The post-internationalisation phase of Gaza: Redefining the region’s security geography
With the UN Security Council’s approval of President Trump’s plan for Gaza, the internationalisation of Gaza has entered a new phase, one whose key feature is the international recognition of the need to disarm the Strip and create a “weapon-free Gaza.” The central question now becomes how will this be implemented if the armed factions on the ground, especially Hamas, refuse to comply voluntarily? This means that any incoming international force would effectively be a peace-enforcement mission, mandated not only to stabilise but also to disarm by force.
During the interim period between forming this international force, defining its mandate, and determining the mechanics of execution before moving to the second stage of the agreement, Israel is seeking to exploit the vacuum during this window. It is intensifying military operations aimed at eliminating armed operatives and pushing toward its larger strategic objective, expressed clearly by Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, that the Gaza tunnels must be destroyed.
Israel understands that the complexity of forming an international force, deploying it on the ground, and the potential for direct confrontation with local armed groups during the disarmament process may create a practical reality: no one will openly oppose Israel’s current actions, and many might quietly accept them. In this sense, the agreement has unintentionally given Israel the political cover necessary at this stage to pursue military operations aligned with its long-standing objectives throughout the two-year conflict.
At the same time, Israel’s escalation in the West Bank and Lebanon fits within the same overarching strategy of conducting pre-emptive operations under the banner of security, disarmament, and “shaping facts on the ground.” These operations, framed as security imperatives, ultimately establish a new political reality, from territorial consolidation to altering the structure of contested areas, forcing all actors to deal with the transformed landscape as an irreversible status quo.
A similar pattern is evident in Israel’s policy toward Syria. The assumption that Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s visit to Washington would provide an American guarantee against Israel’s actions in Syria was fundamentally incorrect. Israel quickly reaffirmed this through concrete moves, from confirming its grip over areas it seized following the collapse of the Syrian regime, to the symbolic but highly deliberate tour of southern Syria by the Israeli Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and top security officials.
These steps underscore a basic truth, as long as Israel frames its actions as security-driven and necessary to prevent an October 7-type scenario, serious American objections are unlikely. Israel sees these measures as central to redrawing the regional security map and restructuring its political partnerships.
These Israeli moves across all adjacent fronts, from Gaza to the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon, are likely to continue and may even expand geographically under this security doctrine. Israel believes it must accelerate these steps, especially as President Trump intensifies efforts to advance the next stages of his Middle East peace vision, anchored in expanding and activating the Abraham Accords.
President Trump, who views himself as the leader capable of ending wars and crises, now seeks to transition from ending conflicts to building peace. This means expanding the Abraham Accords and leveraging international frameworks, including the new multinational force, to push the region toward a broader regional peace architecture, which is Washington’s next major objective.
Therefore, the coming weeks will be defined by the formation and deployment of the regional force, and may witness further Israeli escalation on multiple fronts, Gaza, the West Bank, and most significantly Lebanon. Washington’s unprecedented decision to cancel the Lebanese Army Chief of Staff’s visit, as a protest against the failure to act on the issues of Hizbollah’s weapons, reflects a clear message, the crisis is now fully Lebanese, while Israel is implicitly given the mandate to take actions that others cannot.
In practical terms, this translates to Israel continuing to strike Hezbollah, its infrastructure, personnel, and zones of influence, under the political and strategic cover created by both the international plan and the prevailing regional environment.
With the UN Security Council’s approval of President Trump’s plan for Gaza, the internationalisation of Gaza has entered a new phase, one whose key feature is the international recognition of the need to disarm the Strip and create a “weapon-free Gaza.” The central question now becomes how will this be implemented if the armed factions on the ground, especially Hamas, refuse to comply voluntarily? This means that any incoming international force would effectively be a peace-enforcement mission, mandated not only to stabilise but also to disarm by force.
During the interim period between forming this international force, defining its mandate, and determining the mechanics of execution before moving to the second stage of the agreement, Israel is seeking to exploit the vacuum during this window. It is intensifying military operations aimed at eliminating armed operatives and pushing toward its larger strategic objective, expressed clearly by Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, that the Gaza tunnels must be destroyed.
Israel understands that the complexity of forming an international force, deploying it on the ground, and the potential for direct confrontation with local armed groups during the disarmament process may create a practical reality: no one will openly oppose Israel’s current actions, and many might quietly accept them. In this sense, the agreement has unintentionally given Israel the political cover necessary at this stage to pursue military operations aligned with its long-standing objectives throughout the two-year conflict.
At the same time, Israel’s escalation in the West Bank and Lebanon fits within the same overarching strategy of conducting pre-emptive operations under the banner of security, disarmament, and “shaping facts on the ground.” These operations, framed as security imperatives, ultimately establish a new political reality, from territorial consolidation to altering the structure of contested areas, forcing all actors to deal with the transformed landscape as an irreversible status quo.
A similar pattern is evident in Israel’s policy toward Syria. The assumption that Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s visit to Washington would provide an American guarantee against Israel’s actions in Syria was fundamentally incorrect. Israel quickly reaffirmed this through concrete moves, from confirming its grip over areas it seized following the collapse of the Syrian regime, to the symbolic but highly deliberate tour of southern Syria by the Israeli Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and top security officials.
These steps underscore a basic truth, as long as Israel frames its actions as security-driven and necessary to prevent an October 7-type scenario, serious American objections are unlikely. Israel sees these measures as central to redrawing the regional security map and restructuring its political partnerships.
These Israeli moves across all adjacent fronts, from Gaza to the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon, are likely to continue and may even expand geographically under this security doctrine. Israel believes it must accelerate these steps, especially as President Trump intensifies efforts to advance the next stages of his Middle East peace vision, anchored in expanding and activating the Abraham Accords.
President Trump, who views himself as the leader capable of ending wars and crises, now seeks to transition from ending conflicts to building peace. This means expanding the Abraham Accords and leveraging international frameworks, including the new multinational force, to push the region toward a broader regional peace architecture, which is Washington’s next major objective.
Therefore, the coming weeks will be defined by the formation and deployment of the regional force, and may witness further Israeli escalation on multiple fronts, Gaza, the West Bank, and most significantly Lebanon. Washington’s unprecedented decision to cancel the Lebanese Army Chief of Staff’s visit, as a protest against the failure to act on the issues of Hizbollah’s weapons, reflects a clear message, the crisis is now fully Lebanese, while Israel is implicitly given the mandate to take actions that others cannot.
In practical terms, this translates to Israel continuing to strike Hezbollah, its infrastructure, personnel, and zones of influence, under the political and strategic cover created by both the international plan and the prevailing regional environment.
With the UN Security Council’s approval of President Trump’s plan for Gaza, the internationalisation of Gaza has entered a new phase, one whose key feature is the international recognition of the need to disarm the Strip and create a “weapon-free Gaza.” The central question now becomes how will this be implemented if the armed factions on the ground, especially Hamas, refuse to comply voluntarily? This means that any incoming international force would effectively be a peace-enforcement mission, mandated not only to stabilise but also to disarm by force.
During the interim period between forming this international force, defining its mandate, and determining the mechanics of execution before moving to the second stage of the agreement, Israel is seeking to exploit the vacuum during this window. It is intensifying military operations aimed at eliminating armed operatives and pushing toward its larger strategic objective, expressed clearly by Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, that the Gaza tunnels must be destroyed.
Israel understands that the complexity of forming an international force, deploying it on the ground, and the potential for direct confrontation with local armed groups during the disarmament process may create a practical reality: no one will openly oppose Israel’s current actions, and many might quietly accept them. In this sense, the agreement has unintentionally given Israel the political cover necessary at this stage to pursue military operations aligned with its long-standing objectives throughout the two-year conflict.
At the same time, Israel’s escalation in the West Bank and Lebanon fits within the same overarching strategy of conducting pre-emptive operations under the banner of security, disarmament, and “shaping facts on the ground.” These operations, framed as security imperatives, ultimately establish a new political reality, from territorial consolidation to altering the structure of contested areas, forcing all actors to deal with the transformed landscape as an irreversible status quo.
A similar pattern is evident in Israel’s policy toward Syria. The assumption that Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s visit to Washington would provide an American guarantee against Israel’s actions in Syria was fundamentally incorrect. Israel quickly reaffirmed this through concrete moves, from confirming its grip over areas it seized following the collapse of the Syrian regime, to the symbolic but highly deliberate tour of southern Syria by the Israeli Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and top security officials.
These steps underscore a basic truth, as long as Israel frames its actions as security-driven and necessary to prevent an October 7-type scenario, serious American objections are unlikely. Israel sees these measures as central to redrawing the regional security map and restructuring its political partnerships.
These Israeli moves across all adjacent fronts, from Gaza to the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon, are likely to continue and may even expand geographically under this security doctrine. Israel believes it must accelerate these steps, especially as President Trump intensifies efforts to advance the next stages of his Middle East peace vision, anchored in expanding and activating the Abraham Accords.
President Trump, who views himself as the leader capable of ending wars and crises, now seeks to transition from ending conflicts to building peace. This means expanding the Abraham Accords and leveraging international frameworks, including the new multinational force, to push the region toward a broader regional peace architecture, which is Washington’s next major objective.
Therefore, the coming weeks will be defined by the formation and deployment of the regional force, and may witness further Israeli escalation on multiple fronts, Gaza, the West Bank, and most significantly Lebanon. Washington’s unprecedented decision to cancel the Lebanese Army Chief of Staff’s visit, as a protest against the failure to act on the issues of Hizbollah’s weapons, reflects a clear message, the crisis is now fully Lebanese, while Israel is implicitly given the mandate to take actions that others cannot.
In practical terms, this translates to Israel continuing to strike Hezbollah, its infrastructure, personnel, and zones of influence, under the political and strategic cover created by both the international plan and the prevailing regional environment.
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The post-internationalisation phase of Gaza: Redefining the region’s security geography
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