Iran between the logic of siege and the doctrine of decisive strikes
As the American siege on Iran continues, aimed at forcing Tehran into accepting Washington’s strategic vision regarding its regional and military behaviour, two parallel currents are increasingly visible within Western decision-making circles. The first believes that sustained economic and political pressure is sufficient to transfer the crisis into the Iranian interior, gradually exhausting the system socially, economically, and security-wise, with time remaining the decisive factor in determining the success of this approach.
The second current, much closer to the Israeli vision, operates from the conviction that containment alone is no longer enough, and that preventing Iran from restoring its capabilities requires decisive strikes against the internal structure of the regime and its vital centers. According to this perspective, any pause in escalation would ultimately return the confrontation to square one, particularly amid continuing concerns regarding Iran’s ballistic capabilities, its stockpile of enriched uranium inside Iranian territory, and the long-term strategic threat this represents.
As a result, scenarios involving new strikes against Iran are increasingly gaining traction, extending far beyond the conventional framework of warfare. These scenarios include large-scale assassination campaigns, sophisticated operations deep inside Iranian territory, and even hypotheses involving the seizure of sensitive sites or the activation of armed actors on the ground, within an approach increasingly resembling the Reagan Doctrine, based on empowering local actors to destabilize adversaries from within.
With negotiations failing to produce an agreement under American conditions, the possibility of breaking the current deadlock through military escalation appears increasingly likely, especially as confidence declines in the existence of a genuinely “pragmatic” Iranian current capable of delivering the concessions demanded by Washington.
At the core of this strategic miscalculation lies one of the West’s most persistent analytical errors: the continued interpretation of the Islamic Republic through the classical model of the centralized nation-state built around a single hierarchical leadership structure.
The transformation Iran has undergone during the past years has rendered this framework increasingly obsolete. Iran is no longer a fragile vertical system whose collapse can be engineered through targeting a single center of power. Instead, it has gradually evolved into a distributed, multi-layered security structure capable of reproducing itself even in the absence of a visible political center.
For this reason, the killing of Ali Khamenei did not weaken the system as many had anticipated. On the contrary, it made the regime more flexible, more opaque, and significantly harder to target. Tehran appears to have fully absorbed the concept of “strategic decapitation” and has consequently restructured its internal architecture around the fragmentation and redistribution of authority in order to ensure continuity under sustained external pressure.
Within this context, the ambiguity surrounding Mojtaba Khamenei should not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of weakness or uncertainty. Rather, it may represent part of a deliberate redefinition of leadership itself. Iran is gradually separating authority from visibility, transitioning away from the model of the highly symbolic Supreme Leader toward a less visible coordinating structure managing an interconnected political, military, and security network.
The deeper transformation, however, lies in the gradual shift from a religious-jurisprudential model toward a security-administrative one. While the Islamic Republic formally preserves its theocratic structure, it is in practice evolving into a security technocracy with religious legitimacy, increasingly dominated by the logic of the Revolutionary Guard and integrated security institutions rather than by the traditional clerical establishment.
Figures such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Abbas Araghchi and Ahmad Vahidi should therefore not be interpreted as rival centers of power, but rather as functional arms of a single system distributing roles between negotiation, deterrence, and internal management within a unified strategic framework.
Yet the most dangerous element lies elsewhere, within the Iranian establishment, a growing conviction has taken hold that direct confrontation with the United States and Israel is no longer avoidable in the long term. As Israel continues neutralizing surrounding fronts, from Gaza to Lebanon and Iraq, through assassinations, security pressure, and efforts to reshape regional political balances, the possibility of a broader confrontation aimed at imposing strategic change inside Iran itself appears increasingly realistic.
Within this evolving framework, military operations are no longer defined by their previous conventional character. Instead, they are becoming part of a broader escalation doctrine evolving from the concept of “Epic Rage” toward the “Heavy Hammer” doctrine, alongside wider strategic projects aimed at reshaping the regional environment by force and imposing new security equations that move beyond containing Iran toward restructuring the architecture of the Iranian system itself.
As the American siege on Iran continues, aimed at forcing Tehran into accepting Washington’s strategic vision regarding its regional and military behaviour, two parallel currents are increasingly visible within Western decision-making circles. The first believes that sustained economic and political pressure is sufficient to transfer the crisis into the Iranian interior, gradually exhausting the system socially, economically, and security-wise, with time remaining the decisive factor in determining the success of this approach.
The second current, much closer to the Israeli vision, operates from the conviction that containment alone is no longer enough, and that preventing Iran from restoring its capabilities requires decisive strikes against the internal structure of the regime and its vital centers. According to this perspective, any pause in escalation would ultimately return the confrontation to square one, particularly amid continuing concerns regarding Iran’s ballistic capabilities, its stockpile of enriched uranium inside Iranian territory, and the long-term strategic threat this represents.
As a result, scenarios involving new strikes against Iran are increasingly gaining traction, extending far beyond the conventional framework of warfare. These scenarios include large-scale assassination campaigns, sophisticated operations deep inside Iranian territory, and even hypotheses involving the seizure of sensitive sites or the activation of armed actors on the ground, within an approach increasingly resembling the Reagan Doctrine, based on empowering local actors to destabilize adversaries from within.
With negotiations failing to produce an agreement under American conditions, the possibility of breaking the current deadlock through military escalation appears increasingly likely, especially as confidence declines in the existence of a genuinely “pragmatic” Iranian current capable of delivering the concessions demanded by Washington.
At the core of this strategic miscalculation lies one of the West’s most persistent analytical errors: the continued interpretation of the Islamic Republic through the classical model of the centralized nation-state built around a single hierarchical leadership structure.
The transformation Iran has undergone during the past years has rendered this framework increasingly obsolete. Iran is no longer a fragile vertical system whose collapse can be engineered through targeting a single center of power. Instead, it has gradually evolved into a distributed, multi-layered security structure capable of reproducing itself even in the absence of a visible political center.
For this reason, the killing of Ali Khamenei did not weaken the system as many had anticipated. On the contrary, it made the regime more flexible, more opaque, and significantly harder to target. Tehran appears to have fully absorbed the concept of “strategic decapitation” and has consequently restructured its internal architecture around the fragmentation and redistribution of authority in order to ensure continuity under sustained external pressure.
Within this context, the ambiguity surrounding Mojtaba Khamenei should not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of weakness or uncertainty. Rather, it may represent part of a deliberate redefinition of leadership itself. Iran is gradually separating authority from visibility, transitioning away from the model of the highly symbolic Supreme Leader toward a less visible coordinating structure managing an interconnected political, military, and security network.
The deeper transformation, however, lies in the gradual shift from a religious-jurisprudential model toward a security-administrative one. While the Islamic Republic formally preserves its theocratic structure, it is in practice evolving into a security technocracy with religious legitimacy, increasingly dominated by the logic of the Revolutionary Guard and integrated security institutions rather than by the traditional clerical establishment.
Figures such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Abbas Araghchi and Ahmad Vahidi should therefore not be interpreted as rival centers of power, but rather as functional arms of a single system distributing roles between negotiation, deterrence, and internal management within a unified strategic framework.
Yet the most dangerous element lies elsewhere, within the Iranian establishment, a growing conviction has taken hold that direct confrontation with the United States and Israel is no longer avoidable in the long term. As Israel continues neutralizing surrounding fronts, from Gaza to Lebanon and Iraq, through assassinations, security pressure, and efforts to reshape regional political balances, the possibility of a broader confrontation aimed at imposing strategic change inside Iran itself appears increasingly realistic.
Within this evolving framework, military operations are no longer defined by their previous conventional character. Instead, they are becoming part of a broader escalation doctrine evolving from the concept of “Epic Rage” toward the “Heavy Hammer” doctrine, alongside wider strategic projects aimed at reshaping the regional environment by force and imposing new security equations that move beyond containing Iran toward restructuring the architecture of the Iranian system itself.
As the American siege on Iran continues, aimed at forcing Tehran into accepting Washington’s strategic vision regarding its regional and military behaviour, two parallel currents are increasingly visible within Western decision-making circles. The first believes that sustained economic and political pressure is sufficient to transfer the crisis into the Iranian interior, gradually exhausting the system socially, economically, and security-wise, with time remaining the decisive factor in determining the success of this approach.
The second current, much closer to the Israeli vision, operates from the conviction that containment alone is no longer enough, and that preventing Iran from restoring its capabilities requires decisive strikes against the internal structure of the regime and its vital centers. According to this perspective, any pause in escalation would ultimately return the confrontation to square one, particularly amid continuing concerns regarding Iran’s ballistic capabilities, its stockpile of enriched uranium inside Iranian territory, and the long-term strategic threat this represents.
As a result, scenarios involving new strikes against Iran are increasingly gaining traction, extending far beyond the conventional framework of warfare. These scenarios include large-scale assassination campaigns, sophisticated operations deep inside Iranian territory, and even hypotheses involving the seizure of sensitive sites or the activation of armed actors on the ground, within an approach increasingly resembling the Reagan Doctrine, based on empowering local actors to destabilize adversaries from within.
With negotiations failing to produce an agreement under American conditions, the possibility of breaking the current deadlock through military escalation appears increasingly likely, especially as confidence declines in the existence of a genuinely “pragmatic” Iranian current capable of delivering the concessions demanded by Washington.
At the core of this strategic miscalculation lies one of the West’s most persistent analytical errors: the continued interpretation of the Islamic Republic through the classical model of the centralized nation-state built around a single hierarchical leadership structure.
The transformation Iran has undergone during the past years has rendered this framework increasingly obsolete. Iran is no longer a fragile vertical system whose collapse can be engineered through targeting a single center of power. Instead, it has gradually evolved into a distributed, multi-layered security structure capable of reproducing itself even in the absence of a visible political center.
For this reason, the killing of Ali Khamenei did not weaken the system as many had anticipated. On the contrary, it made the regime more flexible, more opaque, and significantly harder to target. Tehran appears to have fully absorbed the concept of “strategic decapitation” and has consequently restructured its internal architecture around the fragmentation and redistribution of authority in order to ensure continuity under sustained external pressure.
Within this context, the ambiguity surrounding Mojtaba Khamenei should not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of weakness or uncertainty. Rather, it may represent part of a deliberate redefinition of leadership itself. Iran is gradually separating authority from visibility, transitioning away from the model of the highly symbolic Supreme Leader toward a less visible coordinating structure managing an interconnected political, military, and security network.
The deeper transformation, however, lies in the gradual shift from a religious-jurisprudential model toward a security-administrative one. While the Islamic Republic formally preserves its theocratic structure, it is in practice evolving into a security technocracy with religious legitimacy, increasingly dominated by the logic of the Revolutionary Guard and integrated security institutions rather than by the traditional clerical establishment.
Figures such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Abbas Araghchi and Ahmad Vahidi should therefore not be interpreted as rival centers of power, but rather as functional arms of a single system distributing roles between negotiation, deterrence, and internal management within a unified strategic framework.
Yet the most dangerous element lies elsewhere, within the Iranian establishment, a growing conviction has taken hold that direct confrontation with the United States and Israel is no longer avoidable in the long term. As Israel continues neutralizing surrounding fronts, from Gaza to Lebanon and Iraq, through assassinations, security pressure, and efforts to reshape regional political balances, the possibility of a broader confrontation aimed at imposing strategic change inside Iran itself appears increasingly realistic.
Within this evolving framework, military operations are no longer defined by their previous conventional character. Instead, they are becoming part of a broader escalation doctrine evolving from the concept of “Epic Rage” toward the “Heavy Hammer” doctrine, alongside wider strategic projects aimed at reshaping the regional environment by force and imposing new security equations that move beyond containing Iran toward restructuring the architecture of the Iranian system itself.
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Iran between the logic of siege and the doctrine of decisive strikes
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