From the Gulf to Jordan: Iran’s search for new pressure points
Jordan's entry into Iran's circle of direct targeting should not be viewed as an isolated development. Rather, it marks a new phase in the regional confrontation, one that is likely to deepen in the coming weeks as Tehran seeks to compensate for the strategic setbacks it has suffered across multiple theatres.
For years, Iran has treated the spread of instability and controlled chaos as a central pillar of its regional strategy. As its ability for manoeuvre in the Gulf has narrowed under growing military deterrence and an expanded Western presence, Tehran has increasingly shifted its attention towards countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait, calculating that any reduction or redeployment of US forces in the Gulf would inevitably increase Jordan's importance as a safer strategic hub.
From this perspective, Jordan becomes a natural target. It is not only one of Washington's closest strategic partners in the region but also occupies a pivotal geographical position in the regional security architecture, sharing Israel's longest land border and playing a central role in any future security arrangement.
At the same time, Tehran has closely monitored Jordan's domestic landscape since the outbreak of the Gaza war. This explains the growing Iranian political and media messaging directed at the Jordanian public, aimed at testing the resilience of the state while projecting the image that Iran still possesses the capacity to influence the stability of one of the region's most strategically important countries.
The objective extends well beyond threatening Israel directly. Tehran seeks to reinforce the perception that it remains capable of destabilising territories that are critical to both Western interests and Israel's security, despite the increasing pressure it faces across the region.
Jordan's principal challenge, however, remains internal. The absence of a strong and coherent national narrative has created space for regional actors from Hamas previously to Iran today to address the Jordanian public directly and compete for influence over public opinion. Strengthening a unifying national discourse has therefore become an essential component of protecting Jordan's internal front against external attempts at political and ideological penetration.
This does not necessarily mean that Jordan has become the logistical centre for US military operations against Iran. From Tehran's perspective, the issue goes far beyond the presence of American forces. Iranian efforts to pressure Jordan predate current military developments and have long included weapons and narcotics smuggling networks operating through Syria and Iraq. This suggests that Jordan is targeted not because of temporary military deployments, but because of its broader strategic value within the American regional architecture and Israel's security environment.
With the gradual erosion of what Iran once described as the 'Unity of Fronts' strategy, and the containment of several of its traditional theatres of influence, Tehran may increasingly view the opening of new fronts as the most practical means of restoring its deterrence. In this context, Jordan emerges as one of the arenas capable of generating pressure on both Israel and the United States.
At the same time, the Houthi front appears set to regain greater strategic importance, whether through renewed threats to international shipping in the Red Sea or increased pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Available indicators suggest that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has spent recent weeks reactivating this theatre after the declining effectiveness of both the Lebanese and Syrian fronts.
In Iraq, Iran is also likely to continue relying on non-traditional armed groups capable of conducting limited operations while preserving a degree of plausible deniability. Simultaneously, the West Bank may remain a potential arena for reviving what remains of the 'Unity of Fronts' concept. Despite the diversity of these theatres, they all serve the same strategic objective: expanding regional instability as an instrument of political leverage.
Yet there are clear limits to this strategy. The international community is unlikely to tolerate sustained attacks on global maritime navigation or the normalisation of maritime piracy. Such tactics may provide Tehran with temporary leverage, but they could equally become the catalyst for rebuilding a broader and more cohesive international coalition. With Britain moving closer to the American position and existing maritime coalitions already in place, Europe may also find itself compelled to move beyond its largely reactive posture towards a more active security role in the Red Sea and the Gulf.
The coming weeks are therefore likely to see a new phase of Iranian escalation, centred on expanding regional instability, increasing pressure on the Gulf states Jordan and opening additional theatres of tension designed to burden both the region and its strategic partners, particularly the United States.
Jordan's entry into Iran's circle of direct targeting should not be viewed as an isolated development. Rather, it marks a new phase in the regional confrontation, one that is likely to deepen in the coming weeks as Tehran seeks to compensate for the strategic setbacks it has suffered across multiple theatres.
For years, Iran has treated the spread of instability and controlled chaos as a central pillar of its regional strategy. As its ability for manoeuvre in the Gulf has narrowed under growing military deterrence and an expanded Western presence, Tehran has increasingly shifted its attention towards countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait, calculating that any reduction or redeployment of US forces in the Gulf would inevitably increase Jordan's importance as a safer strategic hub.
From this perspective, Jordan becomes a natural target. It is not only one of Washington's closest strategic partners in the region but also occupies a pivotal geographical position in the regional security architecture, sharing Israel's longest land border and playing a central role in any future security arrangement.
At the same time, Tehran has closely monitored Jordan's domestic landscape since the outbreak of the Gaza war. This explains the growing Iranian political and media messaging directed at the Jordanian public, aimed at testing the resilience of the state while projecting the image that Iran still possesses the capacity to influence the stability of one of the region's most strategically important countries.
The objective extends well beyond threatening Israel directly. Tehran seeks to reinforce the perception that it remains capable of destabilising territories that are critical to both Western interests and Israel's security, despite the increasing pressure it faces across the region.
Jordan's principal challenge, however, remains internal. The absence of a strong and coherent national narrative has created space for regional actors from Hamas previously to Iran today to address the Jordanian public directly and compete for influence over public opinion. Strengthening a unifying national discourse has therefore become an essential component of protecting Jordan's internal front against external attempts at political and ideological penetration.
This does not necessarily mean that Jordan has become the logistical centre for US military operations against Iran. From Tehran's perspective, the issue goes far beyond the presence of American forces. Iranian efforts to pressure Jordan predate current military developments and have long included weapons and narcotics smuggling networks operating through Syria and Iraq. This suggests that Jordan is targeted not because of temporary military deployments, but because of its broader strategic value within the American regional architecture and Israel's security environment.
With the gradual erosion of what Iran once described as the 'Unity of Fronts' strategy, and the containment of several of its traditional theatres of influence, Tehran may increasingly view the opening of new fronts as the most practical means of restoring its deterrence. In this context, Jordan emerges as one of the arenas capable of generating pressure on both Israel and the United States.
At the same time, the Houthi front appears set to regain greater strategic importance, whether through renewed threats to international shipping in the Red Sea or increased pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Available indicators suggest that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has spent recent weeks reactivating this theatre after the declining effectiveness of both the Lebanese and Syrian fronts.
In Iraq, Iran is also likely to continue relying on non-traditional armed groups capable of conducting limited operations while preserving a degree of plausible deniability. Simultaneously, the West Bank may remain a potential arena for reviving what remains of the 'Unity of Fronts' concept. Despite the diversity of these theatres, they all serve the same strategic objective: expanding regional instability as an instrument of political leverage.
Yet there are clear limits to this strategy. The international community is unlikely to tolerate sustained attacks on global maritime navigation or the normalisation of maritime piracy. Such tactics may provide Tehran with temporary leverage, but they could equally become the catalyst for rebuilding a broader and more cohesive international coalition. With Britain moving closer to the American position and existing maritime coalitions already in place, Europe may also find itself compelled to move beyond its largely reactive posture towards a more active security role in the Red Sea and the Gulf.
The coming weeks are therefore likely to see a new phase of Iranian escalation, centred on expanding regional instability, increasing pressure on the Gulf states Jordan and opening additional theatres of tension designed to burden both the region and its strategic partners, particularly the United States.
Jordan's entry into Iran's circle of direct targeting should not be viewed as an isolated development. Rather, it marks a new phase in the regional confrontation, one that is likely to deepen in the coming weeks as Tehran seeks to compensate for the strategic setbacks it has suffered across multiple theatres.
For years, Iran has treated the spread of instability and controlled chaos as a central pillar of its regional strategy. As its ability for manoeuvre in the Gulf has narrowed under growing military deterrence and an expanded Western presence, Tehran has increasingly shifted its attention towards countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait, calculating that any reduction or redeployment of US forces in the Gulf would inevitably increase Jordan's importance as a safer strategic hub.
From this perspective, Jordan becomes a natural target. It is not only one of Washington's closest strategic partners in the region but also occupies a pivotal geographical position in the regional security architecture, sharing Israel's longest land border and playing a central role in any future security arrangement.
At the same time, Tehran has closely monitored Jordan's domestic landscape since the outbreak of the Gaza war. This explains the growing Iranian political and media messaging directed at the Jordanian public, aimed at testing the resilience of the state while projecting the image that Iran still possesses the capacity to influence the stability of one of the region's most strategically important countries.
The objective extends well beyond threatening Israel directly. Tehran seeks to reinforce the perception that it remains capable of destabilising territories that are critical to both Western interests and Israel's security, despite the increasing pressure it faces across the region.
Jordan's principal challenge, however, remains internal. The absence of a strong and coherent national narrative has created space for regional actors from Hamas previously to Iran today to address the Jordanian public directly and compete for influence over public opinion. Strengthening a unifying national discourse has therefore become an essential component of protecting Jordan's internal front against external attempts at political and ideological penetration.
This does not necessarily mean that Jordan has become the logistical centre for US military operations against Iran. From Tehran's perspective, the issue goes far beyond the presence of American forces. Iranian efforts to pressure Jordan predate current military developments and have long included weapons and narcotics smuggling networks operating through Syria and Iraq. This suggests that Jordan is targeted not because of temporary military deployments, but because of its broader strategic value within the American regional architecture and Israel's security environment.
With the gradual erosion of what Iran once described as the 'Unity of Fronts' strategy, and the containment of several of its traditional theatres of influence, Tehran may increasingly view the opening of new fronts as the most practical means of restoring its deterrence. In this context, Jordan emerges as one of the arenas capable of generating pressure on both Israel and the United States.
At the same time, the Houthi front appears set to regain greater strategic importance, whether through renewed threats to international shipping in the Red Sea or increased pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Available indicators suggest that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has spent recent weeks reactivating this theatre after the declining effectiveness of both the Lebanese and Syrian fronts.
In Iraq, Iran is also likely to continue relying on non-traditional armed groups capable of conducting limited operations while preserving a degree of plausible deniability. Simultaneously, the West Bank may remain a potential arena for reviving what remains of the 'Unity of Fronts' concept. Despite the diversity of these theatres, they all serve the same strategic objective: expanding regional instability as an instrument of political leverage.
Yet there are clear limits to this strategy. The international community is unlikely to tolerate sustained attacks on global maritime navigation or the normalisation of maritime piracy. Such tactics may provide Tehran with temporary leverage, but they could equally become the catalyst for rebuilding a broader and more cohesive international coalition. With Britain moving closer to the American position and existing maritime coalitions already in place, Europe may also find itself compelled to move beyond its largely reactive posture towards a more active security role in the Red Sea and the Gulf.
The coming weeks are therefore likely to see a new phase of Iranian escalation, centred on expanding regional instability, increasing pressure on the Gulf states Jordan and opening additional theatres of tension designed to burden both the region and its strategic partners, particularly the United States.
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From the Gulf to Jordan: Iran’s search for new pressure points
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