Hasan Dajah

In the context of the rapid political developments on the Palestinian scene, the initiatives and plans of the US administration led by Trump regarding Gaza, compared to the international conference under French and Saudi sponsorship on the two-state solution, appear to have significant points of convergence and divergence. Furthermore, the absence of US support for this conference, and the repercussions of the Sharm el-Sheikh conference, raise profound questions about the balance of influence and the international role in the Palestinian issue.

First, in terms of its broader objectives, the Trump initiative differs radically from the French-Saudi plan in their vision for the future of the Palestinian issue. The Trump plan did not include a reference to the two-state solution or recognition of an independent Palestinian state. Rather, it focused on security and political arrangements aimed at ending the conflict through field measures, such as a ceasefire, prisoner releases, a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from certain areas, and the formation of a transitional government in Gaza under international supervision, with security guarantees for Israel and a direct US role in managing the process.

In contrast, the international conference, sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, made the two-state solution the core of its vision, affirming the Palestinians' right to an independent, sovereign state and calling on the international community to recognize it, support its institutions, and empower them to confront political and security challenges. From this, it becomes clear that the fundamental difference between the two sides lies not only in the means, but also in the goal itself: while the Trump plan seeks to "manage the conflict" according to security conditions, the French-Saudi initiative aims to "resolve the conflict" through the establishment of an internationally recognized Palestinian state.

However, the differences lie in the method, implementation, privileges, and guarantees. The Trump plan is characterized by a significant mandate for American power and a direct role, especially in Gaza. Trump previously proposed that the United States would manage the situation in the Strip through an international committee during a transitional period, with massive reconstruction, international security coordination, and subsequent decentralization of the Strip into the Palestinian state.

This aspect gives the plan a harsh executive character, with significant interference in sovereignty, which sparked Arab objections throughout 2025. In contrast, the French-Saudi conference adopts a more consultative and less externally imposed language, focusing on states' commitment to supporting Palestinian institutions and recognizing the State of Palestine as the legitimate basis for a two-state solution. It also calls for an international role through the United Nations, without specifying a single state with an absolute executive role.

Furthermore, the Trump plan requires movements like Hamas to disarm and hand over control to the Palestinian Authority, a strict implementation condition. The French-Saudi conference, meanwhile, calls for activating the Palestinian Authority, reforming its institutions, and empowering them, but does not offer a detailed plan for this, leaving the matter to negotiations and international support.

Second, from the perspective of legitimacy and international influence, the Trump initiative tends to capitalize on Washington's influence and the limits of its engagement with Israel to present his vision as a viable alternative. However, this exposes the plan to Arab and regional opposition if it appears to perpetuate American or Israeli supremacy at the expense of Palestinian rights. The international conference, sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, attempts to provide an "international space" framework in which Arab and Western states participate, utilizing UN mechanisms to amplify legitimacy. This may grant it broader acceptance in international forums, but with limited actual implementation capacity.

The question of the lack of American support for the international conference has several dimensions. First, the US administration does not want to appear bound by international initiatives that might conflict with Trump's plans or Israel's expectations. Washington also prefers to put forward its own initiatives and not be subject to the dominance of a parallel international axis. Second, the United States often views such conferences as undermining American legitimacy or as potentially serving as a platform for criticism of Israel, and therefore prefers to abstain or refrain from participating. Third, in the case of a two-state conference, there is a possibility that its terms and recommendations may include decisions or commitments that contradict American or Israeli positions, which would cause the United States to refuse to engage or provide direct support. Indeed, when the two-state conference was held in July 2025 under French-Saudi sponsorship, Washington announced that it would not participate and even warned countries against unilateral decisions that could harm the strategic balance in the region.

As for the Sharm el-Sheikh conference, it ostensibly represents an international platform for fostering comprehensive reconciliation after the Gaza conflict and includes major powers. However, from the perspective of the Palestinian issue, it may be perceived as marginalizing the French or other non-American international role, if it is viewed as a forum that gives a central role to certain parties (such as the United States, Egypt, or Arab countries dependent on the United States).

However, there are no strong indications that the goal was to exclude France from the Palestinian issue: France participated in the Sharm el-Sheikh conference alongside other countries and is part of the international initiative supporting the Trump plan and the ideas of the French-Saudi conference. However, politically, emphasizing a summit led by Washington and Egypt may be seen as diminishing the weight of initiatives proposing multilateral and multilateral international frameworks, which could intensify diplomatic competition among the actors for leadership of the Palestinian issue.

Thus, the fundamental difference between the two sides lies in the same basic goal, before the implementation of mechanisms and external mandate. The Trump plan did not include the establishment or recognition of an independent Palestinian state. Rather, it focused on security and administrative arrangements that ensure calm and expand American and Israeli influence in Gaza, with promises of conditional reconstruction and direct oversight of the Strip. In contrast, the French-Saudi initiative seeks to consolidate the two-state solution as the sole legitimate framework and works to build international consensus and support Palestinian state institutions politically and economically.

Hence, the profound divergence between an American vision focused on field control and de facto arrangements, and a French-Saudi vision that relies on international legitimacy and negotiations, becomes apparent. Washington's refusal to support the two-state conference reflects its adherence to the sole leadership role in the solution and its reluctance to commit to decisions that might limit its influence or anger Israel. As for the Sharm el-Sheikh conference, although it may appear to be a repositioning of the influential forces in the Palestinian issue, it does not constitute a direct exclusion of France as much as it expresses a clear competition over who holds the initiative in the peace process and determines its future course.