Hasan Dajah

The relationship between Jordan and Syria transcends mere geographical proximity; it is a deep-rooted human, economic, and social connection. This bond is exemplified by Jordan’s historical hosting of approximately 1.3 million Syrians-including both long-term residents and refugees-to whom it has provided healthcare and educational services, despite limited resources and a scarcity of international support.

This assistance has also included the deployment of Jordanian Civil Defense teams to help extinguish major fires, as well as the dispatch of over 186 relief trucks in the wake of the devastating earthquake. The stability of Syria is a strategic interest for Jordan, just as Jordan serves as a pillar for Syria’s recovery. Consequently, Jordan requires a Syrian state capable of securing its own borders, while Syria needs an active partnership with Jordan-one that supports its recovery, reconstruction, and reintegration into the Arab fold-thereby transforming humanitarian solidarity into sustainable strategic cooperation that bolsters security and peace.

Throughout the years of the Syrian crisis, Jordan has shouldered significant humanitarian, economic, and security burdens. Its society opened its doors to host and support those in need, despite constrained resources and the resulting strain on public services and employment opportunities. This response was not merely a temporary measure to address a refugee crisis; rather, it reflected a profound recognition that the Syrian people are an integral part of the region’s human fabric, and that abandoning them in their moment of distress would run counter to the fundamental responsibilities inherent in being a neighbor. However, solidarity-no matter how broad-does not negate a state’s right to protect its citizens, nor does it transform its borders into an open space where its security and stability can be drained.

The danger in southern Syria lies in the fact that the fragility of institutional control may allow for an overlap between armed groups, smuggling networks, local interests, and illicit economies. These actors do not necessarily require a shared ideology or a unified command to engage in mutually beneficial exchanges; funding, weaponry, or transit routes may bring them together. Consequently, drawing a rigid distinction between terrorism and organized crime can obscure the true nature of the threat-especially when the proceeds from smuggling become a source of funding for violence, or when networks used for transport and concealment serve as infrastructure for various groups with disparate agendas.

It is also essential to distinguish between the Syrian authorities’ inability to exert control over certain areas and a lack of political will to do so. The former necessitates institutional support, intelligence cooperation, and capacity building, whereas the latter requires explicit political engagement and a clear delineation of responsibilities. These two scenarios may intersect during a transitional phase, characterized by a multiplicity of power centers and varying degrees of state authority to enforce its decisions. Most concerning—and infuriating-is that some of these groups have collaborated with Israel in activities aimed at destabilizing Jordan.

Conversely, Jordan cannot indefinitely defer its own security while waiting for its neighbor to complete the process of building its institutions. A state is accountable to its own citizens for preventing threats, not merely for managing the consequences once they have materialized. However, the effectiveness of any security action is not measured solely by its immediate force, but by its capacity to diminish threats and prevent their resurgence, all while protecting civilians and avoiding an escalation of tensions. Security imperatives do not exempt a decision from the need to account for its political and humanitarian consequences; rather, such considerations are integral to its success and sustainability.

This highlights the importance of integrating deterrence and cooperation into a single, coherent policy. Deterrence makes it clear that Jordan’s borders are not a testing ground for the state’s threshold of endurance, while cooperation paves the way for addressing the root sources of threats before they reach the border. Relying on only one of these approaches creates a strategic gap: force alone may merely prompt networks to shift their locations or tactics, while coordination without implementation risks becoming nothing more than an exchange of messages. What is required is the transformation of political understanding into an operational framework equipped with mechanisms for monitoring, accountability, and rapid response.

Such a framework can be built through permanent security communication channels, systematic information sharing, and clear mechanisms for verifying reports and tracking suspected individuals or networks. Furthermore, there should be an agreement on procedures to prevent misunderstandings during border incidents, as well as criteria for assessing progress-distinct from mere public statements. Trust between states is not built on pleasantries alone; it accumulates when institutions honor their commitments, with results manifested in reduced risks and an enhanced capacity for both sides to protect their populations and secure border crossings.

Moreover, any comprehensive approach must also incorporate economic and social dimensions. Areas with limited livelihood opportunities are more susceptible to being co-opted by smuggling networks, armed groups, and extremist organizations. Consequently, revitalizing legitimate trade, facilitating the movement of goods under clear regulations, and supporting employment in border communities can diminish the incentives that fuel criminal economies. These measures are not substitutes for security actions; rather, they are conditions that help consolidate the outcomes of such actions. A stable border requires a population that perceives its own interests as aligned with the rule of law and legitimate exchange, rather than with the persistence of chaos.

Media discourse, for its part, bears the responsibility of shielding the relationship between the two peoples from incitement and sweeping generalizations. Confronting an armed group does not equate to hostility toward the Syrian people, and criticizing security shortcomings should not entail disregarding the suffering in Syria or the complexities of its recovery. Likewise, respect for sovereignty must be coupled with the responsibility to ensure that one’s territory is not used to harm neighbors. Any disagreement regarding security measures should be addressed through facts and institutional channels, rather than by turning public anxieties into fuel for mutual mobilization.

It is in Jordan’s strategic interest for Syria to become a partner capable of preventing threats, and for the border to transform from a source of concern into a space for engagement and development. Therefore, the most constructive message to Damascus is one that combines candor with a readiness to provide support: Jordan’s security is an unwavering priority, Syria’s stability is a shared interest, and genuine solidarity is only realized when it translates into mutual responsibility and concrete action. States cannot choose their neighbors, but they can choose how to manage the relationship-by allowing suspicions and crises to accumulate, or by building a partnership, that safeguards people, borders, and the future.


The writer is professor of strategic studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University