President Trump convened the first meeting of what he called the “Peace Council” in a move that goes beyond symbolism toward redefining the reference framework for managing international conflicts. The source of solutions is no longer confined to traditional institutions; it now revolves around the Council — and around the President himself. Unusually, Trump did not directly attack the United Nations, yet he effectively recalibrated its role, placing it alongside his executive steps rather than at the center of decision-making.
The references to India–Pakistan, Armenia–Azerbaijan, and the detailed presentation of what he has done or intends to do, cannot be read as mere diplomatic display. They signal a clear effort to entrench what could be termed “primary political reference authority” in conflict management, with greater firmness in the period ahead.
Gaza served as the principal entry point for the Council’s vision and its most prominent headline. Comprehensive reconstruction, real estate and technological development, and integration into international economic and sporting systems were discussed. Yet the most complex phase was absent: the transition from vision to implementation.
The disarmament of Hamas and its removal from governing the Strip were treated as settled matters. Reality suggests otherwise. Hamas continues to maneuver and refuses to relinquish its weapons. This means reconstruction will not be a purely technical process; it will be preceded by a restructuring of the political and security landscape that may prove more complex than publicly stated.
Israel understands this dilemma well, granting it room to reposition and potentially escalate as the only effective military force on the ground. In practice, this places Israel as the executive arm of any international vision until international forces are deployed, and reconstruction genuinely begins.
Meanwhile, U.S. military mobilization toward Iran is rising beyond preventive deterrence to the level of offensive preparedness. These deployments do not merely reflect containment of a potential threat, they suggest readiness for confrontation across every arena used as an instrument of Iranian influence — from Iraq to Yemen and potentially beyond.
Here the core idea becomes clear: The U.S. administration believes peace can be imposed through surplus power. Peace is not presented as the outcome of traditional negotiation, but as the product of readiness for war. We are witnessing an attempt to re-engineer the regional landscape through heavy deterrent tools that go beyond a bilateral confrontation with Iran toward redefining the rules of the game across the entire region.
If this analysis is accurate, the objective is not limited to ending Iranian military threats, but to dismantling the political doctrines that have shaped the region since the fall of Saddam Hussein; the logic of proxies, militias, and the export of influence through managed instability.
Yet such transformation may not mean the end of conflict, but its transition into a new form. Cultural change remains the most difficult challenge — harder than any military or political shift. Inherited patterns of conflict are not erased by top-down decisions or reconstruction plans, regardless of cost.
Herein lies the deeper dilemma, structures can be redesigned, constitutions amended, institutions reshaped, and slogans changed. But the political culture that lives on the logic of conflict and employs militias and weapons as tools of influence cannot be altered through cosmetic decisions or external engineering.
The problem is not always the structure of the system, but the culture that produces and reproduces it. Without transformation at that level, structural change risks being recycled into a new version of the same crisis under different names.
The peace proposed today is not limited to economics or urban development. It seeks to end the model of unregulated weapons, break the militia paradigm as a political tool, and redefine the concept of the state. Yet this objective collides with a deeply rooted cultural reality that surplus power alone cannot easily enforce change.
The fundamental question remains: Is the region truly prepared for this transition? Or are we attempting to accelerate change through force? Conflict in the Middle East rarely ends easily; it often reemerges in new forms and arenas. Any project to re-engineer the regional order will remain vulnerable to aftershocks.
Nevertheless, the American-drawn path appears, for now, to be the imposed trajectory for all. Navigating it requires balanced, anticipatory diplomacy — not emotional confrontation or reckless acceleration. In the end, the essential wisdom may be simple; 'It is not about running fast — but about running in the right direction.'
President Trump convened the first meeting of what he called the “Peace Council” in a move that goes beyond symbolism toward redefining the reference framework for managing international conflicts. The source of solutions is no longer confined to traditional institutions; it now revolves around the Council — and around the President himself. Unusually, Trump did not directly attack the United Nations, yet he effectively recalibrated its role, placing it alongside his executive steps rather than at the center of decision-making.
The references to India–Pakistan, Armenia–Azerbaijan, and the detailed presentation of what he has done or intends to do, cannot be read as mere diplomatic display. They signal a clear effort to entrench what could be termed “primary political reference authority” in conflict management, with greater firmness in the period ahead.
Gaza served as the principal entry point for the Council’s vision and its most prominent headline. Comprehensive reconstruction, real estate and technological development, and integration into international economic and sporting systems were discussed. Yet the most complex phase was absent: the transition from vision to implementation.
The disarmament of Hamas and its removal from governing the Strip were treated as settled matters. Reality suggests otherwise. Hamas continues to maneuver and refuses to relinquish its weapons. This means reconstruction will not be a purely technical process; it will be preceded by a restructuring of the political and security landscape that may prove more complex than publicly stated.
Israel understands this dilemma well, granting it room to reposition and potentially escalate as the only effective military force on the ground. In practice, this places Israel as the executive arm of any international vision until international forces are deployed, and reconstruction genuinely begins.
Meanwhile, U.S. military mobilization toward Iran is rising beyond preventive deterrence to the level of offensive preparedness. These deployments do not merely reflect containment of a potential threat, they suggest readiness for confrontation across every arena used as an instrument of Iranian influence — from Iraq to Yemen and potentially beyond.
Here the core idea becomes clear: The U.S. administration believes peace can be imposed through surplus power. Peace is not presented as the outcome of traditional negotiation, but as the product of readiness for war. We are witnessing an attempt to re-engineer the regional landscape through heavy deterrent tools that go beyond a bilateral confrontation with Iran toward redefining the rules of the game across the entire region.
If this analysis is accurate, the objective is not limited to ending Iranian military threats, but to dismantling the political doctrines that have shaped the region since the fall of Saddam Hussein; the logic of proxies, militias, and the export of influence through managed instability.
Yet such transformation may not mean the end of conflict, but its transition into a new form. Cultural change remains the most difficult challenge — harder than any military or political shift. Inherited patterns of conflict are not erased by top-down decisions or reconstruction plans, regardless of cost.
Herein lies the deeper dilemma, structures can be redesigned, constitutions amended, institutions reshaped, and slogans changed. But the political culture that lives on the logic of conflict and employs militias and weapons as tools of influence cannot be altered through cosmetic decisions or external engineering.
The problem is not always the structure of the system, but the culture that produces and reproduces it. Without transformation at that level, structural change risks being recycled into a new version of the same crisis under different names.
The peace proposed today is not limited to economics or urban development. It seeks to end the model of unregulated weapons, break the militia paradigm as a political tool, and redefine the concept of the state. Yet this objective collides with a deeply rooted cultural reality that surplus power alone cannot easily enforce change.
The fundamental question remains: Is the region truly prepared for this transition? Or are we attempting to accelerate change through force? Conflict in the Middle East rarely ends easily; it often reemerges in new forms and arenas. Any project to re-engineer the regional order will remain vulnerable to aftershocks.
Nevertheless, the American-drawn path appears, for now, to be the imposed trajectory for all. Navigating it requires balanced, anticipatory diplomacy — not emotional confrontation or reckless acceleration. In the end, the essential wisdom may be simple; 'It is not about running fast — but about running in the right direction.'
President Trump convened the first meeting of what he called the “Peace Council” in a move that goes beyond symbolism toward redefining the reference framework for managing international conflicts. The source of solutions is no longer confined to traditional institutions; it now revolves around the Council — and around the President himself. Unusually, Trump did not directly attack the United Nations, yet he effectively recalibrated its role, placing it alongside his executive steps rather than at the center of decision-making.
The references to India–Pakistan, Armenia–Azerbaijan, and the detailed presentation of what he has done or intends to do, cannot be read as mere diplomatic display. They signal a clear effort to entrench what could be termed “primary political reference authority” in conflict management, with greater firmness in the period ahead.
Gaza served as the principal entry point for the Council’s vision and its most prominent headline. Comprehensive reconstruction, real estate and technological development, and integration into international economic and sporting systems were discussed. Yet the most complex phase was absent: the transition from vision to implementation.
The disarmament of Hamas and its removal from governing the Strip were treated as settled matters. Reality suggests otherwise. Hamas continues to maneuver and refuses to relinquish its weapons. This means reconstruction will not be a purely technical process; it will be preceded by a restructuring of the political and security landscape that may prove more complex than publicly stated.
Israel understands this dilemma well, granting it room to reposition and potentially escalate as the only effective military force on the ground. In practice, this places Israel as the executive arm of any international vision until international forces are deployed, and reconstruction genuinely begins.
Meanwhile, U.S. military mobilization toward Iran is rising beyond preventive deterrence to the level of offensive preparedness. These deployments do not merely reflect containment of a potential threat, they suggest readiness for confrontation across every arena used as an instrument of Iranian influence — from Iraq to Yemen and potentially beyond.
Here the core idea becomes clear: The U.S. administration believes peace can be imposed through surplus power. Peace is not presented as the outcome of traditional negotiation, but as the product of readiness for war. We are witnessing an attempt to re-engineer the regional landscape through heavy deterrent tools that go beyond a bilateral confrontation with Iran toward redefining the rules of the game across the entire region.
If this analysis is accurate, the objective is not limited to ending Iranian military threats, but to dismantling the political doctrines that have shaped the region since the fall of Saddam Hussein; the logic of proxies, militias, and the export of influence through managed instability.
Yet such transformation may not mean the end of conflict, but its transition into a new form. Cultural change remains the most difficult challenge — harder than any military or political shift. Inherited patterns of conflict are not erased by top-down decisions or reconstruction plans, regardless of cost.
Herein lies the deeper dilemma, structures can be redesigned, constitutions amended, institutions reshaped, and slogans changed. But the political culture that lives on the logic of conflict and employs militias and weapons as tools of influence cannot be altered through cosmetic decisions or external engineering.
The problem is not always the structure of the system, but the culture that produces and reproduces it. Without transformation at that level, structural change risks being recycled into a new version of the same crisis under different names.
The peace proposed today is not limited to economics or urban development. It seeks to end the model of unregulated weapons, break the militia paradigm as a political tool, and redefine the concept of the state. Yet this objective collides with a deeply rooted cultural reality that surplus power alone cannot easily enforce change.
The fundamental question remains: Is the region truly prepared for this transition? Or are we attempting to accelerate change through force? Conflict in the Middle East rarely ends easily; it often reemerges in new forms and arenas. Any project to re-engineer the regional order will remain vulnerable to aftershocks.
Nevertheless, the American-drawn path appears, for now, to be the imposed trajectory for all. Navigating it requires balanced, anticipatory diplomacy — not emotional confrontation or reckless acceleration. In the end, the essential wisdom may be simple; 'It is not about running fast — but about running in the right direction.'
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