Dr. Hamad Kasasbeh

At a time when energy prices are rising, the ongoing war in the Middle East reveals that these gains may not be real for most Arab oil-exporting countries. The current escalation does not only affect the security situation; it also reshapes how the economy functions and limits these countries’ ability to fully benefit from their resources.

With disruptions in maritime routes and rising transportation risks, exporting oil becomes more difficult. As a result, higher prices do not necessarily translate into real revenues. True gains depend on the ability to maintain stable exports in a safe and predictable environment.

The impact of the war goes beyond this and reaches the markets themselves. Some key trade routes may become unsafe or even uninsurable, increasing the cost of trade or disrupting it altogether. As these conditions continue, the crisis shifts from a temporary shock to a factor that influences investment and trade decisions.

Another challenge emerges: the issue is no longer production, but access to markets. Geography, once a source of strength, can turn into a burden during times of crisis, making revenues more dependent on stability than on price levels.

The effects of the war are not limited to exports; they extend to the broader economy. Rising insurance costs and supply chain disruptions gradually weaken economic efficiency. In addition, damage to parts of economic infrastructure adds further pressure, as rebuilding requires time and significant resources.

Under these conditions, higher oil prices may shift from being an advantage to becoming a source of pressure. Costs rise while revenues become less stable, showing that economic strength is not defined by resources alone, but by the ability to manage them during crises.

Even if the war ends, Gulf economies are likely to face a difficult phase. Oil prices may decline while spending needs increase due to reconstruction and restoring market confidence. This creates a situation of lower revenues and higher expenditures.

In response, Gulf countries may redirect investments toward domestic markets or more stable regions, focusing on projects with steady returns. They may also rely more on internal capabilities rather than external protection.

These developments also negatively affect non-oil Arab countries due to their strong economic ties with oil-producing states, especially in labor and investment. Any slowdown in Gulf economies may lead to fewer job opportunities, lower remittances, and reduced investments. In response, these countries need to strengthen their economies, improve their business environments, and enhance their ability to attract investment and participate in regional economic activities.

In conclusion, this war should serve as an important lesson for the Arab world. Facing challenges individually is no longer effective, and Arab economic integration is no longer an option that can be delayed—it is a necessity. Strengthening cooperation and relying on internal capabilities are essential steps toward building a more resilient and stable Arab economy.