Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

The region is entering a sensitive phase and the coming weeks may prove more consequential than they appear today. The confrontation is no longer moving solely towards a conventional military conflict, it is also reshaping the tools through which the conflict is being fought. Washington continues to tighten pressure on Iran, Israel remains active on multiple fronts, while Tehran is looking for space to return to negotiations without entering them already forced to surrender its core positions.

The timing is particularly sensitive with Israel's October 27 election approaching, adding a political dimension to the security calculations, without reducing military decisions to electoral considerations. At the same time, Iran is attempting to use diplomacy to absorb some of the pressure. Yet, the gap between the two sides remains wide. Tehran wants its own conditions to become the starting point for negotiations, while Washington is seeking clear and implementable Iranian concessions.

Iran's current approach therefore appears to combine limited concessions with calibrated escalation. Discussion about the possible return of IAEA inspectors to nuclear sites that were struck can be interpreted as a negotiating signal, but it does not necessarily mean that Tehran has accepted a comprehensive settlement over its nuclear programme, particularly as the issue of access to damaged sites remains disputed.

At the same time, Iran retains other instruments, from the Strait of Hormuz to indirect forms of pressure, to demonstrate that maintaining pressure on Tehran can carry a regional cost. But the more important question is: what tools does Iran still have at its disposal?

Over the past years, Tehran built much of its regional influence around a network of allies and fronts. Today, that network appears less capable of providing the strategic depth it once offered. Hizbollah's diminished role, the transformation of Syria's position, and changes in the Iraqi environment have all narrowed Iran's room for manoeuvre. Under these circumstances, a direct military confrontation with the United States would be extremely costly for Tehran.

This is where the equation begins to shift from conventional deterrence to indirect deterrence. Iran does not necessarily need military superiority to raise the cost of pressure against it. It needs the ability to create security, political or economic disruption through unconventional operations, the activation of local networks, or targeted actions that preserve a degree of deniability.

The advantage of this form of confrontation is that it allows Tehran to generate an impact disproportionate to its direct military capabilities, while maintaining room to manoeuvre and avoiding giving its adversaries an obvious justification for moving immediately towards a wider war.

This is why recent security incidents deserve attention, including the Flydubai incident. There is, however, no established evidence at this stage proving a direct Iranian connection to the incident. Its significance lies instead in the wider security environment, where unconventional threats are becoming increasingly prominent. Tehran itself has recently warned regional states about the consequences of restricting Iranian aviation, while Iranian officials have referred to non-military options that could be used against airports if restrictions escalate.

The broader point is that ambiguity itself may become part of Iran's deterrence strategy. Operations that are difficult to attribute directly, security messages, pressure on infrastructure and interests, and actions designed to raise the cost for the adversary without immediately crossing the threshold into open war.

The region may therefore be entering a phase somewhere between war and negotiations. This could include economic pressure, security signalling, intelligence operations, the activation of dormant networks, limited escalation and parallel attempts by both sides to improve their position before returning to the negotiating table.

For Washington, the objective is to increase the cost of the crisis for Tehran and push it towards substantive concessions. For Iran, the objective is to use whatever cards remain available to demonstrate that continued pressure will not come without a price, while returning to negotiations from a position that does not require it to surrender all of its leverage from the outset.

The next battle, therefore, may not be about who can deliver the biggest strike, but about who can manage escalation and raise the cost for the other side without triggering a wider war. In this grey zone, intelligence warfare and unconventional operations could become among the most important instruments of the next phase, and could also pave the way for a return to targeted military strikes based on precise intelligence.