After Ankara: Where is Gulf national security heading?
The question being asked in Gulf capitals today is no longer whether the United States will remain a key security partner, but rather to what extent it can be relied upon in times of crisis. The US-Israeli war against Iran, and the accompanying limitations in achieving its declared strategic objectives, have revealed a profound shift in the regional security environment. While it is true that Washington still maintains the largest military presence in the Gulf, possessing military bases does not necessarily translate into possessing the political will to use them or the ability to impose decisive strategic outcomes.
The NATO meetings in Ankara come in this context, as an indication of the beginning of a new phase in which the Gulf States are seeking a more diversified security architecture, based on risk distribution and multiple partners, rather than near-total reliance on the US security umbrella. The summit also presents Turkey with an opportunity to strengthen its role as a bridge between the Alliance and the Middle East, leveraging its standing within NATO, the development of its defense industries, and its balanced relations with most regional actors.
In light of these shifts, three main scenarios can be outlined for the future of Gulf national security.
Scenario One: Multi-Partner Security
This scenario is based on the Gulf States’ transition from a “single ally” model to a “multi-partnership” model. Instead of replacing the United States with another power, the Gulf States will distribute their defence relationships among the United States, European countries and Turkey, while expanding cooperation with Asian powers in the areas of technology, cybersecurity and military manufacturing.
In this context, the outcomes of the NATO summit in Ankara could become a platform for enhancing cooperation with the Alliance in maritime security, energy security, air defence and cybersecurity, and for revitalising the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative more effectively, without necessarily leading to a new defence alliance. The probability of this scenario is approximately 55 per cent.
The conditions for its realisation include a continued decline in Gulf confidence in the US military commitment; the readiness of European countries and Turkey to assume greater security responsibilities in the region; the continuation of maritime and missile threats without the outbreak of a full-scale regional war; and the success of the Gulf States in maintaining a policy of balance among international powers.
This scenario is characterised by achieving the greatest degree of strategic flexibility, granting the Gulf States a wider margin for manoeuvre without becoming entangled in conflicting axes.
Scenario Two: Building an Independent Gulf Deterrent System
This scenario assumes that the Gulf States will draw the most important lesson from the recent war: that security cannot be entirely imported from abroad. Therefore, they will accelerate military manufacturing projects, unify air and missile defence systems, establish a more effective joint operations command, and increase investment in local defence industries, drones and military artificial intelligence.
In this scenario, external partnerships become tools for support and technology, while self-deterrence becomes the cornerstone of Gulf security. The probability of this scenario being realised is approximately 30 per cent.
Conditions for realisation include the availability of Gulf political will to overcome internal disputes; increased spending on local defence industries; the development of a unified Gulf command and control system; and the transfer of military technology from international partners instead of merely purchasing weapons.
This scenario represents a qualitative shift in the Gulf security philosophy, but it requires years of institutional development and massive investments, as well as a high degree of political coordination.
Scenario Three: Security Based on Regional Understandings and De-escalation
This scenario assumes that the cost of military confrontations will compel all regional parties to adopt a policy of crisis management rather than escalation, making dialogue with Iran an integral part of the Gulf security framework, alongside continued defence relations with the West.
Thus, the concept of security shifts from military deterrence alone to managing regional balances through diplomacy, ensuring maritime and energy security, and preventing a slide into wider confrontations. The chance of realisation is approximately 15 per cent.
Conditions for realisation include continued Gulf-Iranian dialogue; Iran’s commitment to reducing regional tensions; the success of regional mediations, particularly those of Turkey and Oman; and the existence of international guarantees that safeguard maritime security and freedom of trade. Although this scenario is the least likely, it remains the least costly economically and the most aligned with Gulf development priorities. However, it remains contingent on the level of mutual trust among the region’s stakeholders.
The NATO meetings in Ankara are not merely a routine gathering of the Alliance; they reflect the beginning of a redrawing of the Middle East’s security map. The recent war demonstrated that military superiority alone does not guarantee the achievement of political objectives, and that possessing military bases does not equate to the ability to impose stability or provide absolute protection for allies.
It also revealed that the United States has become more inclined to manage conflicts and reduce direct involvement, rather than wage protracted and costly wars.
Therefore, the Gulf States appear to be entering a transitional phase, redefining the concept of national security from reliance on an external guarantor to building an interconnected network of alliances, self-reliance and regional understandings. Ankara may well be the starting point of this transformation, not because NATO will replace the United States, but because the Gulf security system itself is entering a new phase based on diversifying sources of power, sharing burdens and increasing self-reliance.
The next phase will not witness the end of the Gulf partnership with Washington, but rather the end of the American monopoly on Gulf security and the beginning of a more pluralistic security system, more closely linked to the changing calculations of regional and international interests.
Professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University
The question being asked in Gulf capitals today is no longer whether the United States will remain a key security partner, but rather to what extent it can be relied upon in times of crisis. The US-Israeli war against Iran, and the accompanying limitations in achieving its declared strategic objectives, have revealed a profound shift in the regional security environment. While it is true that Washington still maintains the largest military presence in the Gulf, possessing military bases does not necessarily translate into possessing the political will to use them or the ability to impose decisive strategic outcomes.
The NATO meetings in Ankara come in this context, as an indication of the beginning of a new phase in which the Gulf States are seeking a more diversified security architecture, based on risk distribution and multiple partners, rather than near-total reliance on the US security umbrella. The summit also presents Turkey with an opportunity to strengthen its role as a bridge between the Alliance and the Middle East, leveraging its standing within NATO, the development of its defense industries, and its balanced relations with most regional actors.
In light of these shifts, three main scenarios can be outlined for the future of Gulf national security.
Scenario One: Multi-Partner Security
This scenario is based on the Gulf States’ transition from a “single ally” model to a “multi-partnership” model. Instead of replacing the United States with another power, the Gulf States will distribute their defence relationships among the United States, European countries and Turkey, while expanding cooperation with Asian powers in the areas of technology, cybersecurity and military manufacturing.
In this context, the outcomes of the NATO summit in Ankara could become a platform for enhancing cooperation with the Alliance in maritime security, energy security, air defence and cybersecurity, and for revitalising the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative more effectively, without necessarily leading to a new defence alliance. The probability of this scenario is approximately 55 per cent.
The conditions for its realisation include a continued decline in Gulf confidence in the US military commitment; the readiness of European countries and Turkey to assume greater security responsibilities in the region; the continuation of maritime and missile threats without the outbreak of a full-scale regional war; and the success of the Gulf States in maintaining a policy of balance among international powers.
This scenario is characterised by achieving the greatest degree of strategic flexibility, granting the Gulf States a wider margin for manoeuvre without becoming entangled in conflicting axes.
Scenario Two: Building an Independent Gulf Deterrent System
This scenario assumes that the Gulf States will draw the most important lesson from the recent war: that security cannot be entirely imported from abroad. Therefore, they will accelerate military manufacturing projects, unify air and missile defence systems, establish a more effective joint operations command, and increase investment in local defence industries, drones and military artificial intelligence.
In this scenario, external partnerships become tools for support and technology, while self-deterrence becomes the cornerstone of Gulf security. The probability of this scenario being realised is approximately 30 per cent.
Conditions for realisation include the availability of Gulf political will to overcome internal disputes; increased spending on local defence industries; the development of a unified Gulf command and control system; and the transfer of military technology from international partners instead of merely purchasing weapons.
This scenario represents a qualitative shift in the Gulf security philosophy, but it requires years of institutional development and massive investments, as well as a high degree of political coordination.
Scenario Three: Security Based on Regional Understandings and De-escalation
This scenario assumes that the cost of military confrontations will compel all regional parties to adopt a policy of crisis management rather than escalation, making dialogue with Iran an integral part of the Gulf security framework, alongside continued defence relations with the West.
Thus, the concept of security shifts from military deterrence alone to managing regional balances through diplomacy, ensuring maritime and energy security, and preventing a slide into wider confrontations. The chance of realisation is approximately 15 per cent.
Conditions for realisation include continued Gulf-Iranian dialogue; Iran’s commitment to reducing regional tensions; the success of regional mediations, particularly those of Turkey and Oman; and the existence of international guarantees that safeguard maritime security and freedom of trade. Although this scenario is the least likely, it remains the least costly economically and the most aligned with Gulf development priorities. However, it remains contingent on the level of mutual trust among the region’s stakeholders.
The NATO meetings in Ankara are not merely a routine gathering of the Alliance; they reflect the beginning of a redrawing of the Middle East’s security map. The recent war demonstrated that military superiority alone does not guarantee the achievement of political objectives, and that possessing military bases does not equate to the ability to impose stability or provide absolute protection for allies.
It also revealed that the United States has become more inclined to manage conflicts and reduce direct involvement, rather than wage protracted and costly wars.
Therefore, the Gulf States appear to be entering a transitional phase, redefining the concept of national security from reliance on an external guarantor to building an interconnected network of alliances, self-reliance and regional understandings. Ankara may well be the starting point of this transformation, not because NATO will replace the United States, but because the Gulf security system itself is entering a new phase based on diversifying sources of power, sharing burdens and increasing self-reliance.
The next phase will not witness the end of the Gulf partnership with Washington, but rather the end of the American monopoly on Gulf security and the beginning of a more pluralistic security system, more closely linked to the changing calculations of regional and international interests.
Professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University
The question being asked in Gulf capitals today is no longer whether the United States will remain a key security partner, but rather to what extent it can be relied upon in times of crisis. The US-Israeli war against Iran, and the accompanying limitations in achieving its declared strategic objectives, have revealed a profound shift in the regional security environment. While it is true that Washington still maintains the largest military presence in the Gulf, possessing military bases does not necessarily translate into possessing the political will to use them or the ability to impose decisive strategic outcomes.
The NATO meetings in Ankara come in this context, as an indication of the beginning of a new phase in which the Gulf States are seeking a more diversified security architecture, based on risk distribution and multiple partners, rather than near-total reliance on the US security umbrella. The summit also presents Turkey with an opportunity to strengthen its role as a bridge between the Alliance and the Middle East, leveraging its standing within NATO, the development of its defense industries, and its balanced relations with most regional actors.
In light of these shifts, three main scenarios can be outlined for the future of Gulf national security.
Scenario One: Multi-Partner Security
This scenario is based on the Gulf States’ transition from a “single ally” model to a “multi-partnership” model. Instead of replacing the United States with another power, the Gulf States will distribute their defence relationships among the United States, European countries and Turkey, while expanding cooperation with Asian powers in the areas of technology, cybersecurity and military manufacturing.
In this context, the outcomes of the NATO summit in Ankara could become a platform for enhancing cooperation with the Alliance in maritime security, energy security, air defence and cybersecurity, and for revitalising the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative more effectively, without necessarily leading to a new defence alliance. The probability of this scenario is approximately 55 per cent.
The conditions for its realisation include a continued decline in Gulf confidence in the US military commitment; the readiness of European countries and Turkey to assume greater security responsibilities in the region; the continuation of maritime and missile threats without the outbreak of a full-scale regional war; and the success of the Gulf States in maintaining a policy of balance among international powers.
This scenario is characterised by achieving the greatest degree of strategic flexibility, granting the Gulf States a wider margin for manoeuvre without becoming entangled in conflicting axes.
Scenario Two: Building an Independent Gulf Deterrent System
This scenario assumes that the Gulf States will draw the most important lesson from the recent war: that security cannot be entirely imported from abroad. Therefore, they will accelerate military manufacturing projects, unify air and missile defence systems, establish a more effective joint operations command, and increase investment in local defence industries, drones and military artificial intelligence.
In this scenario, external partnerships become tools for support and technology, while self-deterrence becomes the cornerstone of Gulf security. The probability of this scenario being realised is approximately 30 per cent.
Conditions for realisation include the availability of Gulf political will to overcome internal disputes; increased spending on local defence industries; the development of a unified Gulf command and control system; and the transfer of military technology from international partners instead of merely purchasing weapons.
This scenario represents a qualitative shift in the Gulf security philosophy, but it requires years of institutional development and massive investments, as well as a high degree of political coordination.
Scenario Three: Security Based on Regional Understandings and De-escalation
This scenario assumes that the cost of military confrontations will compel all regional parties to adopt a policy of crisis management rather than escalation, making dialogue with Iran an integral part of the Gulf security framework, alongside continued defence relations with the West.
Thus, the concept of security shifts from military deterrence alone to managing regional balances through diplomacy, ensuring maritime and energy security, and preventing a slide into wider confrontations. The chance of realisation is approximately 15 per cent.
Conditions for realisation include continued Gulf-Iranian dialogue; Iran’s commitment to reducing regional tensions; the success of regional mediations, particularly those of Turkey and Oman; and the existence of international guarantees that safeguard maritime security and freedom of trade. Although this scenario is the least likely, it remains the least costly economically and the most aligned with Gulf development priorities. However, it remains contingent on the level of mutual trust among the region’s stakeholders.
The NATO meetings in Ankara are not merely a routine gathering of the Alliance; they reflect the beginning of a redrawing of the Middle East’s security map. The recent war demonstrated that military superiority alone does not guarantee the achievement of political objectives, and that possessing military bases does not equate to the ability to impose stability or provide absolute protection for allies.
It also revealed that the United States has become more inclined to manage conflicts and reduce direct involvement, rather than wage protracted and costly wars.
Therefore, the Gulf States appear to be entering a transitional phase, redefining the concept of national security from reliance on an external guarantor to building an interconnected network of alliances, self-reliance and regional understandings. Ankara may well be the starting point of this transformation, not because NATO will replace the United States, but because the Gulf security system itself is entering a new phase based on diversifying sources of power, sharing burdens and increasing self-reliance.
The next phase will not witness the end of the Gulf partnership with Washington, but rather the end of the American monopoly on Gulf security and the beginning of a more pluralistic security system, more closely linked to the changing calculations of regional and international interests.
Professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University
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After Ankara: Where is Gulf national security heading?
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