The current geopolitical landscape in the region, with all its looming escalations and complex diplomatic maneuvers, evokes the memory of the meeting between Tariq Aziz and James Baker in January 1991. That meeting, which held everyone's breath awaiting a miracle to avert war, was in essence a formal declaration of the countdown to military confrontation. Today, we find ourselves facing a 'phantom scenario' that reproduces that phase, albeit with fundamental differences that make the current scene even more complex. Negotiations are now taking place under the threat of force and in the complete absence of strategic guarantees. The current situation transcends a mere ultimatum, escalating into an international and regional power struggle where diplomacy is being used as a cover for military repositioning. This increases the likelihood of miscalculations, potentially leading the region toward a 'swift and decisive' confrontation with repercussions far exceeding those witnessed in Iraq decades ago.
What is happening today with Tehran closely resembles the stage of 'negotiating under the threat of force.' In 1991, Washington entered negotiations with Baghdad already decided on war. The famous meeting between Tariq Aziz and James Baker was more of an ultimatum than a genuine negotiation. Today, the Trump administration is reproducing the same scenario, using negotiations as a tool of maximum pressure rather than a real path to a solution, while keeping the door ajar for a swift, decisive, and high-impact strike under the guise of the 'shock doctrine.' Just as with Iraq, the demands being presented to Iran today are ostensibly a 'diplomatic deal,' but in reality, they are linguistically disguised terms of surrender, designed to extract concessions of sovereignty or pave the way for military action in case of refusal. This makes the diplomatic table merely a platform for stalling for time until the zero hour.
The dilemma of the lack of guarantees with Trump is a pressing issue in strategic analysis. His extensive negotiating record indicates a sharp pragmatism that tends to disregard international commitments whenever they conflict with his 'America First' vision. From his dramatic withdrawal from the nuclear agreement despite IAEA reports confirming Iran's compliance, to the 'show' summits with North Korea that ended without binding results or any real dismantling of its capabilities, Trump has adopted the doctrine of the 'surprise strike' as a tool for projecting power. The assassination of Qassem Soleimani remains the most prominent example of his impulsive decisions that disregard all diplomatic norms and traditional rules of engagement, rendering any verbal pledge or diplomatic guarantee against military action mere ink on paper, devoid of any real strategic value.
For Trump, a 'successful limited strike' is the ideal option; it provides him with a domestic achievement to appeal to his electoral base, sends a deterrent message of strength to adversaries abroad, and, most importantly, achieves his objectives without having to get bogged down in the quagmire of the protracted, all-out wars he has so often criticized. This approach renders the current negotiations merely a prelude to military repositioning, with diplomacy serving as a facade to mask potential 'shock and awe' scenarios. This leaves Tehran and the world in a state of deadly uncertainty, where no agreement can be relied upon unless it is followed by a radical and tangible shift in the balance of power on the ground.
In this scenario, Israel emerges not as a secondary player, but as a key driver and catalyst for the American decision. It does not believe in long-term settlements with Iran and considers any technologically capable Iran an existential threat, even if it does not actually possess weapons. What Israel wants goes beyond freezing the nuclear program; it seeks to dismantle Iran's military infrastructure and weaken it regionally in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Negotiations that do not result in a fundamental weakening of Tehran are considered an Israeli failure, placing Washington under constant pressure from powerful lobbies within the administration and Congress.
When comparing the war in Iraq to the current Iranian scenario, we find a frightening similarity in the regime's media demonization, the exaggeration of threats, negotiations lacking any real prospect of success, and the gradual military buildup. However, the differences remain the most terrifying. Iran is not Iraq; it possesses immense geographical and human depth, a network of transnational regional allies, and missile capabilities that grant it the ability to retaliate in an unconventional manner. Therefore, the likely strike will not be an occupation, but rather will take the form of precise air and missile strikes, assassinations, and cyberattacks aimed at destabilizing the country economically and socially, thus transforming the entire region, from the Gulf to the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, into an open battlefield. The current negotiations are not a quest for peace, but rather a test of Iran's patience, a means to buy precious time for Israel to complete its military preparations, and a way to blame Tehran for the 'failure of diplomacy' in the eyes of the international community. Just as it was said before, 'We tried... but Saddam refused,' the world is now poised to hear, 'We tried... but Iran was intransigent.' The strategic conclusion clearly points to the absence of genuine guarantees, and suggests that the negotiations may be nothing more than a 'pre-shock phase.' Israel is not seeking an agreement, but rather a historic weakening of Iran, and the most likely scenario is not a conventional, full-scale war, but a short, multi-front, and costly regional conflict that could forever alter the face of the Middle East.
Hasan Dajah — Professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University
The current geopolitical landscape in the region, with all its looming escalations and complex diplomatic maneuvers, evokes the memory of the meeting between Tariq Aziz and James Baker in January 1991. That meeting, which held everyone's breath awaiting a miracle to avert war, was in essence a formal declaration of the countdown to military confrontation. Today, we find ourselves facing a 'phantom scenario' that reproduces that phase, albeit with fundamental differences that make the current scene even more complex. Negotiations are now taking place under the threat of force and in the complete absence of strategic guarantees. The current situation transcends a mere ultimatum, escalating into an international and regional power struggle where diplomacy is being used as a cover for military repositioning. This increases the likelihood of miscalculations, potentially leading the region toward a 'swift and decisive' confrontation with repercussions far exceeding those witnessed in Iraq decades ago.
What is happening today with Tehran closely resembles the stage of 'negotiating under the threat of force.' In 1991, Washington entered negotiations with Baghdad already decided on war. The famous meeting between Tariq Aziz and James Baker was more of an ultimatum than a genuine negotiation. Today, the Trump administration is reproducing the same scenario, using negotiations as a tool of maximum pressure rather than a real path to a solution, while keeping the door ajar for a swift, decisive, and high-impact strike under the guise of the 'shock doctrine.' Just as with Iraq, the demands being presented to Iran today are ostensibly a 'diplomatic deal,' but in reality, they are linguistically disguised terms of surrender, designed to extract concessions of sovereignty or pave the way for military action in case of refusal. This makes the diplomatic table merely a platform for stalling for time until the zero hour.
The dilemma of the lack of guarantees with Trump is a pressing issue in strategic analysis. His extensive negotiating record indicates a sharp pragmatism that tends to disregard international commitments whenever they conflict with his 'America First' vision. From his dramatic withdrawal from the nuclear agreement despite IAEA reports confirming Iran's compliance, to the 'show' summits with North Korea that ended without binding results or any real dismantling of its capabilities, Trump has adopted the doctrine of the 'surprise strike' as a tool for projecting power. The assassination of Qassem Soleimani remains the most prominent example of his impulsive decisions that disregard all diplomatic norms and traditional rules of engagement, rendering any verbal pledge or diplomatic guarantee against military action mere ink on paper, devoid of any real strategic value.
For Trump, a 'successful limited strike' is the ideal option; it provides him with a domestic achievement to appeal to his electoral base, sends a deterrent message of strength to adversaries abroad, and, most importantly, achieves his objectives without having to get bogged down in the quagmire of the protracted, all-out wars he has so often criticized. This approach renders the current negotiations merely a prelude to military repositioning, with diplomacy serving as a facade to mask potential 'shock and awe' scenarios. This leaves Tehran and the world in a state of deadly uncertainty, where no agreement can be relied upon unless it is followed by a radical and tangible shift in the balance of power on the ground.
In this scenario, Israel emerges not as a secondary player, but as a key driver and catalyst for the American decision. It does not believe in long-term settlements with Iran and considers any technologically capable Iran an existential threat, even if it does not actually possess weapons. What Israel wants goes beyond freezing the nuclear program; it seeks to dismantle Iran's military infrastructure and weaken it regionally in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Negotiations that do not result in a fundamental weakening of Tehran are considered an Israeli failure, placing Washington under constant pressure from powerful lobbies within the administration and Congress.
When comparing the war in Iraq to the current Iranian scenario, we find a frightening similarity in the regime's media demonization, the exaggeration of threats, negotiations lacking any real prospect of success, and the gradual military buildup. However, the differences remain the most terrifying. Iran is not Iraq; it possesses immense geographical and human depth, a network of transnational regional allies, and missile capabilities that grant it the ability to retaliate in an unconventional manner. Therefore, the likely strike will not be an occupation, but rather will take the form of precise air and missile strikes, assassinations, and cyberattacks aimed at destabilizing the country economically and socially, thus transforming the entire region, from the Gulf to the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, into an open battlefield. The current negotiations are not a quest for peace, but rather a test of Iran's patience, a means to buy precious time for Israel to complete its military preparations, and a way to blame Tehran for the 'failure of diplomacy' in the eyes of the international community. Just as it was said before, 'We tried... but Saddam refused,' the world is now poised to hear, 'We tried... but Iran was intransigent.' The strategic conclusion clearly points to the absence of genuine guarantees, and suggests that the negotiations may be nothing more than a 'pre-shock phase.' Israel is not seeking an agreement, but rather a historic weakening of Iran, and the most likely scenario is not a conventional, full-scale war, but a short, multi-front, and costly regional conflict that could forever alter the face of the Middle East.
Hasan Dajah — Professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University
The current geopolitical landscape in the region, with all its looming escalations and complex diplomatic maneuvers, evokes the memory of the meeting between Tariq Aziz and James Baker in January 1991. That meeting, which held everyone's breath awaiting a miracle to avert war, was in essence a formal declaration of the countdown to military confrontation. Today, we find ourselves facing a 'phantom scenario' that reproduces that phase, albeit with fundamental differences that make the current scene even more complex. Negotiations are now taking place under the threat of force and in the complete absence of strategic guarantees. The current situation transcends a mere ultimatum, escalating into an international and regional power struggle where diplomacy is being used as a cover for military repositioning. This increases the likelihood of miscalculations, potentially leading the region toward a 'swift and decisive' confrontation with repercussions far exceeding those witnessed in Iraq decades ago.
What is happening today with Tehran closely resembles the stage of 'negotiating under the threat of force.' In 1991, Washington entered negotiations with Baghdad already decided on war. The famous meeting between Tariq Aziz and James Baker was more of an ultimatum than a genuine negotiation. Today, the Trump administration is reproducing the same scenario, using negotiations as a tool of maximum pressure rather than a real path to a solution, while keeping the door ajar for a swift, decisive, and high-impact strike under the guise of the 'shock doctrine.' Just as with Iraq, the demands being presented to Iran today are ostensibly a 'diplomatic deal,' but in reality, they are linguistically disguised terms of surrender, designed to extract concessions of sovereignty or pave the way for military action in case of refusal. This makes the diplomatic table merely a platform for stalling for time until the zero hour.
The dilemma of the lack of guarantees with Trump is a pressing issue in strategic analysis. His extensive negotiating record indicates a sharp pragmatism that tends to disregard international commitments whenever they conflict with his 'America First' vision. From his dramatic withdrawal from the nuclear agreement despite IAEA reports confirming Iran's compliance, to the 'show' summits with North Korea that ended without binding results or any real dismantling of its capabilities, Trump has adopted the doctrine of the 'surprise strike' as a tool for projecting power. The assassination of Qassem Soleimani remains the most prominent example of his impulsive decisions that disregard all diplomatic norms and traditional rules of engagement, rendering any verbal pledge or diplomatic guarantee against military action mere ink on paper, devoid of any real strategic value.
For Trump, a 'successful limited strike' is the ideal option; it provides him with a domestic achievement to appeal to his electoral base, sends a deterrent message of strength to adversaries abroad, and, most importantly, achieves his objectives without having to get bogged down in the quagmire of the protracted, all-out wars he has so often criticized. This approach renders the current negotiations merely a prelude to military repositioning, with diplomacy serving as a facade to mask potential 'shock and awe' scenarios. This leaves Tehran and the world in a state of deadly uncertainty, where no agreement can be relied upon unless it is followed by a radical and tangible shift in the balance of power on the ground.
In this scenario, Israel emerges not as a secondary player, but as a key driver and catalyst for the American decision. It does not believe in long-term settlements with Iran and considers any technologically capable Iran an existential threat, even if it does not actually possess weapons. What Israel wants goes beyond freezing the nuclear program; it seeks to dismantle Iran's military infrastructure and weaken it regionally in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Negotiations that do not result in a fundamental weakening of Tehran are considered an Israeli failure, placing Washington under constant pressure from powerful lobbies within the administration and Congress.
When comparing the war in Iraq to the current Iranian scenario, we find a frightening similarity in the regime's media demonization, the exaggeration of threats, negotiations lacking any real prospect of success, and the gradual military buildup. However, the differences remain the most terrifying. Iran is not Iraq; it possesses immense geographical and human depth, a network of transnational regional allies, and missile capabilities that grant it the ability to retaliate in an unconventional manner. Therefore, the likely strike will not be an occupation, but rather will take the form of precise air and missile strikes, assassinations, and cyberattacks aimed at destabilizing the country economically and socially, thus transforming the entire region, from the Gulf to the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, into an open battlefield. The current negotiations are not a quest for peace, but rather a test of Iran's patience, a means to buy precious time for Israel to complete its military preparations, and a way to blame Tehran for the 'failure of diplomacy' in the eyes of the international community. Just as it was said before, 'We tried... but Saddam refused,' the world is now poised to hear, 'We tried... but Iran was intransigent.' The strategic conclusion clearly points to the absence of genuine guarantees, and suggests that the negotiations may be nothing more than a 'pre-shock phase.' Israel is not seeking an agreement, but rather a historic weakening of Iran, and the most likely scenario is not a conventional, full-scale war, but a short, multi-front, and costly regional conflict that could forever alter the face of the Middle East.
Hasan Dajah — Professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University
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