The Cost of Power: Can the U.S. Economy Carry the Burden of a Global Role?
The main challenge facing the United States today is not the size of its power, but its ability to carry the rising cost of that power in the years ahead. American strength does not rest only on the military, the dollar, and technology. It also depends on the economy and public finances being able to support all of them over time. The key question, then, is less about how powerful the United States is today and more about whether Washington can continue paying for that power tomorrow without allowing today’s commitments to consume the resources needed for the future.
The first pressure comes from debt. In 2026, total federal debt moved above $40 trillion, equal to more than 120% of GDP. To avoid confusion, this is different from debt held by the public, which is the measure used by the Congressional Budget Office in its projections. Debt held by the public is about 101% of GDP in 2026 and could rise to 120% by 2036. Over the same period, the annual federal deficit could widen from about $1.9 trillion to $3.1 trillion. The direction matters more than any single number: borrowing continues, while fiscal room gradually becomes tighter.
The burden of debt becomes even clearer when interest costs are considered. Net interest payments are close to $1 trillion in 2026 and could reach about $2.1 trillion by 2036. This spending does not build a factory, a university, or a transport network; it pays for past borrowing. As interest costs rise, the federal budget faces a sharper trade-off between servicing the past and financing the future. This is one of the biggest risks of rising debt: it can crowd out the spending that improves productivity and builds new sources of economic strength.
The pressure does not come from interest alone. An aging population is raising the cost of Social Security and healthcare, while programs such as Medicare remain among the largest areas of federal spending. This means a growing share of the budget is tied to commitments that are difficult to reduce quickly, while another large share goes to servicing debt. The result is a less flexible budget and less room for investment or for responding to new economic shocks.
At the same time, military commitments are unlikely to fall sharply. The U.S. request for national defense resources for fiscal year 2026 was about $1.01 trillion, a figure close to the annual cost of net interest. That comparison captures an important part of the problem: Washington is paying almost the equivalent of a full major defense budget just to service debt, while it must also finance competition with China, security commitments in Europe and the Middle East, and the modernization of nuclear, space, and cyber capabilities.
Competition with China makes the equation even harder because it goes far beyond military spending. It includes semiconductors, artificial intelligence, energy, critical minerals, manufacturing, and supply chains. These sectors require major domestic investment if the United States wants to remain a leader in technology and production. So as debt costs, mandatory programs, and defense spending rise, one question becomes more urgent: how much money is left to invest in the economy that finances American power itself?
As these pressures increase, it is understandable that Washington looks for ways to expand its economic and strategic room for maneuver through energy, resources, and key trade routes. This helps explain part of its interest in Venezuela and the Middle East. It would be inaccurate to treat these moves as a direct way to reduce U.S. debt, but more stable energy supplies, protected trade routes, and influence in resource markets can reduce some economic risks and strengthen U.S. influence in the global economy. Still, the debt problem ultimately depends on growth, revenues, and fiscal discipline at home.
The British experience offers a useful lesson without suggesting that history will repeat itself. Britain did not lose its global influence in a single moment. Its room for maneuver gradually narrowed as overseas commitments became heavier relative to its economic capacity. The Suez Crisis of 1956 showed that political and military power cannot be separated from the financial ability to use it. The United States today is far stronger than Britain was then, but the principle remains important: relative decline can begin when the cost of maintaining a global position grows faster than the resources available to support it.
For that reason, the real test over the next decade will not be whether the United States can borrow or spend more. It will be whether it can control the debt path, finance social commitments, maintain military deterrence, and still invest in future sources of growth. If debt held by the public approaches 120% of GDP by 2036 while interest costs continue to rise, the choices will become harder. The issue will no longer be only how much power the United States has, but how much it must pay to preserve it—and what it may have to postpone at home in order to keep financing its role abroad.
The main challenge facing the United States today is not the size of its power, but its ability to carry the rising cost of that power in the years ahead. American strength does not rest only on the military, the dollar, and technology. It also depends on the economy and public finances being able to support all of them over time. The key question, then, is less about how powerful the United States is today and more about whether Washington can continue paying for that power tomorrow without allowing today’s commitments to consume the resources needed for the future.
The first pressure comes from debt. In 2026, total federal debt moved above $40 trillion, equal to more than 120% of GDP. To avoid confusion, this is different from debt held by the public, which is the measure used by the Congressional Budget Office in its projections. Debt held by the public is about 101% of GDP in 2026 and could rise to 120% by 2036. Over the same period, the annual federal deficit could widen from about $1.9 trillion to $3.1 trillion. The direction matters more than any single number: borrowing continues, while fiscal room gradually becomes tighter.
The burden of debt becomes even clearer when interest costs are considered. Net interest payments are close to $1 trillion in 2026 and could reach about $2.1 trillion by 2036. This spending does not build a factory, a university, or a transport network; it pays for past borrowing. As interest costs rise, the federal budget faces a sharper trade-off between servicing the past and financing the future. This is one of the biggest risks of rising debt: it can crowd out the spending that improves productivity and builds new sources of economic strength.
The pressure does not come from interest alone. An aging population is raising the cost of Social Security and healthcare, while programs such as Medicare remain among the largest areas of federal spending. This means a growing share of the budget is tied to commitments that are difficult to reduce quickly, while another large share goes to servicing debt. The result is a less flexible budget and less room for investment or for responding to new economic shocks.
At the same time, military commitments are unlikely to fall sharply. The U.S. request for national defense resources for fiscal year 2026 was about $1.01 trillion, a figure close to the annual cost of net interest. That comparison captures an important part of the problem: Washington is paying almost the equivalent of a full major defense budget just to service debt, while it must also finance competition with China, security commitments in Europe and the Middle East, and the modernization of nuclear, space, and cyber capabilities.
Competition with China makes the equation even harder because it goes far beyond military spending. It includes semiconductors, artificial intelligence, energy, critical minerals, manufacturing, and supply chains. These sectors require major domestic investment if the United States wants to remain a leader in technology and production. So as debt costs, mandatory programs, and defense spending rise, one question becomes more urgent: how much money is left to invest in the economy that finances American power itself?
As these pressures increase, it is understandable that Washington looks for ways to expand its economic and strategic room for maneuver through energy, resources, and key trade routes. This helps explain part of its interest in Venezuela and the Middle East. It would be inaccurate to treat these moves as a direct way to reduce U.S. debt, but more stable energy supplies, protected trade routes, and influence in resource markets can reduce some economic risks and strengthen U.S. influence in the global economy. Still, the debt problem ultimately depends on growth, revenues, and fiscal discipline at home.
The British experience offers a useful lesson without suggesting that history will repeat itself. Britain did not lose its global influence in a single moment. Its room for maneuver gradually narrowed as overseas commitments became heavier relative to its economic capacity. The Suez Crisis of 1956 showed that political and military power cannot be separated from the financial ability to use it. The United States today is far stronger than Britain was then, but the principle remains important: relative decline can begin when the cost of maintaining a global position grows faster than the resources available to support it.
For that reason, the real test over the next decade will not be whether the United States can borrow or spend more. It will be whether it can control the debt path, finance social commitments, maintain military deterrence, and still invest in future sources of growth. If debt held by the public approaches 120% of GDP by 2036 while interest costs continue to rise, the choices will become harder. The issue will no longer be only how much power the United States has, but how much it must pay to preserve it—and what it may have to postpone at home in order to keep financing its role abroad.
The main challenge facing the United States today is not the size of its power, but its ability to carry the rising cost of that power in the years ahead. American strength does not rest only on the military, the dollar, and technology. It also depends on the economy and public finances being able to support all of them over time. The key question, then, is less about how powerful the United States is today and more about whether Washington can continue paying for that power tomorrow without allowing today’s commitments to consume the resources needed for the future.
The first pressure comes from debt. In 2026, total federal debt moved above $40 trillion, equal to more than 120% of GDP. To avoid confusion, this is different from debt held by the public, which is the measure used by the Congressional Budget Office in its projections. Debt held by the public is about 101% of GDP in 2026 and could rise to 120% by 2036. Over the same period, the annual federal deficit could widen from about $1.9 trillion to $3.1 trillion. The direction matters more than any single number: borrowing continues, while fiscal room gradually becomes tighter.
The burden of debt becomes even clearer when interest costs are considered. Net interest payments are close to $1 trillion in 2026 and could reach about $2.1 trillion by 2036. This spending does not build a factory, a university, or a transport network; it pays for past borrowing. As interest costs rise, the federal budget faces a sharper trade-off between servicing the past and financing the future. This is one of the biggest risks of rising debt: it can crowd out the spending that improves productivity and builds new sources of economic strength.
The pressure does not come from interest alone. An aging population is raising the cost of Social Security and healthcare, while programs such as Medicare remain among the largest areas of federal spending. This means a growing share of the budget is tied to commitments that are difficult to reduce quickly, while another large share goes to servicing debt. The result is a less flexible budget and less room for investment or for responding to new economic shocks.
At the same time, military commitments are unlikely to fall sharply. The U.S. request for national defense resources for fiscal year 2026 was about $1.01 trillion, a figure close to the annual cost of net interest. That comparison captures an important part of the problem: Washington is paying almost the equivalent of a full major defense budget just to service debt, while it must also finance competition with China, security commitments in Europe and the Middle East, and the modernization of nuclear, space, and cyber capabilities.
Competition with China makes the equation even harder because it goes far beyond military spending. It includes semiconductors, artificial intelligence, energy, critical minerals, manufacturing, and supply chains. These sectors require major domestic investment if the United States wants to remain a leader in technology and production. So as debt costs, mandatory programs, and defense spending rise, one question becomes more urgent: how much money is left to invest in the economy that finances American power itself?
As these pressures increase, it is understandable that Washington looks for ways to expand its economic and strategic room for maneuver through energy, resources, and key trade routes. This helps explain part of its interest in Venezuela and the Middle East. It would be inaccurate to treat these moves as a direct way to reduce U.S. debt, but more stable energy supplies, protected trade routes, and influence in resource markets can reduce some economic risks and strengthen U.S. influence in the global economy. Still, the debt problem ultimately depends on growth, revenues, and fiscal discipline at home.
The British experience offers a useful lesson without suggesting that history will repeat itself. Britain did not lose its global influence in a single moment. Its room for maneuver gradually narrowed as overseas commitments became heavier relative to its economic capacity. The Suez Crisis of 1956 showed that political and military power cannot be separated from the financial ability to use it. The United States today is far stronger than Britain was then, but the principle remains important: relative decline can begin when the cost of maintaining a global position grows faster than the resources available to support it.
For that reason, the real test over the next decade will not be whether the United States can borrow or spend more. It will be whether it can control the debt path, finance social commitments, maintain military deterrence, and still invest in future sources of growth. If debt held by the public approaches 120% of GDP by 2036 while interest costs continue to rise, the choices will become harder. The issue will no longer be only how much power the United States has, but how much it must pay to preserve it—and what it may have to postpone at home in order to keep financing its role abroad.
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The Cost of Power: Can the U.S. Economy Carry the Burden of a Global Role?
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