Parallel escalations: From Gaza to Lebanon and Syria
Alarming developments continue to unfold as Lebanon slides into a dangerous phase of internal escalation, while southern Syria experiences a sharp deterioration in its security landscape. This comes in parallel with Israel accelerating its operations in Gaza, pulling the region back into a spiral of open-ended escalation and reshaping the dynamics of confrontation across multiple fronts.
Israel’s approach to Gaza has shifted toward full control—something that should not come as a surprise. The steps taken over the past months have been paving the way toward total dominance over the Strip. By avoiding the term 'occupation' and instead emphasizing 'control,' the intent remains the same. The declared goal, broadly aligned with U.S. approval, is to defeat Hamas, eliminate its military capacity, and hand over Gaza to Arab forces—something problematic from the outset.
There are no viable Arab forces capable of acting as peacekeepers without eventually confronting Palestinian factions on the ground. This complexity has been Netanyahu’s justification to continue the military operation, while stalling any serious conversation about transferring power to a regional Arab force that Israel does not classify as hostile—all while firmly rejecting any role for the Palestinian Authority.
Israel has worked over recent months to secure the borders, fragment Gaza into manageable zones, and establish a tight security grid. In its view, a ceasefire means only one thing: the return of its hostages. But defeating Hamas remains the red line—without it, no deal is acceptable. For Israel, the war can only end when the reality in Gaza fundamentally changes, transforming it into a space that cannot be used as a future launching pad for hostile activity.
Hence the current strategy: tighten control over borders and crossings, enforce a security-based division of the territory, and push forward with demographic displacement. Israel insists that coexisting with Gaza’s dense population—seen as a social incubator for militant movements—is no longer viable.
Simultaneously, Israel is preparing for the Lebanese front. One of the key aims of the war’s early stages was to turn Hezbollah from a regional actor capable of waging cross-border war into a domestic burden—a political party armed within a fragile Lebanese system. Today, this objective is becoming more visible.
Israel is anticipating Hezbollah retaliation—whether political or through targeted military actions—but knows well that the party has no interest in starting a full-scale war. What Hezbollah wants is pressure without collapse: using the threat of war to apply maximum internal pressure on the Lebanese government, in hopes of drawing international actors to intervene and freeze or postpone the disarmament process, which the party sees as a potential trigger for civil unrest.
Yet Hezbollah’s maneuvering, in the context of regional escalation and particularly within Syria, raises the risks of internal confrontation in Lebanon. Protests could easily morph into violent clashes between sects and factions, leading to the collapse of the central government and pushing various groups toward carving out spheres of influence across different territories.
The Syrian scene reflects a similar trajectory. Southern Syria—especially Suwayda—has become, in recent months, the operational and humanitarian center of a complex hybrid war. This conflict is low in intensity but high in strategic significance. It features methodical military operations, cross-border infiltrations, sectarian targeting, and the steady erosion of the Syrian state’s authority in favor of non-state actors backed by foreign powers.
Foremost among those actors is Iran, which seeks to reduce pressure on itself by aligning with local forces and disrupting any Israeli effort to secure buffer zones along its border. This dynamic reinforces the likelihood of armed conflict between fragmented communities—proxy wars with explicit ethnic and religious dimensions.
Alarming developments continue to unfold as Lebanon slides into a dangerous phase of internal escalation, while southern Syria experiences a sharp deterioration in its security landscape. This comes in parallel with Israel accelerating its operations in Gaza, pulling the region back into a spiral of open-ended escalation and reshaping the dynamics of confrontation across multiple fronts.
Israel’s approach to Gaza has shifted toward full control—something that should not come as a surprise. The steps taken over the past months have been paving the way toward total dominance over the Strip. By avoiding the term 'occupation' and instead emphasizing 'control,' the intent remains the same. The declared goal, broadly aligned with U.S. approval, is to defeat Hamas, eliminate its military capacity, and hand over Gaza to Arab forces—something problematic from the outset.
There are no viable Arab forces capable of acting as peacekeepers without eventually confronting Palestinian factions on the ground. This complexity has been Netanyahu’s justification to continue the military operation, while stalling any serious conversation about transferring power to a regional Arab force that Israel does not classify as hostile—all while firmly rejecting any role for the Palestinian Authority.
Israel has worked over recent months to secure the borders, fragment Gaza into manageable zones, and establish a tight security grid. In its view, a ceasefire means only one thing: the return of its hostages. But defeating Hamas remains the red line—without it, no deal is acceptable. For Israel, the war can only end when the reality in Gaza fundamentally changes, transforming it into a space that cannot be used as a future launching pad for hostile activity.
Hence the current strategy: tighten control over borders and crossings, enforce a security-based division of the territory, and push forward with demographic displacement. Israel insists that coexisting with Gaza’s dense population—seen as a social incubator for militant movements—is no longer viable.
Simultaneously, Israel is preparing for the Lebanese front. One of the key aims of the war’s early stages was to turn Hezbollah from a regional actor capable of waging cross-border war into a domestic burden—a political party armed within a fragile Lebanese system. Today, this objective is becoming more visible.
Israel is anticipating Hezbollah retaliation—whether political or through targeted military actions—but knows well that the party has no interest in starting a full-scale war. What Hezbollah wants is pressure without collapse: using the threat of war to apply maximum internal pressure on the Lebanese government, in hopes of drawing international actors to intervene and freeze or postpone the disarmament process, which the party sees as a potential trigger for civil unrest.
Yet Hezbollah’s maneuvering, in the context of regional escalation and particularly within Syria, raises the risks of internal confrontation in Lebanon. Protests could easily morph into violent clashes between sects and factions, leading to the collapse of the central government and pushing various groups toward carving out spheres of influence across different territories.
The Syrian scene reflects a similar trajectory. Southern Syria—especially Suwayda—has become, in recent months, the operational and humanitarian center of a complex hybrid war. This conflict is low in intensity but high in strategic significance. It features methodical military operations, cross-border infiltrations, sectarian targeting, and the steady erosion of the Syrian state’s authority in favor of non-state actors backed by foreign powers.
Foremost among those actors is Iran, which seeks to reduce pressure on itself by aligning with local forces and disrupting any Israeli effort to secure buffer zones along its border. This dynamic reinforces the likelihood of armed conflict between fragmented communities—proxy wars with explicit ethnic and religious dimensions.
Alarming developments continue to unfold as Lebanon slides into a dangerous phase of internal escalation, while southern Syria experiences a sharp deterioration in its security landscape. This comes in parallel with Israel accelerating its operations in Gaza, pulling the region back into a spiral of open-ended escalation and reshaping the dynamics of confrontation across multiple fronts.
Israel’s approach to Gaza has shifted toward full control—something that should not come as a surprise. The steps taken over the past months have been paving the way toward total dominance over the Strip. By avoiding the term 'occupation' and instead emphasizing 'control,' the intent remains the same. The declared goal, broadly aligned with U.S. approval, is to defeat Hamas, eliminate its military capacity, and hand over Gaza to Arab forces—something problematic from the outset.
There are no viable Arab forces capable of acting as peacekeepers without eventually confronting Palestinian factions on the ground. This complexity has been Netanyahu’s justification to continue the military operation, while stalling any serious conversation about transferring power to a regional Arab force that Israel does not classify as hostile—all while firmly rejecting any role for the Palestinian Authority.
Israel has worked over recent months to secure the borders, fragment Gaza into manageable zones, and establish a tight security grid. In its view, a ceasefire means only one thing: the return of its hostages. But defeating Hamas remains the red line—without it, no deal is acceptable. For Israel, the war can only end when the reality in Gaza fundamentally changes, transforming it into a space that cannot be used as a future launching pad for hostile activity.
Hence the current strategy: tighten control over borders and crossings, enforce a security-based division of the territory, and push forward with demographic displacement. Israel insists that coexisting with Gaza’s dense population—seen as a social incubator for militant movements—is no longer viable.
Simultaneously, Israel is preparing for the Lebanese front. One of the key aims of the war’s early stages was to turn Hezbollah from a regional actor capable of waging cross-border war into a domestic burden—a political party armed within a fragile Lebanese system. Today, this objective is becoming more visible.
Israel is anticipating Hezbollah retaliation—whether political or through targeted military actions—but knows well that the party has no interest in starting a full-scale war. What Hezbollah wants is pressure without collapse: using the threat of war to apply maximum internal pressure on the Lebanese government, in hopes of drawing international actors to intervene and freeze or postpone the disarmament process, which the party sees as a potential trigger for civil unrest.
Yet Hezbollah’s maneuvering, in the context of regional escalation and particularly within Syria, raises the risks of internal confrontation in Lebanon. Protests could easily morph into violent clashes between sects and factions, leading to the collapse of the central government and pushing various groups toward carving out spheres of influence across different territories.
The Syrian scene reflects a similar trajectory. Southern Syria—especially Suwayda—has become, in recent months, the operational and humanitarian center of a complex hybrid war. This conflict is low in intensity but high in strategic significance. It features methodical military operations, cross-border infiltrations, sectarian targeting, and the steady erosion of the Syrian state’s authority in favor of non-state actors backed by foreign powers.
Foremost among those actors is Iran, which seeks to reduce pressure on itself by aligning with local forces and disrupting any Israeli effort to secure buffer zones along its border. This dynamic reinforces the likelihood of armed conflict between fragmented communities—proxy wars with explicit ethnic and religious dimensions.
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Parallel escalations: From Gaza to Lebanon and Syria
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