Dr. Hamad Kasasbeh

Why do Arab countries bear the cost of global economic stability more than they benefit from it? This question is no longer theoretical. It has become part of a recurring economic reality with every wave of tension in the region. Each time crises escalate, global markets return to one central concern: energy—not just as a commodity, but as a key pillar of global economic stability.

In this context, the Arab region is no longer simply a source of energy. It has become one of the main pillars supporting the balance of global markets. The continuity of supply reflects not only production capacity, but also the region’s ability to manage the risks surrounding this role, providing the global economy with a margin of stability.

This means that Arab countries are not only producers, but also contributors to stabilizing global markets. When markets continue to function without major disruptions, the world benefits directly, while the effects of instability are felt most strongly within the region itself.

At first glance, rising oil prices may appear to generate quick gains for some Arab economies. However, this view is incomplete. Sharp price fluctuations increase uncertainty, raise the cost of economic planning, and negatively affect long-term investment decisions, making such gains far less stable than they seem.

The impact goes beyond visible costs. There is also what can be described as an “invisible loss.” Resources directed toward managing risks could have been invested in productive sectors such as industry and technology. This represents postponed growth opportunities that could have strengthened economic performance over the long term.

Meanwhile, the global economy benefits from this stability without bearing an equivalent share of the burden. Industrialized countries rely on stable energy flows and predictable prices, while the costs associated with maintaining this stability remain largely concentrated in the Arab region, reflecting an imbalance in the distribution of burdens.

This leads to a clear paradox: while countries and corporations pay significant amounts for risk insurance, the Arab region effectively provides a form of “economic insurance” to the global economy—without receiving a proportional economic or political return.

More importantly, this role is not translated into gains that reflect its scale—neither economically nor politically. The issue is not that the Arab region contributes to global stability, but that this contribution is not accounted for as part of its return, making the cost of underutilizing this role greater than the cost of performing it.

This creates a key challenge for policymakers: to rebalance the relationship between international commitments and domestic economic priorities, ensuring that this strategic role directly supports local economic welfare and is transformed from a disproportionate burden into a tangible economic gain. Ultimately, the Arab region does not lack economic influence—it lacks the mechanisms to convert that influence into real power. The question is no longer who stabilizes the market, but how this role can be transformed into a strategic and economic advantage.