Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

The Yemeni front has once again become the stage of a significant Israeli escalation. After the continued targeting of Tel Aviv by missiles launched from Yemen, including the qualitative use of a cluster missile against Israel, Tel Aviv has shifted to conducting focused operations against Houthi leaders. This development indicates the availability of intelligence and operational capacities inside Yemen that were previously absent, suggesting that Israel’s campaign is no longer confined to rocket fire and aerial strikes but has expanded to intelligence penetration and field information-gathering. This in turn has required broader operations in the Red Sea and a noticeable Israeli naval presence, which may well be part of this process of infiltration, targeting, and follow-up inside Yemeni territory.

In Syria, Israel continues to send clear messages that Syrian skies and territory remain an open operational theater whenever it deems necessary. The recent military landings on the outskirts of Damascus, direct strikes against weapons depots, and arrests in the south all underscore that political talks or Syrian promises will not deter Israel from treating Syria as an active battlefield. On the political level, the decision to postpone elections in three provinces has only deepened the already complex crisis with two core components of Syria’s fabric: Sweida and Hasaka. This decision adds pressure on the Syrian government and strengthens the resolve of other actors to pursue alternative political formulas aligned with their visions for a “new Syria.”

In this context, these forces will seek to capitalize on their exclusion from voting. The Autonomous Administration in the northeast, for example, is unlikely to miss the opportunity to leverage the current situation, especially if it secures American guarantees toward adopting an “Iraqi model”—a parallel institutional representation that would provide it with negotiating leverage in future reconciliation talks. These mounting challenges may place the Syrian government under increasing strain in the coming months, particularly if local confrontations escalate—from Sweida to the northeast—which would deepen the regime’s crisis further and in more dangerous ways.

Meanwhile, the path back to confrontation with Tehran appears to be accelerating. From the return of European sanctions against Iran to the beginning of moves to criminalize and isolate its policies—as seen recently in Australia, which directly accused Iran of threatening national security—an emerging trajectory is taking shape that practically legitimizes direct targeting of Tehran, in line with Israel’s objectives. Tel Aviv is visibly preparing for such a confrontation by working to eliminate remaining threats across the region: from Gaza to the West Bank, from Lebanon to Syria, with a qualitative shift in targeting the Houthis in Yemen, alongside close monitoring of the Iraqi scene, where signals suggest it may soon be drawn into the wave of pre-emptive strikes preceding a confrontation with Iran. This was evident in the recent evacuation of some U.S. military bases in Iraq.

Over the past two years, Israel has worked systematically to contain the danger of militias and Iranian-aligned organizations, transforming them from forces capable of waging regional wars or posing major security threats to Israel into local armed groups that increasingly burden their own societies—whether Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. This trajectory effectively strips Iran of any meaningful capacity to directly threaten Israel or export its security crises beyond its borders. As a result, the likelihood of Israel resuming its long-delayed confrontation with Tehran has grown significantly.

At the same time, Israel’s efforts to neutralize threats coincide with the deepening of Iran’s crises on multiple levels. Politically, through renewed European sanctions and mounting international isolation. In security terms, through ongoing strikes inside Iran, cross-border terrorism, and mysterious operations. And domestically, through worsening economic and service conditions that threaten internal unrest. All this unfolds in parallel with Israel’s unmistakable preparations—not only through neutralizing regional risks but also via continuous reinforcement of its defensive systems and military arsenal—signalling that the prospect of a renewed confrontation with Tehran is no longer a distant scenario.