What does a Democratic victory mean for Jordan? The answer is not as straightforward as it might first appear. It is easy to assume that a Democratic majority in Congress will safeguard aid, broaden the scope for dialogue and ease pressures on the region. However, certain statements made by the victors suggest we should exercise caution. The elections have shifted the majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate; as the new Congress convenes in January, power will be redistributed between the two parties.
One statement worth noting was made by Abdul El Sayed — a senator-elect from Michigan — during an interview with NPR on November 4th. In expressing his opposition to using American taxpayer dollars to support foreign militaries, he specifically mentioned Jordan, alongside Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. His argument is clear: Americans have domestic needs — in healthcare, education and infrastructure — and he wants public funds directed towards those areas. This is an argument that may well resonate with voters concerned about the costs of medical care or their children’s education.
It would be a mistake to either dismiss these remarks entirely or to overinterpret them. El Sayed was referring specifically to military aid; he did not, in that interview, propose a plan to eliminate all forms of economic and developmental support for Jordan. Furthermore, regardless of the significance of his victory, he is but one member of the Senate, and his statement does not constitute official party policy. Yet, it would be equally misguided to assume his is merely an isolated voice; his position might well gain traction among other voters and lawmakers who believe that spending outside the United States comes at the expense of their own daily needs. Here, an issue arises that is often overlooked in Arab analyses of US elections: An alignment with a politician’s stance on Palestine does not necessarily mean they will support aid to Jordan. A politician might advocate for Palestinian rights while simultaneously opposing the funding of foreign militaries — including those of Arab states. They may see no contradiction between these two positions, as both stem from a broader objection to military spending abroad. Consequently, judging election winners solely by their names, ethnic backgrounds, or positions on Israel is insufficient to determine how they might affect Jordan’s interests.
Voices from both parties may converge on reducing foreign spending, even if their underlying motivations differ. A Democrat might call for redirecting funds towards healthcare, while a Republican might seek to curtail the nation’s overseas commitments; yet, both could end up voting for the same reduction. This does not necessarily mean a majority has formed to cut aid to Jordan, but it does indicate that partisan division alone cannot explain future developments. What truly matters is the position individual members take when the aid package is brought to the table, and the conditions they might attach to their approval.
Nevertheless, Jordan does not begin from a position of weakness in Congress. The relationship is anchored by long-standing, bipartisan support and a memorandum of understanding covering the 2023–2029 fiscal years, which outlines a commitment to provide $1.45 billion annually in economic and military aid — subject, of course, to congressional appropriations. Notably, an amendment to eliminate the proposed aid to Jordan was rejected by a margin of 421 votes to six. This is a significant outcome, demonstrating that support for Jordan transcends partisan affiliation. However, this reservoir of goodwill requires active follow-up with the new members, who will arrive with their own priorities and commitments to their constituents.
What Jordan needs now is to engage with these new winners — just as it has with their predecessors — and to explain its cooperation programmes in terms of their objectives and outcomes. What do water-sector investments achieve? How does support for education and development serve shared interests? What is the mutual benefit of military cooperation and border security? These are questions that American lawmakers will face from their constituents, and it is in our interest that they have clear, compelling answers.
We possess a valuable asset in Washington — one that Jordan has successfully maintained across successive administrations and shifting congressional majorities. Preserving this today requires the same level of effort with these new faces. We should neither assume that they will automatically stand with us, nor conclude that a dissenting statement has permanently closed the door to dialogue.
The author is a former Jordanian minister of state for economic affairs
What does a Democratic victory mean for Jordan? The answer is not as straightforward as it might first appear. It is easy to assume that a Democratic majority in Congress will safeguard aid, broaden the scope for dialogue and ease pressures on the region. However, certain statements made by the victors suggest we should exercise caution. The elections have shifted the majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate; as the new Congress convenes in January, power will be redistributed between the two parties.
One statement worth noting was made by Abdul El Sayed — a senator-elect from Michigan — during an interview with NPR on November 4th. In expressing his opposition to using American taxpayer dollars to support foreign militaries, he specifically mentioned Jordan, alongside Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. His argument is clear: Americans have domestic needs — in healthcare, education and infrastructure — and he wants public funds directed towards those areas. This is an argument that may well resonate with voters concerned about the costs of medical care or their children’s education.
It would be a mistake to either dismiss these remarks entirely or to overinterpret them. El Sayed was referring specifically to military aid; he did not, in that interview, propose a plan to eliminate all forms of economic and developmental support for Jordan. Furthermore, regardless of the significance of his victory, he is but one member of the Senate, and his statement does not constitute official party policy. Yet, it would be equally misguided to assume his is merely an isolated voice; his position might well gain traction among other voters and lawmakers who believe that spending outside the United States comes at the expense of their own daily needs. Here, an issue arises that is often overlooked in Arab analyses of US elections: An alignment with a politician’s stance on Palestine does not necessarily mean they will support aid to Jordan. A politician might advocate for Palestinian rights while simultaneously opposing the funding of foreign militaries — including those of Arab states. They may see no contradiction between these two positions, as both stem from a broader objection to military spending abroad. Consequently, judging election winners solely by their names, ethnic backgrounds, or positions on Israel is insufficient to determine how they might affect Jordan’s interests.
Voices from both parties may converge on reducing foreign spending, even if their underlying motivations differ. A Democrat might call for redirecting funds towards healthcare, while a Republican might seek to curtail the nation’s overseas commitments; yet, both could end up voting for the same reduction. This does not necessarily mean a majority has formed to cut aid to Jordan, but it does indicate that partisan division alone cannot explain future developments. What truly matters is the position individual members take when the aid package is brought to the table, and the conditions they might attach to their approval.
Nevertheless, Jordan does not begin from a position of weakness in Congress. The relationship is anchored by long-standing, bipartisan support and a memorandum of understanding covering the 2023–2029 fiscal years, which outlines a commitment to provide $1.45 billion annually in economic and military aid — subject, of course, to congressional appropriations. Notably, an amendment to eliminate the proposed aid to Jordan was rejected by a margin of 421 votes to six. This is a significant outcome, demonstrating that support for Jordan transcends partisan affiliation. However, this reservoir of goodwill requires active follow-up with the new members, who will arrive with their own priorities and commitments to their constituents.
What Jordan needs now is to engage with these new winners — just as it has with their predecessors — and to explain its cooperation programmes in terms of their objectives and outcomes. What do water-sector investments achieve? How does support for education and development serve shared interests? What is the mutual benefit of military cooperation and border security? These are questions that American lawmakers will face from their constituents, and it is in our interest that they have clear, compelling answers.
We possess a valuable asset in Washington — one that Jordan has successfully maintained across successive administrations and shifting congressional majorities. Preserving this today requires the same level of effort with these new faces. We should neither assume that they will automatically stand with us, nor conclude that a dissenting statement has permanently closed the door to dialogue.
The author is a former Jordanian minister of state for economic affairs
What does a Democratic victory mean for Jordan? The answer is not as straightforward as it might first appear. It is easy to assume that a Democratic majority in Congress will safeguard aid, broaden the scope for dialogue and ease pressures on the region. However, certain statements made by the victors suggest we should exercise caution. The elections have shifted the majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate; as the new Congress convenes in January, power will be redistributed between the two parties.
One statement worth noting was made by Abdul El Sayed — a senator-elect from Michigan — during an interview with NPR on November 4th. In expressing his opposition to using American taxpayer dollars to support foreign militaries, he specifically mentioned Jordan, alongside Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. His argument is clear: Americans have domestic needs — in healthcare, education and infrastructure — and he wants public funds directed towards those areas. This is an argument that may well resonate with voters concerned about the costs of medical care or their children’s education.
It would be a mistake to either dismiss these remarks entirely or to overinterpret them. El Sayed was referring specifically to military aid; he did not, in that interview, propose a plan to eliminate all forms of economic and developmental support for Jordan. Furthermore, regardless of the significance of his victory, he is but one member of the Senate, and his statement does not constitute official party policy. Yet, it would be equally misguided to assume his is merely an isolated voice; his position might well gain traction among other voters and lawmakers who believe that spending outside the United States comes at the expense of their own daily needs. Here, an issue arises that is often overlooked in Arab analyses of US elections: An alignment with a politician’s stance on Palestine does not necessarily mean they will support aid to Jordan. A politician might advocate for Palestinian rights while simultaneously opposing the funding of foreign militaries — including those of Arab states. They may see no contradiction between these two positions, as both stem from a broader objection to military spending abroad. Consequently, judging election winners solely by their names, ethnic backgrounds, or positions on Israel is insufficient to determine how they might affect Jordan’s interests.
Voices from both parties may converge on reducing foreign spending, even if their underlying motivations differ. A Democrat might call for redirecting funds towards healthcare, while a Republican might seek to curtail the nation’s overseas commitments; yet, both could end up voting for the same reduction. This does not necessarily mean a majority has formed to cut aid to Jordan, but it does indicate that partisan division alone cannot explain future developments. What truly matters is the position individual members take when the aid package is brought to the table, and the conditions they might attach to their approval.
Nevertheless, Jordan does not begin from a position of weakness in Congress. The relationship is anchored by long-standing, bipartisan support and a memorandum of understanding covering the 2023–2029 fiscal years, which outlines a commitment to provide $1.45 billion annually in economic and military aid — subject, of course, to congressional appropriations. Notably, an amendment to eliminate the proposed aid to Jordan was rejected by a margin of 421 votes to six. This is a significant outcome, demonstrating that support for Jordan transcends partisan affiliation. However, this reservoir of goodwill requires active follow-up with the new members, who will arrive with their own priorities and commitments to their constituents.
What Jordan needs now is to engage with these new winners — just as it has with their predecessors — and to explain its cooperation programmes in terms of their objectives and outcomes. What do water-sector investments achieve? How does support for education and development serve shared interests? What is the mutual benefit of military cooperation and border security? These are questions that American lawmakers will face from their constituents, and it is in our interest that they have clear, compelling answers.
We possess a valuable asset in Washington — one that Jordan has successfully maintained across successive administrations and shifting congressional majorities. Preserving this today requires the same level of effort with these new faces. We should neither assume that they will automatically stand with us, nor conclude that a dissenting statement has permanently closed the door to dialogue.
The author is a former Jordanian minister of state for economic affairs
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