No war, no peace: The intelligence war around Iran
The crisis between Iran and the United States is no longer a direct war, but peace has certainly not been achieved. We are facing what can best be described as a state of “no war, no peace,” in which military operations have stopped while the other instruments of confrontation remain fully active, including economic pressure, internal exhaustion, intelligence warfare and a constant military threat. Washington appears determined to maintain pressure on Iran and deepen its economic crisis while simultaneously preserving its overwhelming military advantage and full readiness to resume operations. The current phase, therefore, looks increasingly like an intelligence war conducted under the veil of a military pause.
But this intelligence war is not directed at Iran alone. The United States and Israel now appear focused on dismantling what remains of Iran’s regional network of influence by intensifying pressure on Hezbollah, continuing to target the Houthis, and giving the Iraqi government greater room to address the issue of militias and weapons outside state control. In this context, Iran’s emergency response and its moves toward Iraq, including the dispatch of Esmail Qaani to warn against disarming Iraqi factions at this particular moment, become significant.
Rather than moving directly back into a confrontation with Iran, the region appears to be entering a stage that could precede a new direct confrontation, while Iran’s regional instruments are progressively weakened, including Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Iraqi militias. At the same time, the Iranian interior is becoming a major theatre for intelligence operations, exploiting a crisis that is deepening politically, economically, socially and in terms of security.
The Strait of Hormuz provides a clear example of this equation. Iran can disrupt navigation and raise the cost of maritime risks through mines, fast boats, drones and missiles, which explains the growing concerns among shipping and insurance companies. But disrupting navigation is not the same as exercising military control over the Strait. The United States remains the dominant military power in the area, yet its presence alone cannot prevent every attempt to target or disrupt shipping. This creates an important paradox, a weaker power can achieve a limited objective, disrupting navigation, while a much stronger power cannot easily guarantee its security.
More importantly, Washington may not be in a hurry to bring this situation to an end. A prolonged Hormuz crisis pushes the world to rely on the United States and strengthens Washington’s demand that other countries contribute to securing navigation. It is, in effect, a process of reshaping relations with both allies and adversaries, transforming a regional crisis into an international responsibility led by the United States.
This also explains why the crisis is becoming a test for the wider international system. Russia is facing growing pressures, while China cannot ignore a prolonged crisis threatening global trade and energy flows. Yet the longer the crisis continues, the more it may serve another American objective by accelerating the search for alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz.
Talk of pipelines, overland routes and connectivity linking the Gulf through Jordan to the Mediterranean, alongside emerging corridors connecting India and Europe, becomes more significant the longer the Strait remains unstable. The world cannot base its energy security indefinitely on a passage that can be disrupted for an extended period. Alternatives, therefore, may gradually shift from strategic projects to practical necessities.
Against this backdrop, Donald Trump’s statement that the American response would be “a thousand times greater” if Iran attacked the United States also serves to keep the Iranian threat firmly within the strategic equation. Maintaining Iran as a potential threat to American interests and assets creates the political and psychological conditions for a possible return to confrontation, while the continued presence of American military power in the region requires a sustained strategic justification.
This is where the real danger of “no war, no peace” lies. As the crisis inside Iran deepens, the regime may eventually see external escalation as a means of rebuilding its legitimacy, while Washington could view any escalation as justification for using force again. The current phase, therefore, may not represent the end of the war, but preparation for another one, a war now being fought through economics, intelligence and political pressure, before developments inside Iran determine whether the region remains trapped in “no war, no peace,” or moves once again toward direct confrontation.
The crisis between Iran and the United States is no longer a direct war, but peace has certainly not been achieved. We are facing what can best be described as a state of “no war, no peace,” in which military operations have stopped while the other instruments of confrontation remain fully active, including economic pressure, internal exhaustion, intelligence warfare and a constant military threat. Washington appears determined to maintain pressure on Iran and deepen its economic crisis while simultaneously preserving its overwhelming military advantage and full readiness to resume operations. The current phase, therefore, looks increasingly like an intelligence war conducted under the veil of a military pause.
But this intelligence war is not directed at Iran alone. The United States and Israel now appear focused on dismantling what remains of Iran’s regional network of influence by intensifying pressure on Hezbollah, continuing to target the Houthis, and giving the Iraqi government greater room to address the issue of militias and weapons outside state control. In this context, Iran’s emergency response and its moves toward Iraq, including the dispatch of Esmail Qaani to warn against disarming Iraqi factions at this particular moment, become significant.
Rather than moving directly back into a confrontation with Iran, the region appears to be entering a stage that could precede a new direct confrontation, while Iran’s regional instruments are progressively weakened, including Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Iraqi militias. At the same time, the Iranian interior is becoming a major theatre for intelligence operations, exploiting a crisis that is deepening politically, economically, socially and in terms of security.
The Strait of Hormuz provides a clear example of this equation. Iran can disrupt navigation and raise the cost of maritime risks through mines, fast boats, drones and missiles, which explains the growing concerns among shipping and insurance companies. But disrupting navigation is not the same as exercising military control over the Strait. The United States remains the dominant military power in the area, yet its presence alone cannot prevent every attempt to target or disrupt shipping. This creates an important paradox, a weaker power can achieve a limited objective, disrupting navigation, while a much stronger power cannot easily guarantee its security.
More importantly, Washington may not be in a hurry to bring this situation to an end. A prolonged Hormuz crisis pushes the world to rely on the United States and strengthens Washington’s demand that other countries contribute to securing navigation. It is, in effect, a process of reshaping relations with both allies and adversaries, transforming a regional crisis into an international responsibility led by the United States.
This also explains why the crisis is becoming a test for the wider international system. Russia is facing growing pressures, while China cannot ignore a prolonged crisis threatening global trade and energy flows. Yet the longer the crisis continues, the more it may serve another American objective by accelerating the search for alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz.
Talk of pipelines, overland routes and connectivity linking the Gulf through Jordan to the Mediterranean, alongside emerging corridors connecting India and Europe, becomes more significant the longer the Strait remains unstable. The world cannot base its energy security indefinitely on a passage that can be disrupted for an extended period. Alternatives, therefore, may gradually shift from strategic projects to practical necessities.
Against this backdrop, Donald Trump’s statement that the American response would be “a thousand times greater” if Iran attacked the United States also serves to keep the Iranian threat firmly within the strategic equation. Maintaining Iran as a potential threat to American interests and assets creates the political and psychological conditions for a possible return to confrontation, while the continued presence of American military power in the region requires a sustained strategic justification.
This is where the real danger of “no war, no peace” lies. As the crisis inside Iran deepens, the regime may eventually see external escalation as a means of rebuilding its legitimacy, while Washington could view any escalation as justification for using force again. The current phase, therefore, may not represent the end of the war, but preparation for another one, a war now being fought through economics, intelligence and political pressure, before developments inside Iran determine whether the region remains trapped in “no war, no peace,” or moves once again toward direct confrontation.
The crisis between Iran and the United States is no longer a direct war, but peace has certainly not been achieved. We are facing what can best be described as a state of “no war, no peace,” in which military operations have stopped while the other instruments of confrontation remain fully active, including economic pressure, internal exhaustion, intelligence warfare and a constant military threat. Washington appears determined to maintain pressure on Iran and deepen its economic crisis while simultaneously preserving its overwhelming military advantage and full readiness to resume operations. The current phase, therefore, looks increasingly like an intelligence war conducted under the veil of a military pause.
But this intelligence war is not directed at Iran alone. The United States and Israel now appear focused on dismantling what remains of Iran’s regional network of influence by intensifying pressure on Hezbollah, continuing to target the Houthis, and giving the Iraqi government greater room to address the issue of militias and weapons outside state control. In this context, Iran’s emergency response and its moves toward Iraq, including the dispatch of Esmail Qaani to warn against disarming Iraqi factions at this particular moment, become significant.
Rather than moving directly back into a confrontation with Iran, the region appears to be entering a stage that could precede a new direct confrontation, while Iran’s regional instruments are progressively weakened, including Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Iraqi militias. At the same time, the Iranian interior is becoming a major theatre for intelligence operations, exploiting a crisis that is deepening politically, economically, socially and in terms of security.
The Strait of Hormuz provides a clear example of this equation. Iran can disrupt navigation and raise the cost of maritime risks through mines, fast boats, drones and missiles, which explains the growing concerns among shipping and insurance companies. But disrupting navigation is not the same as exercising military control over the Strait. The United States remains the dominant military power in the area, yet its presence alone cannot prevent every attempt to target or disrupt shipping. This creates an important paradox, a weaker power can achieve a limited objective, disrupting navigation, while a much stronger power cannot easily guarantee its security.
More importantly, Washington may not be in a hurry to bring this situation to an end. A prolonged Hormuz crisis pushes the world to rely on the United States and strengthens Washington’s demand that other countries contribute to securing navigation. It is, in effect, a process of reshaping relations with both allies and adversaries, transforming a regional crisis into an international responsibility led by the United States.
This also explains why the crisis is becoming a test for the wider international system. Russia is facing growing pressures, while China cannot ignore a prolonged crisis threatening global trade and energy flows. Yet the longer the crisis continues, the more it may serve another American objective by accelerating the search for alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz.
Talk of pipelines, overland routes and connectivity linking the Gulf through Jordan to the Mediterranean, alongside emerging corridors connecting India and Europe, becomes more significant the longer the Strait remains unstable. The world cannot base its energy security indefinitely on a passage that can be disrupted for an extended period. Alternatives, therefore, may gradually shift from strategic projects to practical necessities.
Against this backdrop, Donald Trump’s statement that the American response would be “a thousand times greater” if Iran attacked the United States also serves to keep the Iranian threat firmly within the strategic equation. Maintaining Iran as a potential threat to American interests and assets creates the political and psychological conditions for a possible return to confrontation, while the continued presence of American military power in the region requires a sustained strategic justification.
This is where the real danger of “no war, no peace” lies. As the crisis inside Iran deepens, the regime may eventually see external escalation as a means of rebuilding its legitimacy, while Washington could view any escalation as justification for using force again. The current phase, therefore, may not represent the end of the war, but preparation for another one, a war now being fought through economics, intelligence and political pressure, before developments inside Iran determine whether the region remains trapped in “no war, no peace,” or moves once again toward direct confrontation.
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No war, no peace: The intelligence war around Iran
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