As the Economy Around Us Changes: Where Does Jordan Stand on the New Arab Economic Map?
The Arab economic map is changing not only because economies are growing or slowing, but because roles themselves are being redistributed. Capital is moving toward new sectors, supply chains are reconsidering where they operate, and technology is reducing the value of some traditional advantages while creating new ones. These shifts are taking place amid rising political and security tensions in the Middle East, intensified by the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran and its effects on energy, trade, and supply chains. In such a period, the key question for a small economy is not simply how to preserve what it has, but which role it wants to secure before the regional map settles around it.
Jordan enters this stage with an economy that grew by around 2.8% in 2025, while the International Monetary Fund expects growth of about 2.7% in 2026. These figures show the economy’s ability to continue operating in a difficult regional environment, but they also suggest that improving performance within the existing path may not be enough. The next phase of competition will not be only about raising the growth rate. It will also be about entering early into the activities that are likely to drive an important share of regional growth and investment over the coming years.
This creates an important distinction between capturing a temporary opportunity and building an advantage that is difficult to replace. An opportunity may move when prices or incentives change. A real advantage is more durable: it develops when a country becomes continuously useful to its partners and surrounding markets. Jordan’s economic debate therefore deserves a more focused question. It is not only what Jordan can produce, but what it can do so well that surrounding economies increasingly need Jordan as part of their own economic calculations.
The answer may lie in a limited number of areas rather than an attempt to compete in everything. Jordan can combine digital, health, and education services with specialized pharmaceutical and food industries, professional services, and selected activities linked to water, energy, and technology. The advantage would not come from the size of any one sector. It would come from building a cluster of connected capabilities that gives the Jordanian economy a recognizable specialization and allows it to accumulate knowledge, investment, and market access over time.
This also requires a broader definition of market size. The number of consumers inside the Kingdom should not be the only measure of economic opportunity. A Jordanian company that can reach Gulf, Iraqi, or other markets digitally or commercially is, in practice, operating in a market larger than Jordan’s borders. The objective, therefore, should be to make Jordan a base for reaching several markets, while reducing the cost, time, and uncertainty of serving them. In this way, the effective size of the opportunity available to Jordanian producers and investors becomes much larger than the domestic market alone.
Investment policy should evolve in the same direction, moving from broad attraction toward economic targeting. The most valuable investment is not necessarily the largest. It is the investment that fills a missing link in a production chain, brings in a new supplier, opens an external market, or transfers knowledge that the economy does not yet possess. With unemployment among Jordanians at about 21.1% in the first quarter of 2026, the quality of jobs created by investment—their productivity, income, and ability to build skills—matters more than simply counting how many jobs are announced.
This leads to another useful measure: the cost of access. Transport, energy, customs, digital systems, and finance are not separate issues from the perspective of an investor or exporter. Together, they determine the time, cost, and risk that separate a Jordanian product or service from its market. The value of infrastructure and reform should therefore be judged by how much they shorten this economic distance. The faster, cheaper, and more predictable market access becomes, the more Jordan’s geography can be converted into a genuine competitive advantage rather than remaining only a location on the map.
The main gap today is not the absence of programs. The 2026-2029 Executive Program of the Economic Modernisation Vision already provides a broad base for action. The greater challenge is to turn existing priorities into more focused economic choices. Once Jordan identifies the areas in which it can build a regional advantage, education, finance, infrastructure, incentives, and investment can be directed more deliberately toward them. Spreading effort equally across dozens of paths may improve general performance, but it does not necessarily create an advantage that other economies will find difficult to replicate.
Ultimately, the next round of economic competition will not be decided only by who has the largest capital base or the widest market. It will also be decided by who can make itself a necessary part of other countries’ economic calculations. Jordan’s opportunity lies in moving from searching for opportunities within the regional economy to building interests that make its presence part of those opportunities. The strongest position is not the one a country declares for itself, but the one others come to need. At that point, Jordan would not merely be affected by the new Arab economic map; it would carry real weight in helping shape it.
The Arab economic map is changing not only because economies are growing or slowing, but because roles themselves are being redistributed. Capital is moving toward new sectors, supply chains are reconsidering where they operate, and technology is reducing the value of some traditional advantages while creating new ones. These shifts are taking place amid rising political and security tensions in the Middle East, intensified by the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran and its effects on energy, trade, and supply chains. In such a period, the key question for a small economy is not simply how to preserve what it has, but which role it wants to secure before the regional map settles around it.
Jordan enters this stage with an economy that grew by around 2.8% in 2025, while the International Monetary Fund expects growth of about 2.7% in 2026. These figures show the economy’s ability to continue operating in a difficult regional environment, but they also suggest that improving performance within the existing path may not be enough. The next phase of competition will not be only about raising the growth rate. It will also be about entering early into the activities that are likely to drive an important share of regional growth and investment over the coming years.
This creates an important distinction between capturing a temporary opportunity and building an advantage that is difficult to replace. An opportunity may move when prices or incentives change. A real advantage is more durable: it develops when a country becomes continuously useful to its partners and surrounding markets. Jordan’s economic debate therefore deserves a more focused question. It is not only what Jordan can produce, but what it can do so well that surrounding economies increasingly need Jordan as part of their own economic calculations.
The answer may lie in a limited number of areas rather than an attempt to compete in everything. Jordan can combine digital, health, and education services with specialized pharmaceutical and food industries, professional services, and selected activities linked to water, energy, and technology. The advantage would not come from the size of any one sector. It would come from building a cluster of connected capabilities that gives the Jordanian economy a recognizable specialization and allows it to accumulate knowledge, investment, and market access over time.
This also requires a broader definition of market size. The number of consumers inside the Kingdom should not be the only measure of economic opportunity. A Jordanian company that can reach Gulf, Iraqi, or other markets digitally or commercially is, in practice, operating in a market larger than Jordan’s borders. The objective, therefore, should be to make Jordan a base for reaching several markets, while reducing the cost, time, and uncertainty of serving them. In this way, the effective size of the opportunity available to Jordanian producers and investors becomes much larger than the domestic market alone.
Investment policy should evolve in the same direction, moving from broad attraction toward economic targeting. The most valuable investment is not necessarily the largest. It is the investment that fills a missing link in a production chain, brings in a new supplier, opens an external market, or transfers knowledge that the economy does not yet possess. With unemployment among Jordanians at about 21.1% in the first quarter of 2026, the quality of jobs created by investment—their productivity, income, and ability to build skills—matters more than simply counting how many jobs are announced.
This leads to another useful measure: the cost of access. Transport, energy, customs, digital systems, and finance are not separate issues from the perspective of an investor or exporter. Together, they determine the time, cost, and risk that separate a Jordanian product or service from its market. The value of infrastructure and reform should therefore be judged by how much they shorten this economic distance. The faster, cheaper, and more predictable market access becomes, the more Jordan’s geography can be converted into a genuine competitive advantage rather than remaining only a location on the map.
The main gap today is not the absence of programs. The 2026-2029 Executive Program of the Economic Modernisation Vision already provides a broad base for action. The greater challenge is to turn existing priorities into more focused economic choices. Once Jordan identifies the areas in which it can build a regional advantage, education, finance, infrastructure, incentives, and investment can be directed more deliberately toward them. Spreading effort equally across dozens of paths may improve general performance, but it does not necessarily create an advantage that other economies will find difficult to replicate.
Ultimately, the next round of economic competition will not be decided only by who has the largest capital base or the widest market. It will also be decided by who can make itself a necessary part of other countries’ economic calculations. Jordan’s opportunity lies in moving from searching for opportunities within the regional economy to building interests that make its presence part of those opportunities. The strongest position is not the one a country declares for itself, but the one others come to need. At that point, Jordan would not merely be affected by the new Arab economic map; it would carry real weight in helping shape it.
The Arab economic map is changing not only because economies are growing or slowing, but because roles themselves are being redistributed. Capital is moving toward new sectors, supply chains are reconsidering where they operate, and technology is reducing the value of some traditional advantages while creating new ones. These shifts are taking place amid rising political and security tensions in the Middle East, intensified by the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran and its effects on energy, trade, and supply chains. In such a period, the key question for a small economy is not simply how to preserve what it has, but which role it wants to secure before the regional map settles around it.
Jordan enters this stage with an economy that grew by around 2.8% in 2025, while the International Monetary Fund expects growth of about 2.7% in 2026. These figures show the economy’s ability to continue operating in a difficult regional environment, but they also suggest that improving performance within the existing path may not be enough. The next phase of competition will not be only about raising the growth rate. It will also be about entering early into the activities that are likely to drive an important share of regional growth and investment over the coming years.
This creates an important distinction between capturing a temporary opportunity and building an advantage that is difficult to replace. An opportunity may move when prices or incentives change. A real advantage is more durable: it develops when a country becomes continuously useful to its partners and surrounding markets. Jordan’s economic debate therefore deserves a more focused question. It is not only what Jordan can produce, but what it can do so well that surrounding economies increasingly need Jordan as part of their own economic calculations.
The answer may lie in a limited number of areas rather than an attempt to compete in everything. Jordan can combine digital, health, and education services with specialized pharmaceutical and food industries, professional services, and selected activities linked to water, energy, and technology. The advantage would not come from the size of any one sector. It would come from building a cluster of connected capabilities that gives the Jordanian economy a recognizable specialization and allows it to accumulate knowledge, investment, and market access over time.
This also requires a broader definition of market size. The number of consumers inside the Kingdom should not be the only measure of economic opportunity. A Jordanian company that can reach Gulf, Iraqi, or other markets digitally or commercially is, in practice, operating in a market larger than Jordan’s borders. The objective, therefore, should be to make Jordan a base for reaching several markets, while reducing the cost, time, and uncertainty of serving them. In this way, the effective size of the opportunity available to Jordanian producers and investors becomes much larger than the domestic market alone.
Investment policy should evolve in the same direction, moving from broad attraction toward economic targeting. The most valuable investment is not necessarily the largest. It is the investment that fills a missing link in a production chain, brings in a new supplier, opens an external market, or transfers knowledge that the economy does not yet possess. With unemployment among Jordanians at about 21.1% in the first quarter of 2026, the quality of jobs created by investment—their productivity, income, and ability to build skills—matters more than simply counting how many jobs are announced.
This leads to another useful measure: the cost of access. Transport, energy, customs, digital systems, and finance are not separate issues from the perspective of an investor or exporter. Together, they determine the time, cost, and risk that separate a Jordanian product or service from its market. The value of infrastructure and reform should therefore be judged by how much they shorten this economic distance. The faster, cheaper, and more predictable market access becomes, the more Jordan’s geography can be converted into a genuine competitive advantage rather than remaining only a location on the map.
The main gap today is not the absence of programs. The 2026-2029 Executive Program of the Economic Modernisation Vision already provides a broad base for action. The greater challenge is to turn existing priorities into more focused economic choices. Once Jordan identifies the areas in which it can build a regional advantage, education, finance, infrastructure, incentives, and investment can be directed more deliberately toward them. Spreading effort equally across dozens of paths may improve general performance, but it does not necessarily create an advantage that other economies will find difficult to replicate.
Ultimately, the next round of economic competition will not be decided only by who has the largest capital base or the widest market. It will also be decided by who can make itself a necessary part of other countries’ economic calculations. Jordan’s opportunity lies in moving from searching for opportunities within the regional economy to building interests that make its presence part of those opportunities. The strongest position is not the one a country declares for itself, but the one others come to need. At that point, Jordan would not merely be affected by the new Arab economic map; it would carry real weight in helping shape it.
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As the Economy Around Us Changes: Where Does Jordan Stand on the New Arab Economic Map?
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