response, however, gives the administration an opportunity to bypass the harder question: how did the fault reach a point that called for suspending take-offs across the country?

According to the preliminary explanation given by Transport Secretary Sean Duffy on 14 November, the disruption began while copper communications lines were being replaced with fibre-optic ones at a remote site belonging to the network. He pointed to a router that flooded other devices with repeated connection attempts, while the precise cause remained under investigation, between the possibility of an error in installation or operation and a defect in the device itself. The director of the Aviation Administration explained that this work falls within maintenance of the existing network and the updating of its components, and is separate from the comprehensive modernisation programme.

This distinction is necessary for accuracy, but it does not exempt the institution from explaining the network's inability to contain the disruption. If work at a limited site called for suspending take-offs across the country, then the review must cover the design of the system, the mechanisms for isolating faults, the tests that precede modifications, and the plans for restoring operation when they fail. The available information does not allow one to state with certainty which of these procedures failed, but the breadth of the impact requires all of them to be examined. Reducing what happened to a faulty device leaves the most important question unanswered: how did its effect spread until it disrupted traffic on this scale?

Human error and equipment defects are two well-known possibilities in aviation, which is why safety procedures are built on anticipating them and containing their effects. When a limited fault spreads to disrupt a wide network, accountability must go beyond the last person who worked on the device, to include whoever set the work procedures, approved the tests and undertook supervision. The individual's responsibility may be established, but confining oneself to it may conceal administrative and technical decisions that allowed the error to spread.

I see no justification for condemning the contracting company before the evidence is complete, nor do I regard its declared cooperation with the investigation as proof that its work was sound. L3Harris stated that it supports the investigation and is coordinating with the Aviation Administration and its partners on communications modernisation, though its statement neither identifies the cause of the fault nor settles its responsibility for it. Serious accountability requires examining what the company carried out and what the government body approved, and determining each party's responsibility for testing, supervision and ensuring continuity of service.

The Department of Transport announced that about 3,500 aircraft that were in the air landed safely. From my experience, I know what that demands in precision and coordination between controllers and pilots in exceptional circumstances. But their competence in containing the crisis does not give the administration exemption from accountability, and it must not be used as a screen that hides the shortcomings the investigation reveals. Appreciating these workers requires providing a reliable system that protects their work, holding to account whoever is shown to have been negligent, and carrying out reforms that reduce the likelihood of the crisis recurring.

American air traffic has stopped on a national scale before, but similarity of scene does not mean similarity of causes or responsibilities. On 11 September 2001 the authorities ordered aircraft in the air to be brought down following the terrorist attacks in which civilian aircraft were used, and the reopening of airspace to commercial flights began on 13 September, on condition that new security measures were applied. The decision was a response to an exceptional security threat, and therefore it cannot be taken as a precedent justifying an internal technical disruption. The two incidents may be compared in terms of the breadth of disruption, but assessing responsibility requires distinguishing between confronting a deliberate attack and the ability of an operational system to contain its faults.

As for the clearest technical precedent, it occurred on 11 January 2023, when the air notices system (NOTAM), which supplies crews with information essential for operation and safety, failed. According to official testimony before the Senate, aircraft take-offs were suspended at about a quarter past seven in the morning Eastern Time and resumed at 9:07. Preliminary findings indicated that workers at a contracting firm had deleted files unintentionally while dealing with synchronisation between the main database and a backup one. The Administration later announced a delay in synchronisation to prevent corrupted data from passing to the backup database, and a requirement that more than one person take part in carrying out and supervising database work. These measures raise a legitimate critical question about why such safeguards were absent before the failure, despite the importance of the system and the breadth of the impact of its stoppage.

That precedent deserves serious review, because a backup system loses its value if the fault that struck the main system passes to it. The existence of an alternative alone is not enough; it must be protected by arrangements that prevent it failing for the same reason and allow reliance on it when needed. The question today is how the lessons of that incident were reflected in risk management across the rest of the system. A difference in devices does not exempt the institution from generalising what it has learned and examining other systems for similar weaknesses before a new crisis exposes them.

Then the Newark disruptions came to make these questions more pressing. On 28 April 2025, the controllers responsible for the airport's airspace lost radar and radio contact with aircraft for about ninety seconds because a copper wire burned out, according to a memo from the Department of Transport's Inspector General; and on 9 May the outage recurred for a similar length of time as a result of the failure of the primary and backup communications infrastructure. The incidents were local, but they revealed a weakness that calls for a review extending beyond the airport's boundaries. Ninety seconds in which monitoring and communication are cut deserve a rigorous investigation, and the failure of both the primary and backup paths requires verifying their actual independence and their ability to protect operations when needed.

In November 2025, another face of the system's fragility appeared. On the sixth of that month, the authorities announced a plan to reduce flights gradually at forty busy airports, reaching a target of ten per cent, as pressures mounted from the shortage of controllers and their having to keep working without receiving their pay during the government shutdown. It was later announced that the reduction order would end from 17 November. That crisis showed how funding disputes can press on workers until they call for a reduction of air traffic in the interest of safety. In my estimation, managing a facility this sensitive requires protecting the continuity of its funding, rather than leaving workers and travellers to bear the consequences of political stalemate.

These incidents do not prove that the crises arose from a single cause, but they weaken the argument of surprise. The risks of failure of information and communications and of staff shortages were documented, and their operational effects were clear to decision-makers. The specific failure and its timing may be hard to predict, but that does not exempt institutions from preparing for the possibility and containing its consequences. That is why accountability should include the measures taken after earlier warnings and how effective they were when the new test came.

What disturbs me most is that the warnings were documented in official oversight reports. The Government Accountability Office relayed an assessment that classified 51 of 138 air traffic control systems as unsustainable and another 54 as at risk of reaching the same condition. The causes for concern included difficulty in obtaining spare parts and technical expertise, and an inability to meet operational needs. These classifications do not mean the systems stopped working, but they place the responsible bodies before known risks that require remedy. And when service continues despite these difficulties, its continuation must not be taken as evidence that repair can be postponed.

When a danger becomes documented, the response to it becomes the object of accountability. What measures were taken? How were priorities ordered? Were remedies carried out on time? And who approved continued operation with the known risks, and on the basis of which assessment? Clear answers should be published, allowing public oversight to verify what was achieved, what was delayed and the reasons for the delay. A report that warns of danger loses its value if it is not followed by decisions that can be implemented and held to account.

Nor do I accept that the demand for more funding should become an answer that closes the debate. Money is necessary, but the Government Accountability Office report issued in September 2026 found that the new modernisation programme lacks a comprehensive, documented estimate of its cost over its whole life cycle and an integrated master schedule for its first phase. It pointed to thousands of separate schedules that were not integrated sufficiently to coordinate the work and limit its impact on operations. These findings reveal an administrative shortcoming that requires remedy, because replacing equipment within weak planning may delay reform and raise its cost.

The government has a right to ask Congress for stable funding, and it must present a clear plan whose implementation can be tracked and those responsible for it held to account; and Congress has a right to scrutinise spending, but it is also responsible for decisions to delay funding for proven needs and what follows from them. As for the exchange of accusations after every disruption, it dissipates responsibility among the institutions and leaves workers and travellers to bear the consequences of decisions in which they took no part.

I believe accountability begins with publishing a documented sequence of the incident, identifying the protective measures that failed and why they failed, and naming the bodies responsible for remedying them within announced deadlines. Then come independent tests that verify the network's ability to contain faults and restore operation. Completion rates and numbers of devices replaced remain incomplete indicators unless accompanied by evidence of improved reliability of the system when it is exposed to a fault.

My experience has taught me that among the most dangerous things that can befall an institution working in a sensitive field is that it grows accustomed to getting through crises, so it confuses its ability to contain them with its readiness to prevent them. Over time, the diligence of workers may become a permanent compensation for a shortcoming that has not been addressed, and the return of operations becomes a pretext for closing the file of responsibility. At that point people are drained in protecting a service that reliable procedures were supposed to protect.

As for the traveller, his crisis does not end the moment the network is restored. His aircraft may be far from its scheduled position, or he may be waiting for a replacement crew, or he may have missed a connecting flight and an appointment that is hard to make up. So the assessment of the response should include the accuracy of the information given to him, the speed of providing alternatives and the time it took to restore his journey. For technical recovery is not complete in its effect unless it reaches the people.

When my friends called me, they wanted to understand why the aircraft had stopped, and after reviewing the information available up to 15 November 2026 I found that the most pressing question concerns what the institutions did with the warnings that preceded the crisis. The value of knowing about a danger shows in the decisions that follow it and in its capacity to reduce the likelihood of its occurrence and limit its effects.

After more than forty years in aviation, I recognise that error will remain an ever-present possibility, and that the competence of institutions is measured by their ability to contain it and learn from it. As a retired pilot who flew for more than forty years, I believe the seriousness of the response will become clear in the implementation of the investigation's recommendations, the testing of alternatives, and holding to account those who made decisions alongside those who carried them out. Flights have resumed, but restoring trust requires public evidence that shortcomings are being addressed. If the file is closed with the replacement of a device and a reassuring statement, the reasons for the wide impact of the fault will remain insufficiently explained, and there will be nothing to justify confidence that it will not recur.




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