Ammon News : The recent Venezuelan crisis is no longer a local event, nor even a regional one confined to Latin America. It has quickly become a mirror reflecting the extent of the dysfunction that has afflicted the international order established since the end of World War II.

The arrest of a head of state by force outside his country's borders, under disputed legal and political pretexts, constitutes a dangerous precedent that strikes at the very heart of the concept of national sovereignty and strikes at the core of the principles upon which the Charter of the United Nations is founded, most notably non-interference in the internal affairs of states and the prohibition of the use of force in international relations except in cases of self-defense or with a clear collective mandate.

The shockwaves of this event were not limited to Venezuela alone. They triggered a sharp international division between a camp that sees what happened as the imposition of the will of force, and another camp that considers it a selective application of international law serving the interests of a single party.

This division, in reality, reflects a deeper crisis: a crisis in the legitimacy of the international system itself, in the ability of its institutions to regulate the behavior of major powers, and in the impartiality of the rules that are supposed to govern everyone equally. When this principle is violated, the dispute is no longer about a specific incident, but rather about who has the right to define the law, who has the right to break it, and who is obligated to abide by it.

From this perspective, the sharp reactions from some major powers were a clear indication that what happened constituted a blatant violation of sovereignty and a direct threat to international stability. These powers did not merely defend a particular state or individual, but rather the idea that the international system cannot be based on the principle that the strongest decides, and that the law becomes a political tool used against adversaries and suspended for allies.

What happened in Venezuela appeared, in the eyes of many, to be a practical declaration of the global system's transition from a phase of 'rule by rules' to one of 'rule by imposed realities,' where legitimacy is created after the act, not before, and the law is reinterpreted to suit the balance of power, not its original texts.

This shift places China and Russia at a pivotal moment. They understand that overlooking this precedent implies tacit acceptance of its repetition in other parts of the world, perhaps even in arenas directly affecting their interests.

Therefore, their stance was not merely a political reaction, but a strategic message: the logic of imposing a fait accompli by force will not go unpunished, and the world is heading toward a new phase of confrontation if international law is not restored as the governing framework. In this context, clear signs of repositioning have emerged, not only in rhetoric, but also in the way alliances are thought, in the tools of deterrence, and in the very concept of influence.

The repercussions of this crisis extend far beyond Latin America and the relations between major powers. They reach directly into the Middle East, which for decades has been a central arena for power struggles, geopolitical score-settling, and the application of double standards. If the model based on the legitimization of force rather than the legitimization of law becomes entrenched, the region will be among the most vulnerable to its consequences, whether in terms of increased foreign intervention, escalating regional conflicts, or the erosion of opportunities for political settlements based on international consensus.

Furthermore, shifts in the global balance of power will impact sensitive Middle Eastern issues, from security and energy to chronic conflicts and regional alliances. If major powers feel that the existing rules no longer protect their interests, they will resort to strengthening their direct presence, supporting their allies more explicitly, or even imposing new realities that redraw spheres of influence.

This means the region could enter a more turbulent phase, where the projects of major powers intersect with those of regional powers, in the absence of an effective legal framework capable of containing the conflict. More dangerously, this crisis is accelerating the dismantling of the post-World War II international order, which- despite all its flaws- was based on the idea that global stability requires common rules, unifying institutions, and mechanisms for conflict resolution.

Today, this system appears severely weakened, its capacity for action diminishing, states' trust in it eroding, and it is gradually transforming into a mere formality, lacking both deterrent power and enforcement authority. With the increasing number of crises resolved by force or the threat of force, talk of an 'international order' becomes more of a theoretical construct than a practical reality.

This explains why the Venezuelan crisis is seen as a harbinger of a new era, one in which the features of an alternative international order are taking shape. This order will not necessarily be based on universal consensus, but rather on multipolar power balances and open competition between major projects, each striving to impose its own vision of the world, of law, and of legitimacy. In this emerging system, rules will not be uniform but relative; institutions will not be neutral but arenas of conflict; and stability will not be the primary objective, but rather managing conflict at the lowest possible cost.

This transformation does not necessarily mean a more just or unjust world, but rather a more fragile, less predictable, and more susceptible world to major crises resulting from miscalculations or conflicting interests. In such a world, local crises become sparks for international ones, regional conflicts become knots in a complex global web of competition, and concepts like sovereignty and independence lose their traditional meaning, being redefined according to the logic of power.

The Venezuelan crisis, in this sense, is merely a symptom of the profound transformation underway in the structure of the global order. It is not the cause of the collapse, but rather one of its symptoms. Unless the principle that law is above force is reaffirmed, and that legitimacy is not imposed but built, the world is heading toward a phase where checks and balances weaken, risks escalate, and the fundamental question becomes not how to prevent conflicts, but how to live with and manage them.

In this context, what begins in Venezuela may not end there, but may extend to other regions, most notably the Middle East, which finds itself once again at the heart of major transformations, not as a key player, but as an arena where the struggle of powers, the clash of projects, and the imbalance of law and power are manifested.

Hasan Dajah - Professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University

Ammon News : The recent Venezuelan crisis is no longer a local event, nor even a regional one confined to Latin America. It has quickly become a mirror reflecting the extent of the dysfunction that has afflicted the international order established since the end of World War II.

The arrest of a head of state by force outside his country's borders, under disputed legal and political pretexts, constitutes a dangerous precedent that strikes at the very heart of the concept of national sovereignty and strikes at the core of the principles upon which the Charter of the United Nations is founded, most notably non-interference in the internal affairs of states and the prohibition of the use of force in international relations except in cases of self-defense or with a clear collective mandate.

The shockwaves of this event were not limited to Venezuela alone. They triggered a sharp international division between a camp that sees what happened as the imposition of the will of force, and another camp that considers it a selective application of international law serving the interests of a single party.

This division, in reality, reflects a deeper crisis: a crisis in the legitimacy of the international system itself, in the ability of its institutions to regulate the behavior of major powers, and in the impartiality of the rules that are supposed to govern everyone equally. When this principle is violated, the dispute is no longer about a specific incident, but rather about who has the right to define the law, who has the right to break it, and who is obligated to abide by it.

From this perspective, the sharp reactions from some major powers were a clear indication that what happened constituted a blatant violation of sovereignty and a direct threat to international stability. These powers did not merely defend a particular state or individual, but rather the idea that the international system cannot be based on the principle that the strongest decides, and that the law becomes a political tool used against adversaries and suspended for allies.

What happened in Venezuela appeared, in the eyes of many, to be a practical declaration of the global system's transition from a phase of 'rule by rules' to one of 'rule by imposed realities,' where legitimacy is created after the act, not before, and the law is reinterpreted to suit the balance of power, not its original texts.

This shift places China and Russia at a pivotal moment. They understand that overlooking this precedent implies tacit acceptance of its repetition in other parts of the world, perhaps even in arenas directly affecting their interests.

Therefore, their stance was not merely a political reaction, but a strategic message: the logic of imposing a fait accompli by force will not go unpunished, and the world is heading toward a new phase of confrontation if international law is not restored as the governing framework. In this context, clear signs of repositioning have emerged, not only in rhetoric, but also in the way alliances are thought, in the tools of deterrence, and in the very concept of influence.

The repercussions of this crisis extend far beyond Latin America and the relations between major powers. They reach directly into the Middle East, which for decades has been a central arena for power struggles, geopolitical score-settling, and the application of double standards. If the model based on the legitimization of force rather than the legitimization of law becomes entrenched, the region will be among the most vulnerable to its consequences, whether in terms of increased foreign intervention, escalating regional conflicts, or the erosion of opportunities for political settlements based on international consensus.

Furthermore, shifts in the global balance of power will impact sensitive Middle Eastern issues, from security and energy to chronic conflicts and regional alliances. If major powers feel that the existing rules no longer protect their interests, they will resort to strengthening their direct presence, supporting their allies more explicitly, or even imposing new realities that redraw spheres of influence.

This means the region could enter a more turbulent phase, where the projects of major powers intersect with those of regional powers, in the absence of an effective legal framework capable of containing the conflict. More dangerously, this crisis is accelerating the dismantling of the post-World War II international order, which- despite all its flaws- was based on the idea that global stability requires common rules, unifying institutions, and mechanisms for conflict resolution.

Today, this system appears severely weakened, its capacity for action diminishing, states' trust in it eroding, and it is gradually transforming into a mere formality, lacking both deterrent power and enforcement authority. With the increasing number of crises resolved by force or the threat of force, talk of an 'international order' becomes more of a theoretical construct than a practical reality.

This explains why the Venezuelan crisis is seen as a harbinger of a new era, one in which the features of an alternative international order are taking shape. This order will not necessarily be based on universal consensus, but rather on multipolar power balances and open competition between major projects, each striving to impose its own vision of the world, of law, and of legitimacy. In this emerging system, rules will not be uniform but relative; institutions will not be neutral but arenas of conflict; and stability will not be the primary objective, but rather managing conflict at the lowest possible cost.

This transformation does not necessarily mean a more just or unjust world, but rather a more fragile, less predictable, and more susceptible world to major crises resulting from miscalculations or conflicting interests. In such a world, local crises become sparks for international ones, regional conflicts become knots in a complex global web of competition, and concepts like sovereignty and independence lose their traditional meaning, being redefined according to the logic of power.

The Venezuelan crisis, in this sense, is merely a symptom of the profound transformation underway in the structure of the global order. It is not the cause of the collapse, but rather one of its symptoms. Unless the principle that law is above force is reaffirmed, and that legitimacy is not imposed but built, the world is heading toward a phase where checks and balances weaken, risks escalate, and the fundamental question becomes not how to prevent conflicts, but how to live with and manage them.

In this context, what begins in Venezuela may not end there, but may extend to other regions, most notably the Middle East, which finds itself once again at the heart of major transformations, not as a key player, but as an arena where the struggle of powers, the clash of projects, and the imbalance of law and power are manifested.

Hasan Dajah - Professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University

https://en.ammonnews.net/article/88051