With Israel-Jordan Relations at an All-Time Low, the Countries Aren't Likely to Cooperate in the West Bank
Amman and Jerusalem need to worry about maintaining peace, not new arrangements in the West Bank. In his thoughtful essay, Elliott Abrams puts forward a compelling articulation of the obstacles that have stood in the way of the formation of a Palestinian state, and which continue to do so. As a possible alternative to the two-state solution, Abrams brings up the possibility of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation turning the Palestinian West Bank territories into a semi-autonomous entity within Jordan. It is this proposal that I wish to focus on. Variations of the Jordanian option have been raised by figures on almost every side of the conflict over the years. For all the points Abrams raises in its favor, it still presents nearly insurmountable hurdles, perhaps none more difficult than the ongoing erosion of the Israel-Jordan relationship.
To begin with, Jordan's King Abdullah has of late been uncharacteristically pointed in his criticism of Israel. Following Israel's September 9 attack on Hamas's leadership in Qatar, the king joined 56 other countries at the September 15 Arab-Islamic summit in calling for tougher measures against the Jewish state. He also called the attack 'proof that the Israeli threat has no limits,' and advocated for a 'clear, decisive, and deterrent' response. He urged his colleagues to 'review all our tools of joint action to confront the threat of this extremist Israeli government'.
Just days later, during his September 23 speech before the UN General Assembly, King Abdullah again centered his remarks on Israel. His criticisms focused on the Israeli government's threats of annexation and settlement expansion in the West Bank, its alleged complicity in the desecration of Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, and on its 'provocative calls for a so-called 'Greater Israel'. In light of all this bad behavior, the king said, 'the international community must stop entertaining the illusion that this [Israeli] government is a willing partner for peace'.
King Abdullah's increasingly tough language is notable for several reasons. For a leader whose motto through much of his reign has been 'Jordan First' to deliver a fifteen-minute UN speech focused entirely on the Palestinian issue without reference to his own country- was surprising, to say the least. Mostly, though, these latest remarks are striking because the king generally refrains from this kind of incendiary language. To be sure, King Abdullah has given speeches critical of Israel before. At the 2024 General Assembly-a year into the Gaza war-he spoke at length about Israeli 'impunity'. Questioning the government of Israel's commitment to peace at the latest UN gathering, however, was not incidental. It was a deliberate, if oblique, reference to the 1994 Wadi Arava Israel-Jordan treaty, intended to reflect the kingdom's increasing frustration with its peace partner. (A frustration shared by other Arab states that have normalized with Israel) .
This type of heated rhetoric has traditionally been the preserve of the king's subordinates. Within the Jordanian system, the foreign minister conventionally assumes the role of chief Israel critic, articulating popular sentiments in the kingdom. Since his appointment in 2017, Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi has played the heavy, while the palace and King Abdullah have taken more moderate and conciliatory lines. In recent weeks, however, the king's public remarks have increasingly echoed those of Safadi.
Long before the Gaza War, Safadi was disparaging Israel's policies on Palestinians, the peace process, West Bank settlement expansion, the arrangements on Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount), and broken commitments to regional economic-cooperation projects. At times, his continuous and withering criticisms seemed rather incongruous, considering the longstanding peace treaty between the states. Still, given Jordan's demographics-an estimated 60 percent of the population is of Palestinian origin-many of Safadi's critiques were predictable. Furthermore, bilateral relations between Israel and the kingdom were objectively bad even before Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack. In 2019, King Abdullah described the relationship as being 'at an all-time low'.
This assessment was sadly premature. Nearly two years after the start of the war in Gaza, Jordanian-Israeli ties have further deteriorated, seemingly nearing the point of rupture. There is no doubt that the high death toll, humanitarian crisis, and disturbing images emanating from Gaza have contributed to the decline. Shortly after the war started, the kingdom saw massive demonstrations against Israel. In November 2023, Jordan pulled its ambassador from Tel Aviv. A year later, Safadi encouraged the European Union and the United Nations to sanction and embargo arms transfers to Israel. Despite increased tensions, however, in May 2024, Israel and Jordan agreed to extend a water deal, supplying the kingdom with double the amount of water stipulated in the 1994 Wadi Arava peace treaty.
In recent months, though, new and more serious challenges to the peace have emerged. Of particular concern to Jordan is the Israeli government's announcement of plans to build settlements in E-1, a West Bank territory that connects the town of Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem, dealing a severe blow to the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state. To be sure, the Israeli government has often repeated that there will never be a Palestinian state, but Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has said explicitly that this new settlement project would '
bury the idea of a Palestinian state'. Annexation is also under discussion, and Israel has floated a controversial plan to encourage Gazans who wish to do so move to third countries. Should either of these initiatives be implemented, popular sentiment in the kingdom would make it difficult if not impossible for the king to maintain the peace treaty.
Tensions spiked after Jerusalem announced all these latest plans. This past August, Safadi branded Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a 'war criminal'. Israel's September 9 attack on Hamas leaders in Doha brought matters to a head. The strike, which failed to meet its objectives, shook Gulf states' confidence in Washington's ability to constrain what they saw as Israel's worst instincts.
Jordan's condemnation of Israel at the September 15 joint meeting of the Arab League and Organization of Islamic States was unprecedented. In addition to the standard criticisms of post-October 7 Israeli strikes on Gaza, Qatar, Syria, Iran, and Lebanon, Safadi called for 'collective Arab action' and a 'comprehensive strategy-a political, economic, legal, and defense strategy that employs all available tools to protect our future and interests' to try to limit Israeli actions vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Safadi also defined as a Jordanian ' red line... the displacement of Palestinians from their homeland,' and said that Jordan would confront dislocation 'with all our might'. Safadi's statement at the Arab-Islamic ministerial was deliberately escalatory, so much so that it drew the attention of even long-time Jordan watchers, who over the years have become inured to his routine condemnations of Israel.
Since Wadi Arava was signed in 1994, relations between Jordan and Israel have fluctuated dramatically. In March 1997, a Jordanian soldier murdered seven Israeli schoolgirls visiting the 'Island of Peace' park on the border. Later that year, Mossad agents were captured in Amman attempting to assassinate the Hamas leader Khaled Mashal. The second intifada (2000-2005) and Israel's 2008-2009 Cast Lead military operation in Gaza were challenging periods for the relationship. In 2017, an Israeli security guard at the embassy in Amman killed an assailant and an innocent Jordanian national, shuttering the embassy for six months. Two years later, Jordan withdrew its ambassador when Israel detained Jordanian women visiting the West Bank. In 2024, and again in 2025, Jordanians opened fire, killing Israeli troops at a border crossing. And the list goes on.
Yet few, if any, of these incidents-save for perhaps the 1997 attempt to kill Mashal- threatened the treaty. But even then, Amman and Jerusalem reconciled, and two years later Jordan expelled Hamas from the kingdom. After the Island of Peace attack, King Hussein traveled to Israel to console the families of the victims, a gesture that remains a high point in the relationship. Alas, in a sign of how strained relations had become, in November 2019- four years before the start of the Gaza war-Jordan cancelled the lease of this territory to Israel, a provision originally enshrined in Wadi Arava.
The list of grievances is growing, and the rhetoric is getting stronger. At the same time, while Israeli and Jordanian intelligence and military ties persist and remain highly productive on the professional level, there are reportedly few, if any, meaningful ongoing political contacts between the states. The trajectory isn't promising. Notwithstanding the difficult state of the current ties, a rupture-or even just a '
freezing' of the treaty-would be disastrous for both states, as well as for Washington.
Jordan and Israel share a 415-mile-long border, secured by the peace agreement. Not only does this obviate the requirement for large numbers of Israeli troops along the frontier, close and continuing.
intelligence sharing helps secure the home front. Jordan also provides Israel with strategic depth and early warning vis-à-vis Iran. In April and October 2024, as well as during the June 2025 twelve-day war, bilateral defense cooperation was critical to helping to counter Iranian missile and drone attacks against Israel. Like Israel, Jordan benefits greatly from defense and intelligence cooperation.
And, importantly, Wadi Arava opened the door to other types of engagement with Israel. Israeli water is critical for the parched kingdom. Today almost 10 percent of Jordan's water currently comes from across the Jordan River. The kingdom also purchases a significant amount of gas from Israel. In 2016, Jordan signed a fifteen-year, $10 billion gas deal, which at the time supplied about 40 percent of the kingdom's annual requirement.
Perhaps even more significantly, peace with Israel launched the beginning of what has been a productive and enduring strategic relationship between Jordan and the United States. Since 1994, the U.S. has provided Jordan with substantial amounts of both foreign military financing and economic-support funding. The aid has been very helpful to the economically challenged kingdom, and Jordan has reciprocated by deploying troops in support of U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
President Trump's pledge last week that he would not allow Israel to annex West Bank territory may slow the pace of the Israel-Jordan deterioration, but the treaty is far from secure. While unlikely, it's conceivable that Jordan could one day suspend the treaty, leading to the cancellation of Israeli water deliveries and other serious consequences. In 1967, facing pressure from Arab allies, Jordan's King Hussein joined the war against Israel and lost the West Bank. Today, war is not on the horizon, but, as in 1967, it appears these states are again approaching the precipice.
Elliott Abrams points out that the idea of Jordanian-Palestinian confederation still holds currency in both Israeli politics and Palestinian public opinion. But the relationship between Israel and Jordan is under its greatest strain since 1994, if not since 1967, and amelioration, let alone reconciliation, is nowhere in sight. In 1970, the forefathers of today's Palestinian Authority tried to overthrow the monarchy and establish a state in place of the kingdom-and nearly succeeded. Would Jordan really be willing to help Israel solve its West Bank problems, even if doing so were beneficial to Palestinians? And would Israel really be willing to trust such an important part of its security to Jordan? And even if such an agreement were possible, would it really bring peace and stability, given the tense situation between the two countries? At present, there's little reason for optimism.
Amman and Jerusalem need to worry about maintaining peace, not new arrangements in the West Bank. In his thoughtful essay, Elliott Abrams puts forward a compelling articulation of the obstacles that have stood in the way of the formation of a Palestinian state, and which continue to do so. As a possible alternative to the two-state solution, Abrams brings up the possibility of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation turning the Palestinian West Bank territories into a semi-autonomous entity within Jordan. It is this proposal that I wish to focus on. Variations of the Jordanian option have been raised by figures on almost every side of the conflict over the years. For all the points Abrams raises in its favor, it still presents nearly insurmountable hurdles, perhaps none more difficult than the ongoing erosion of the Israel-Jordan relationship.
To begin with, Jordan's King Abdullah has of late been uncharacteristically pointed in his criticism of Israel. Following Israel's September 9 attack on Hamas's leadership in Qatar, the king joined 56 other countries at the September 15 Arab-Islamic summit in calling for tougher measures against the Jewish state. He also called the attack 'proof that the Israeli threat has no limits,' and advocated for a 'clear, decisive, and deterrent' response. He urged his colleagues to 'review all our tools of joint action to confront the threat of this extremist Israeli government'.
Just days later, during his September 23 speech before the UN General Assembly, King Abdullah again centered his remarks on Israel. His criticisms focused on the Israeli government's threats of annexation and settlement expansion in the West Bank, its alleged complicity in the desecration of Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, and on its 'provocative calls for a so-called 'Greater Israel'. In light of all this bad behavior, the king said, 'the international community must stop entertaining the illusion that this [Israeli] government is a willing partner for peace'.
King Abdullah's increasingly tough language is notable for several reasons. For a leader whose motto through much of his reign has been 'Jordan First' to deliver a fifteen-minute UN speech focused entirely on the Palestinian issue without reference to his own country- was surprising, to say the least. Mostly, though, these latest remarks are striking because the king generally refrains from this kind of incendiary language. To be sure, King Abdullah has given speeches critical of Israel before. At the 2024 General Assembly-a year into the Gaza war-he spoke at length about Israeli 'impunity'. Questioning the government of Israel's commitment to peace at the latest UN gathering, however, was not incidental. It was a deliberate, if oblique, reference to the 1994 Wadi Arava Israel-Jordan treaty, intended to reflect the kingdom's increasing frustration with its peace partner. (A frustration shared by other Arab states that have normalized with Israel) .
This type of heated rhetoric has traditionally been the preserve of the king's subordinates. Within the Jordanian system, the foreign minister conventionally assumes the role of chief Israel critic, articulating popular sentiments in the kingdom. Since his appointment in 2017, Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi has played the heavy, while the palace and King Abdullah have taken more moderate and conciliatory lines. In recent weeks, however, the king's public remarks have increasingly echoed those of Safadi.
Long before the Gaza War, Safadi was disparaging Israel's policies on Palestinians, the peace process, West Bank settlement expansion, the arrangements on Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount), and broken commitments to regional economic-cooperation projects. At times, his continuous and withering criticisms seemed rather incongruous, considering the longstanding peace treaty between the states. Still, given Jordan's demographics-an estimated 60 percent of the population is of Palestinian origin-many of Safadi's critiques were predictable. Furthermore, bilateral relations between Israel and the kingdom were objectively bad even before Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack. In 2019, King Abdullah described the relationship as being 'at an all-time low'.
This assessment was sadly premature. Nearly two years after the start of the war in Gaza, Jordanian-Israeli ties have further deteriorated, seemingly nearing the point of rupture. There is no doubt that the high death toll, humanitarian crisis, and disturbing images emanating from Gaza have contributed to the decline. Shortly after the war started, the kingdom saw massive demonstrations against Israel. In November 2023, Jordan pulled its ambassador from Tel Aviv. A year later, Safadi encouraged the European Union and the United Nations to sanction and embargo arms transfers to Israel. Despite increased tensions, however, in May 2024, Israel and Jordan agreed to extend a water deal, supplying the kingdom with double the amount of water stipulated in the 1994 Wadi Arava peace treaty.
In recent months, though, new and more serious challenges to the peace have emerged. Of particular concern to Jordan is the Israeli government's announcement of plans to build settlements in E-1, a West Bank territory that connects the town of Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem, dealing a severe blow to the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state. To be sure, the Israeli government has often repeated that there will never be a Palestinian state, but Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has said explicitly that this new settlement project would '
bury the idea of a Palestinian state'. Annexation is also under discussion, and Israel has floated a controversial plan to encourage Gazans who wish to do so move to third countries. Should either of these initiatives be implemented, popular sentiment in the kingdom would make it difficult if not impossible for the king to maintain the peace treaty.
Tensions spiked after Jerusalem announced all these latest plans. This past August, Safadi branded Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a 'war criminal'. Israel's September 9 attack on Hamas leaders in Doha brought matters to a head. The strike, which failed to meet its objectives, shook Gulf states' confidence in Washington's ability to constrain what they saw as Israel's worst instincts.
Jordan's condemnation of Israel at the September 15 joint meeting of the Arab League and Organization of Islamic States was unprecedented. In addition to the standard criticisms of post-October 7 Israeli strikes on Gaza, Qatar, Syria, Iran, and Lebanon, Safadi called for 'collective Arab action' and a 'comprehensive strategy-a political, economic, legal, and defense strategy that employs all available tools to protect our future and interests' to try to limit Israeli actions vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Safadi also defined as a Jordanian ' red line... the displacement of Palestinians from their homeland,' and said that Jordan would confront dislocation 'with all our might'. Safadi's statement at the Arab-Islamic ministerial was deliberately escalatory, so much so that it drew the attention of even long-time Jordan watchers, who over the years have become inured to his routine condemnations of Israel.
Since Wadi Arava was signed in 1994, relations between Jordan and Israel have fluctuated dramatically. In March 1997, a Jordanian soldier murdered seven Israeli schoolgirls visiting the 'Island of Peace' park on the border. Later that year, Mossad agents were captured in Amman attempting to assassinate the Hamas leader Khaled Mashal. The second intifada (2000-2005) and Israel's 2008-2009 Cast Lead military operation in Gaza were challenging periods for the relationship. In 2017, an Israeli security guard at the embassy in Amman killed an assailant and an innocent Jordanian national, shuttering the embassy for six months. Two years later, Jordan withdrew its ambassador when Israel detained Jordanian women visiting the West Bank. In 2024, and again in 2025, Jordanians opened fire, killing Israeli troops at a border crossing. And the list goes on.
Yet few, if any, of these incidents-save for perhaps the 1997 attempt to kill Mashal- threatened the treaty. But even then, Amman and Jerusalem reconciled, and two years later Jordan expelled Hamas from the kingdom. After the Island of Peace attack, King Hussein traveled to Israel to console the families of the victims, a gesture that remains a high point in the relationship. Alas, in a sign of how strained relations had become, in November 2019- four years before the start of the Gaza war-Jordan cancelled the lease of this territory to Israel, a provision originally enshrined in Wadi Arava.
The list of grievances is growing, and the rhetoric is getting stronger. At the same time, while Israeli and Jordanian intelligence and military ties persist and remain highly productive on the professional level, there are reportedly few, if any, meaningful ongoing political contacts between the states. The trajectory isn't promising. Notwithstanding the difficult state of the current ties, a rupture-or even just a '
freezing' of the treaty-would be disastrous for both states, as well as for Washington.
Jordan and Israel share a 415-mile-long border, secured by the peace agreement. Not only does this obviate the requirement for large numbers of Israeli troops along the frontier, close and continuing.
intelligence sharing helps secure the home front. Jordan also provides Israel with strategic depth and early warning vis-à-vis Iran. In April and October 2024, as well as during the June 2025 twelve-day war, bilateral defense cooperation was critical to helping to counter Iranian missile and drone attacks against Israel. Like Israel, Jordan benefits greatly from defense and intelligence cooperation.
And, importantly, Wadi Arava opened the door to other types of engagement with Israel. Israeli water is critical for the parched kingdom. Today almost 10 percent of Jordan's water currently comes from across the Jordan River. The kingdom also purchases a significant amount of gas from Israel. In 2016, Jordan signed a fifteen-year, $10 billion gas deal, which at the time supplied about 40 percent of the kingdom's annual requirement.
Perhaps even more significantly, peace with Israel launched the beginning of what has been a productive and enduring strategic relationship between Jordan and the United States. Since 1994, the U.S. has provided Jordan with substantial amounts of both foreign military financing and economic-support funding. The aid has been very helpful to the economically challenged kingdom, and Jordan has reciprocated by deploying troops in support of U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
President Trump's pledge last week that he would not allow Israel to annex West Bank territory may slow the pace of the Israel-Jordan deterioration, but the treaty is far from secure. While unlikely, it's conceivable that Jordan could one day suspend the treaty, leading to the cancellation of Israeli water deliveries and other serious consequences. In 1967, facing pressure from Arab allies, Jordan's King Hussein joined the war against Israel and lost the West Bank. Today, war is not on the horizon, but, as in 1967, it appears these states are again approaching the precipice.
Elliott Abrams points out that the idea of Jordanian-Palestinian confederation still holds currency in both Israeli politics and Palestinian public opinion. But the relationship between Israel and Jordan is under its greatest strain since 1994, if not since 1967, and amelioration, let alone reconciliation, is nowhere in sight. In 1970, the forefathers of today's Palestinian Authority tried to overthrow the monarchy and establish a state in place of the kingdom-and nearly succeeded. Would Jordan really be willing to help Israel solve its West Bank problems, even if doing so were beneficial to Palestinians? And would Israel really be willing to trust such an important part of its security to Jordan? And even if such an agreement were possible, would it really bring peace and stability, given the tense situation between the two countries? At present, there's little reason for optimism.
Amman and Jerusalem need to worry about maintaining peace, not new arrangements in the West Bank. In his thoughtful essay, Elliott Abrams puts forward a compelling articulation of the obstacles that have stood in the way of the formation of a Palestinian state, and which continue to do so. As a possible alternative to the two-state solution, Abrams brings up the possibility of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation turning the Palestinian West Bank territories into a semi-autonomous entity within Jordan. It is this proposal that I wish to focus on. Variations of the Jordanian option have been raised by figures on almost every side of the conflict over the years. For all the points Abrams raises in its favor, it still presents nearly insurmountable hurdles, perhaps none more difficult than the ongoing erosion of the Israel-Jordan relationship.
To begin with, Jordan's King Abdullah has of late been uncharacteristically pointed in his criticism of Israel. Following Israel's September 9 attack on Hamas's leadership in Qatar, the king joined 56 other countries at the September 15 Arab-Islamic summit in calling for tougher measures against the Jewish state. He also called the attack 'proof that the Israeli threat has no limits,' and advocated for a 'clear, decisive, and deterrent' response. He urged his colleagues to 'review all our tools of joint action to confront the threat of this extremist Israeli government'.
Just days later, during his September 23 speech before the UN General Assembly, King Abdullah again centered his remarks on Israel. His criticisms focused on the Israeli government's threats of annexation and settlement expansion in the West Bank, its alleged complicity in the desecration of Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, and on its 'provocative calls for a so-called 'Greater Israel'. In light of all this bad behavior, the king said, 'the international community must stop entertaining the illusion that this [Israeli] government is a willing partner for peace'.
King Abdullah's increasingly tough language is notable for several reasons. For a leader whose motto through much of his reign has been 'Jordan First' to deliver a fifteen-minute UN speech focused entirely on the Palestinian issue without reference to his own country- was surprising, to say the least. Mostly, though, these latest remarks are striking because the king generally refrains from this kind of incendiary language. To be sure, King Abdullah has given speeches critical of Israel before. At the 2024 General Assembly-a year into the Gaza war-he spoke at length about Israeli 'impunity'. Questioning the government of Israel's commitment to peace at the latest UN gathering, however, was not incidental. It was a deliberate, if oblique, reference to the 1994 Wadi Arava Israel-Jordan treaty, intended to reflect the kingdom's increasing frustration with its peace partner. (A frustration shared by other Arab states that have normalized with Israel) .
This type of heated rhetoric has traditionally been the preserve of the king's subordinates. Within the Jordanian system, the foreign minister conventionally assumes the role of chief Israel critic, articulating popular sentiments in the kingdom. Since his appointment in 2017, Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi has played the heavy, while the palace and King Abdullah have taken more moderate and conciliatory lines. In recent weeks, however, the king's public remarks have increasingly echoed those of Safadi.
Long before the Gaza War, Safadi was disparaging Israel's policies on Palestinians, the peace process, West Bank settlement expansion, the arrangements on Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount), and broken commitments to regional economic-cooperation projects. At times, his continuous and withering criticisms seemed rather incongruous, considering the longstanding peace treaty between the states. Still, given Jordan's demographics-an estimated 60 percent of the population is of Palestinian origin-many of Safadi's critiques were predictable. Furthermore, bilateral relations between Israel and the kingdom were objectively bad even before Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack. In 2019, King Abdullah described the relationship as being 'at an all-time low'.
This assessment was sadly premature. Nearly two years after the start of the war in Gaza, Jordanian-Israeli ties have further deteriorated, seemingly nearing the point of rupture. There is no doubt that the high death toll, humanitarian crisis, and disturbing images emanating from Gaza have contributed to the decline. Shortly after the war started, the kingdom saw massive demonstrations against Israel. In November 2023, Jordan pulled its ambassador from Tel Aviv. A year later, Safadi encouraged the European Union and the United Nations to sanction and embargo arms transfers to Israel. Despite increased tensions, however, in May 2024, Israel and Jordan agreed to extend a water deal, supplying the kingdom with double the amount of water stipulated in the 1994 Wadi Arava peace treaty.
In recent months, though, new and more serious challenges to the peace have emerged. Of particular concern to Jordan is the Israeli government's announcement of plans to build settlements in E-1, a West Bank territory that connects the town of Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem, dealing a severe blow to the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state. To be sure, the Israeli government has often repeated that there will never be a Palestinian state, but Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has said explicitly that this new settlement project would '
bury the idea of a Palestinian state'. Annexation is also under discussion, and Israel has floated a controversial plan to encourage Gazans who wish to do so move to third countries. Should either of these initiatives be implemented, popular sentiment in the kingdom would make it difficult if not impossible for the king to maintain the peace treaty.
Tensions spiked after Jerusalem announced all these latest plans. This past August, Safadi branded Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a 'war criminal'. Israel's September 9 attack on Hamas leaders in Doha brought matters to a head. The strike, which failed to meet its objectives, shook Gulf states' confidence in Washington's ability to constrain what they saw as Israel's worst instincts.
Jordan's condemnation of Israel at the September 15 joint meeting of the Arab League and Organization of Islamic States was unprecedented. In addition to the standard criticisms of post-October 7 Israeli strikes on Gaza, Qatar, Syria, Iran, and Lebanon, Safadi called for 'collective Arab action' and a 'comprehensive strategy-a political, economic, legal, and defense strategy that employs all available tools to protect our future and interests' to try to limit Israeli actions vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Safadi also defined as a Jordanian ' red line... the displacement of Palestinians from their homeland,' and said that Jordan would confront dislocation 'with all our might'. Safadi's statement at the Arab-Islamic ministerial was deliberately escalatory, so much so that it drew the attention of even long-time Jordan watchers, who over the years have become inured to his routine condemnations of Israel.
Since Wadi Arava was signed in 1994, relations between Jordan and Israel have fluctuated dramatically. In March 1997, a Jordanian soldier murdered seven Israeli schoolgirls visiting the 'Island of Peace' park on the border. Later that year, Mossad agents were captured in Amman attempting to assassinate the Hamas leader Khaled Mashal. The second intifada (2000-2005) and Israel's 2008-2009 Cast Lead military operation in Gaza were challenging periods for the relationship. In 2017, an Israeli security guard at the embassy in Amman killed an assailant and an innocent Jordanian national, shuttering the embassy for six months. Two years later, Jordan withdrew its ambassador when Israel detained Jordanian women visiting the West Bank. In 2024, and again in 2025, Jordanians opened fire, killing Israeli troops at a border crossing. And the list goes on.
Yet few, if any, of these incidents-save for perhaps the 1997 attempt to kill Mashal- threatened the treaty. But even then, Amman and Jerusalem reconciled, and two years later Jordan expelled Hamas from the kingdom. After the Island of Peace attack, King Hussein traveled to Israel to console the families of the victims, a gesture that remains a high point in the relationship. Alas, in a sign of how strained relations had become, in November 2019- four years before the start of the Gaza war-Jordan cancelled the lease of this territory to Israel, a provision originally enshrined in Wadi Arava.
The list of grievances is growing, and the rhetoric is getting stronger. At the same time, while Israeli and Jordanian intelligence and military ties persist and remain highly productive on the professional level, there are reportedly few, if any, meaningful ongoing political contacts between the states. The trajectory isn't promising. Notwithstanding the difficult state of the current ties, a rupture-or even just a '
freezing' of the treaty-would be disastrous for both states, as well as for Washington.
Jordan and Israel share a 415-mile-long border, secured by the peace agreement. Not only does this obviate the requirement for large numbers of Israeli troops along the frontier, close and continuing.
intelligence sharing helps secure the home front. Jordan also provides Israel with strategic depth and early warning vis-à-vis Iran. In April and October 2024, as well as during the June 2025 twelve-day war, bilateral defense cooperation was critical to helping to counter Iranian missile and drone attacks against Israel. Like Israel, Jordan benefits greatly from defense and intelligence cooperation.
And, importantly, Wadi Arava opened the door to other types of engagement with Israel. Israeli water is critical for the parched kingdom. Today almost 10 percent of Jordan's water currently comes from across the Jordan River. The kingdom also purchases a significant amount of gas from Israel. In 2016, Jordan signed a fifteen-year, $10 billion gas deal, which at the time supplied about 40 percent of the kingdom's annual requirement.
Perhaps even more significantly, peace with Israel launched the beginning of what has been a productive and enduring strategic relationship between Jordan and the United States. Since 1994, the U.S. has provided Jordan with substantial amounts of both foreign military financing and economic-support funding. The aid has been very helpful to the economically challenged kingdom, and Jordan has reciprocated by deploying troops in support of U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
President Trump's pledge last week that he would not allow Israel to annex West Bank territory may slow the pace of the Israel-Jordan deterioration, but the treaty is far from secure. While unlikely, it's conceivable that Jordan could one day suspend the treaty, leading to the cancellation of Israeli water deliveries and other serious consequences. In 1967, facing pressure from Arab allies, Jordan's King Hussein joined the war against Israel and lost the West Bank. Today, war is not on the horizon, but, as in 1967, it appears these states are again approaching the precipice.
Elliott Abrams points out that the idea of Jordanian-Palestinian confederation still holds currency in both Israeli politics and Palestinian public opinion. But the relationship between Israel and Jordan is under its greatest strain since 1994, if not since 1967, and amelioration, let alone reconciliation, is nowhere in sight. In 1970, the forefathers of today's Palestinian Authority tried to overthrow the monarchy and establish a state in place of the kingdom-and nearly succeeded. Would Jordan really be willing to help Israel solve its West Bank problems, even if doing so were beneficial to Palestinians? And would Israel really be willing to trust such an important part of its security to Jordan? And even if such an agreement were possible, would it really bring peace and stability, given the tense situation between the two countries? At present, there's little reason for optimism.
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With Israel-Jordan Relations at an All-Time Low, the Countries Aren't Likely to Cooperate in the West Bank
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