After three days in Amman, Jordan enjoying a New Year’s break with friends, talking politics with a wide range of Jordanians and analysts, and reading every parliamentary election poster in sight, I am convinced that if you have to visit only one country to gain insights into the many forces shaping the Middle East, Jordan is the country. That is because every single important political, religious, economic, ideological, cultural and civic element visible across the Arab world is present and active in the country.
This includes pan-Arab nationalists, narrow Jordanian state nationalists, Muslim Brotherhood mainstream Islamists, more hard-line Salafists, tribal and ethnic forces, private-sector globalists, civil society and human rights activists, the deep security and intelligence system, a parliament with limited credibility, thugs who beat up demonstrators, Arabs who accept or shun coexistence with Israel, monarchists and republicans, vocal youth activists, those involved in dynamizing the digital sector, refugees from other countries, severe economic stress and social disparities, fervent social entrepreneurs, Arab and foreign powers that meddle in local affairs, constitutional adjustments, a few home-grown terrorists, and a coffee shop and café culture jamboree.
Jordan is also passing through what is probably a defining moment in its history since its establishment 90 years ago in the wake of World War I. All the elements defining the well-being of the state are now in motion and will either reconfigure the country politically and economically or see the existing system persist with increasing tensions and vulnerabilities.
Jordan is not facing an existential threat and the monarchy is not going anywhere; the majority of Jordanians complain vigorously, but they get on with their lives and look to a better future through gradual, real reforms and better economic conditions. Nevertheless, the monarchy – along with its key support systems including the political-corporate elite, the security services, and foreign donors – is certainly facing its most serious challenge ever, even more serious than the plots of the 1950s and 1960s, or the brief clash with Palestinian guerrillas in 1970.
This is because Jordan’s problem today is that three critical groups in the country have been slowly losing faith in the capacity of the ruling elite to manage the country efficiently and equitably, and they are speaking out to demand significant changes in the political and economic management systems.
These groups include the tens of thousands of Islamists who tend to be, disproportionately, of Palestinian origin and live in a few large urban areas; the marginalized, rural Transjordanians in places like Tafileh and Maan, who dangerously mirror the same sentiments of vulnerability and fear that we saw in rural Tunisia, Egypt and Syria in early 2011; and – perhaps the most troubling danger sign that the regime must grasp soon – the thousands of educated, dynamic, creative and loyal young professionals from both East and West Bank lineage, disappointed by the lack of political reform and economic advances during the last dozen years of King Abdullah’s reign.
The result of the economic disparities and the parallel political discontent rippling through the country is mainly evident in a newfound willingness by youths and adults alike to speak their mind in public, including most notably crossing former red lines: criticizing aspects of the royal family’s rule and the security services’ involvement in many aspects of people’s lives.
Critics as well as many independent analysts see the king as out of touch and unresponsive, while others close to the monarchy offer much counter-evidence to that the king regularly meets with locals across the country to be sure he understands the criticisms against him. This includes a series of ongoing small gatherings with demonstrators who have taken to the street to challenge him to make real constitutional reforms that dilute the monarchy’s powers.
The king and some elements in the ruling elite have grasped the nature of citizens’ discontent, and are exploring the most realistic and credible way to respond to populist demands.
But they have yet to find the key to moving the political system forward into a new balance of power that would distribute responsibility between parliament, the monarchy, the judiciary and the Cabinet.
The security system hovers above them all as the ultimate guarantor of state stability. However, even the security agencies are facing unprecedented calls by some citizens to refrain from interfering in areas that are not deep security issues – such as education, media, and social media – and even to have security budgets scrutinized by the elected Parliament.
So this is a good month for the visitor who might travel to Jordan to gain insights into sentiment across much of the Arab world, because the parliamentary elections at the end of January have generated public discussions that highlight the very deep demands for reform. They have, simultaneously, clarified the weaknesses and constraints that still hamper the Jordanian system’s capacity to undertake real reforms, as I will discuss in a column tomorrow.
* Rami G. Khouri is published twice weekly by THE DAILY STAR. This is the first of two columns on Jordan.
A version of this article appeared in the print edition of The Daily Star on January 04, 2013, on page 7.
By Rami G. Khouri/ The Daily Star
After three days in Amman, Jordan enjoying a New Year’s break with friends, talking politics with a wide range of Jordanians and analysts, and reading every parliamentary election poster in sight, I am convinced that if you have to visit only one country to gain insights into the many forces shaping the Middle East, Jordan is the country. That is because every single important political, religious, economic, ideological, cultural and civic element visible across the Arab world is present and active in the country.
This includes pan-Arab nationalists, narrow Jordanian state nationalists, Muslim Brotherhood mainstream Islamists, more hard-line Salafists, tribal and ethnic forces, private-sector globalists, civil society and human rights activists, the deep security and intelligence system, a parliament with limited credibility, thugs who beat up demonstrators, Arabs who accept or shun coexistence with Israel, monarchists and republicans, vocal youth activists, those involved in dynamizing the digital sector, refugees from other countries, severe economic stress and social disparities, fervent social entrepreneurs, Arab and foreign powers that meddle in local affairs, constitutional adjustments, a few home-grown terrorists, and a coffee shop and café culture jamboree.
Jordan is also passing through what is probably a defining moment in its history since its establishment 90 years ago in the wake of World War I. All the elements defining the well-being of the state are now in motion and will either reconfigure the country politically and economically or see the existing system persist with increasing tensions and vulnerabilities.
Jordan is not facing an existential threat and the monarchy is not going anywhere; the majority of Jordanians complain vigorously, but they get on with their lives and look to a better future through gradual, real reforms and better economic conditions. Nevertheless, the monarchy – along with its key support systems including the political-corporate elite, the security services, and foreign donors – is certainly facing its most serious challenge ever, even more serious than the plots of the 1950s and 1960s, or the brief clash with Palestinian guerrillas in 1970.
This is because Jordan’s problem today is that three critical groups in the country have been slowly losing faith in the capacity of the ruling elite to manage the country efficiently and equitably, and they are speaking out to demand significant changes in the political and economic management systems.
These groups include the tens of thousands of Islamists who tend to be, disproportionately, of Palestinian origin and live in a few large urban areas; the marginalized, rural Transjordanians in places like Tafileh and Maan, who dangerously mirror the same sentiments of vulnerability and fear that we saw in rural Tunisia, Egypt and Syria in early 2011; and – perhaps the most troubling danger sign that the regime must grasp soon – the thousands of educated, dynamic, creative and loyal young professionals from both East and West Bank lineage, disappointed by the lack of political reform and economic advances during the last dozen years of King Abdullah’s reign.
The result of the economic disparities and the parallel political discontent rippling through the country is mainly evident in a newfound willingness by youths and adults alike to speak their mind in public, including most notably crossing former red lines: criticizing aspects of the royal family’s rule and the security services’ involvement in many aspects of people’s lives.
Critics as well as many independent analysts see the king as out of touch and unresponsive, while others close to the monarchy offer much counter-evidence to that the king regularly meets with locals across the country to be sure he understands the criticisms against him. This includes a series of ongoing small gatherings with demonstrators who have taken to the street to challenge him to make real constitutional reforms that dilute the monarchy’s powers.
The king and some elements in the ruling elite have grasped the nature of citizens’ discontent, and are exploring the most realistic and credible way to respond to populist demands.
But they have yet to find the key to moving the political system forward into a new balance of power that would distribute responsibility between parliament, the monarchy, the judiciary and the Cabinet.
The security system hovers above them all as the ultimate guarantor of state stability. However, even the security agencies are facing unprecedented calls by some citizens to refrain from interfering in areas that are not deep security issues – such as education, media, and social media – and even to have security budgets scrutinized by the elected Parliament.
So this is a good month for the visitor who might travel to Jordan to gain insights into sentiment across much of the Arab world, because the parliamentary elections at the end of January have generated public discussions that highlight the very deep demands for reform. They have, simultaneously, clarified the weaknesses and constraints that still hamper the Jordanian system’s capacity to undertake real reforms, as I will discuss in a column tomorrow.
* Rami G. Khouri is published twice weekly by THE DAILY STAR. This is the first of two columns on Jordan.
A version of this article appeared in the print edition of The Daily Star on January 04, 2013, on page 7.
By Rami G. Khouri/ The Daily Star
After three days in Amman, Jordan enjoying a New Year’s break with friends, talking politics with a wide range of Jordanians and analysts, and reading every parliamentary election poster in sight, I am convinced that if you have to visit only one country to gain insights into the many forces shaping the Middle East, Jordan is the country. That is because every single important political, religious, economic, ideological, cultural and civic element visible across the Arab world is present and active in the country.
This includes pan-Arab nationalists, narrow Jordanian state nationalists, Muslim Brotherhood mainstream Islamists, more hard-line Salafists, tribal and ethnic forces, private-sector globalists, civil society and human rights activists, the deep security and intelligence system, a parliament with limited credibility, thugs who beat up demonstrators, Arabs who accept or shun coexistence with Israel, monarchists and republicans, vocal youth activists, those involved in dynamizing the digital sector, refugees from other countries, severe economic stress and social disparities, fervent social entrepreneurs, Arab and foreign powers that meddle in local affairs, constitutional adjustments, a few home-grown terrorists, and a coffee shop and café culture jamboree.
Jordan is also passing through what is probably a defining moment in its history since its establishment 90 years ago in the wake of World War I. All the elements defining the well-being of the state are now in motion and will either reconfigure the country politically and economically or see the existing system persist with increasing tensions and vulnerabilities.
Jordan is not facing an existential threat and the monarchy is not going anywhere; the majority of Jordanians complain vigorously, but they get on with their lives and look to a better future through gradual, real reforms and better economic conditions. Nevertheless, the monarchy – along with its key support systems including the political-corporate elite, the security services, and foreign donors – is certainly facing its most serious challenge ever, even more serious than the plots of the 1950s and 1960s, or the brief clash with Palestinian guerrillas in 1970.
This is because Jordan’s problem today is that three critical groups in the country have been slowly losing faith in the capacity of the ruling elite to manage the country efficiently and equitably, and they are speaking out to demand significant changes in the political and economic management systems.
These groups include the tens of thousands of Islamists who tend to be, disproportionately, of Palestinian origin and live in a few large urban areas; the marginalized, rural Transjordanians in places like Tafileh and Maan, who dangerously mirror the same sentiments of vulnerability and fear that we saw in rural Tunisia, Egypt and Syria in early 2011; and – perhaps the most troubling danger sign that the regime must grasp soon – the thousands of educated, dynamic, creative and loyal young professionals from both East and West Bank lineage, disappointed by the lack of political reform and economic advances during the last dozen years of King Abdullah’s reign.
The result of the economic disparities and the parallel political discontent rippling through the country is mainly evident in a newfound willingness by youths and adults alike to speak their mind in public, including most notably crossing former red lines: criticizing aspects of the royal family’s rule and the security services’ involvement in many aspects of people’s lives.
Critics as well as many independent analysts see the king as out of touch and unresponsive, while others close to the monarchy offer much counter-evidence to that the king regularly meets with locals across the country to be sure he understands the criticisms against him. This includes a series of ongoing small gatherings with demonstrators who have taken to the street to challenge him to make real constitutional reforms that dilute the monarchy’s powers.
The king and some elements in the ruling elite have grasped the nature of citizens’ discontent, and are exploring the most realistic and credible way to respond to populist demands.
But they have yet to find the key to moving the political system forward into a new balance of power that would distribute responsibility between parliament, the monarchy, the judiciary and the Cabinet.
The security system hovers above them all as the ultimate guarantor of state stability. However, even the security agencies are facing unprecedented calls by some citizens to refrain from interfering in areas that are not deep security issues – such as education, media, and social media – and even to have security budgets scrutinized by the elected Parliament.
So this is a good month for the visitor who might travel to Jordan to gain insights into sentiment across much of the Arab world, because the parliamentary elections at the end of January have generated public discussions that highlight the very deep demands for reform. They have, simultaneously, clarified the weaknesses and constraints that still hamper the Jordanian system’s capacity to undertake real reforms, as I will discuss in a column tomorrow.
* Rami G. Khouri is published twice weekly by THE DAILY STAR. This is the first of two columns on Jordan.
A version of this article appeared in the print edition of The Daily Star on January 04, 2013, on page 7.
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