The first reshuffle of Prime Minister Jaafar Hassan’s government was far from dramatic—neither in the number of ministerial posts affected nor in the immediate political implications it carried. On the surface, it appeared more like a “limited administrative adjustment” aimed at fine-tuning certain economic tracks, technocratic in nature and lacking political weight. Yet, as is often the case in Jordanian politics, what remains unsaid or unannounced can be far more significant than what is declared in official letters of designation or government statements.
The most striking paradox—and perhaps the one that best reflects the essence of this moment—lies not in who left the government, but in who stayed. Many within Jordan’s political elite had expected the reshuffle to include the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ayman Safadi, given the volume of speculation, leaks, and analyses in the days leading up to the announcement. Before asking why Safadi remained, however, it may be more accurate to first ask: why did so many expect him to be removed?
The answer lies in the presence of a “prevailing” view among certain influential political circles in Jordan that Safadi—since the start of the war on Gaza—has led Jordanian diplomacy into what they see as a costly “adventure,” especially within a highly complex regional and international context. Rather than steering foreign policy toward realism and strategic restraint in a fragile Arab environment—compounded by uneasy ties with Washington and a decline in the Arab world’s regional weight—Safadi, according to this view, openly confronted Israel, placing Jordan in a weaker position in the eyes of the Trump administration.
Proponents of this perspective point to the cooling of Jordan-U.S. relations in recent months, particularly Jordan’s absence from visits by U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Steven Witkoff, the lukewarm rapport with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and the diminished ability of Amman to influence U.S. decision-making on the Palestinian file—something it had long been a leading and most trusted mediator in.
From this angle, Safadi’s continued presence is seen as an overlooking of the erosion in diplomatic influence and as a sign that Jordan is persisting on a potentially costly and risky path at a time when it needs strategic repositioning and precise calculations, not open confrontations with major regional and international actors.
On the other hand, keeping Safadi in place signals that he is not acting independently but rather executing a clearly defined higher vision. His political and diplomatic rhetoric—including at times sharp tones toward Israel and sustained, high-profile diplomatic escalation against the Netanyahu government—is not a personal choice, but state policy. Here lies the stronger message: Jordan’s stance on the Palestinian issue, the war on Gaza, and the Israeli project is not merely reactive or circumstantial, but stems from a deep understanding of Jordan’s strategic interests, shaped directly by His Majesty King Abdullah himself, who has drawn the boundaries within which Safadi’s actions and statements operate.
The reshuffle, therefore, carried silent yet profound political messages. Chief among them is that Jordan’s positions on the Palestinian file and its relationship with Netanyahu are not tactical moves, nor aimed at absorbing domestic anger over Gaza—as some Israeli media narratives have tried to suggest—but rather represent a firm position rooted in an acute awareness of the dangers posed by the Israeli far-right project, not only to the Palestinian cause and the prospects for peace, but also to regional security and Jordan’s own national security.
A second implication lies in what the reshuffle chose to leave untouched. It focused narrowly on economic and service portfolios, steering clear of any political content in domestic affairs. This in itself is politically telling—especially in light of the major political modernization project launched by the King nearly four years ago, which marked a significant legislative shift in party and election laws and in the state’s approach to political and partisan engagement. The current political thinness of the government raises serious questions about the future of this modernization process and the decision-making circle’s intentions regarding the next phase of the political experiment: the relationship with political opposition, the fate of the Islamic Action Front, the next stage of local administration reforms, and the anticipated amendments to the electoral law aimed at expanding the scope of party-based political life.
And perhaps the million-dollar question for Jordanians remains: Is all of this still on track?
The first reshuffle of Prime Minister Jaafar Hassan’s government was far from dramatic—neither in the number of ministerial posts affected nor in the immediate political implications it carried. On the surface, it appeared more like a “limited administrative adjustment” aimed at fine-tuning certain economic tracks, technocratic in nature and lacking political weight. Yet, as is often the case in Jordanian politics, what remains unsaid or unannounced can be far more significant than what is declared in official letters of designation or government statements.
The most striking paradox—and perhaps the one that best reflects the essence of this moment—lies not in who left the government, but in who stayed. Many within Jordan’s political elite had expected the reshuffle to include the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ayman Safadi, given the volume of speculation, leaks, and analyses in the days leading up to the announcement. Before asking why Safadi remained, however, it may be more accurate to first ask: why did so many expect him to be removed?
The answer lies in the presence of a “prevailing” view among certain influential political circles in Jordan that Safadi—since the start of the war on Gaza—has led Jordanian diplomacy into what they see as a costly “adventure,” especially within a highly complex regional and international context. Rather than steering foreign policy toward realism and strategic restraint in a fragile Arab environment—compounded by uneasy ties with Washington and a decline in the Arab world’s regional weight—Safadi, according to this view, openly confronted Israel, placing Jordan in a weaker position in the eyes of the Trump administration.
Proponents of this perspective point to the cooling of Jordan-U.S. relations in recent months, particularly Jordan’s absence from visits by U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Steven Witkoff, the lukewarm rapport with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and the diminished ability of Amman to influence U.S. decision-making on the Palestinian file—something it had long been a leading and most trusted mediator in.
From this angle, Safadi’s continued presence is seen as an overlooking of the erosion in diplomatic influence and as a sign that Jordan is persisting on a potentially costly and risky path at a time when it needs strategic repositioning and precise calculations, not open confrontations with major regional and international actors.
On the other hand, keeping Safadi in place signals that he is not acting independently but rather executing a clearly defined higher vision. His political and diplomatic rhetoric—including at times sharp tones toward Israel and sustained, high-profile diplomatic escalation against the Netanyahu government—is not a personal choice, but state policy. Here lies the stronger message: Jordan’s stance on the Palestinian issue, the war on Gaza, and the Israeli project is not merely reactive or circumstantial, but stems from a deep understanding of Jordan’s strategic interests, shaped directly by His Majesty King Abdullah himself, who has drawn the boundaries within which Safadi’s actions and statements operate.
The reshuffle, therefore, carried silent yet profound political messages. Chief among them is that Jordan’s positions on the Palestinian file and its relationship with Netanyahu are not tactical moves, nor aimed at absorbing domestic anger over Gaza—as some Israeli media narratives have tried to suggest—but rather represent a firm position rooted in an acute awareness of the dangers posed by the Israeli far-right project, not only to the Palestinian cause and the prospects for peace, but also to regional security and Jordan’s own national security.
A second implication lies in what the reshuffle chose to leave untouched. It focused narrowly on economic and service portfolios, steering clear of any political content in domestic affairs. This in itself is politically telling—especially in light of the major political modernization project launched by the King nearly four years ago, which marked a significant legislative shift in party and election laws and in the state’s approach to political and partisan engagement. The current political thinness of the government raises serious questions about the future of this modernization process and the decision-making circle’s intentions regarding the next phase of the political experiment: the relationship with political opposition, the fate of the Islamic Action Front, the next stage of local administration reforms, and the anticipated amendments to the electoral law aimed at expanding the scope of party-based political life.
And perhaps the million-dollar question for Jordanians remains: Is all of this still on track?
The first reshuffle of Prime Minister Jaafar Hassan’s government was far from dramatic—neither in the number of ministerial posts affected nor in the immediate political implications it carried. On the surface, it appeared more like a “limited administrative adjustment” aimed at fine-tuning certain economic tracks, technocratic in nature and lacking political weight. Yet, as is often the case in Jordanian politics, what remains unsaid or unannounced can be far more significant than what is declared in official letters of designation or government statements.
The most striking paradox—and perhaps the one that best reflects the essence of this moment—lies not in who left the government, but in who stayed. Many within Jordan’s political elite had expected the reshuffle to include the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ayman Safadi, given the volume of speculation, leaks, and analyses in the days leading up to the announcement. Before asking why Safadi remained, however, it may be more accurate to first ask: why did so many expect him to be removed?
The answer lies in the presence of a “prevailing” view among certain influential political circles in Jordan that Safadi—since the start of the war on Gaza—has led Jordanian diplomacy into what they see as a costly “adventure,” especially within a highly complex regional and international context. Rather than steering foreign policy toward realism and strategic restraint in a fragile Arab environment—compounded by uneasy ties with Washington and a decline in the Arab world’s regional weight—Safadi, according to this view, openly confronted Israel, placing Jordan in a weaker position in the eyes of the Trump administration.
Proponents of this perspective point to the cooling of Jordan-U.S. relations in recent months, particularly Jordan’s absence from visits by U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Steven Witkoff, the lukewarm rapport with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and the diminished ability of Amman to influence U.S. decision-making on the Palestinian file—something it had long been a leading and most trusted mediator in.
From this angle, Safadi’s continued presence is seen as an overlooking of the erosion in diplomatic influence and as a sign that Jordan is persisting on a potentially costly and risky path at a time when it needs strategic repositioning and precise calculations, not open confrontations with major regional and international actors.
On the other hand, keeping Safadi in place signals that he is not acting independently but rather executing a clearly defined higher vision. His political and diplomatic rhetoric—including at times sharp tones toward Israel and sustained, high-profile diplomatic escalation against the Netanyahu government—is not a personal choice, but state policy. Here lies the stronger message: Jordan’s stance on the Palestinian issue, the war on Gaza, and the Israeli project is not merely reactive or circumstantial, but stems from a deep understanding of Jordan’s strategic interests, shaped directly by His Majesty King Abdullah himself, who has drawn the boundaries within which Safadi’s actions and statements operate.
The reshuffle, therefore, carried silent yet profound political messages. Chief among them is that Jordan’s positions on the Palestinian file and its relationship with Netanyahu are not tactical moves, nor aimed at absorbing domestic anger over Gaza—as some Israeli media narratives have tried to suggest—but rather represent a firm position rooted in an acute awareness of the dangers posed by the Israeli far-right project, not only to the Palestinian cause and the prospects for peace, but also to regional security and Jordan’s own national security.
A second implication lies in what the reshuffle chose to leave untouched. It focused narrowly on economic and service portfolios, steering clear of any political content in domestic affairs. This in itself is politically telling—especially in light of the major political modernization project launched by the King nearly four years ago, which marked a significant legislative shift in party and election laws and in the state’s approach to political and partisan engagement. The current political thinness of the government raises serious questions about the future of this modernization process and the decision-making circle’s intentions regarding the next phase of the political experiment: the relationship with political opposition, the fate of the Islamic Action Front, the next stage of local administration reforms, and the anticipated amendments to the electoral law aimed at expanding the scope of party-based political life.
And perhaps the million-dollar question for Jordanians remains: Is all of this still on track?
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